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A quick internet search reveals that the term geopolitics is hardly ever  associated 
with the term knowledge-based economy. Journalists, debaters and politicians 
do not make such a link in their articulations and the textbooks of geopoli-
tics, political geography, economic geography and urban studies are equally 
silent on the issue (see, however, Salter 2009). Yet, the air is full of popular 
and scholarly argumentation concerning how we are currently living in an era 
marked by the prominence of knowledge in all societal, economic and cul-
tural developments, as well as pronouncements about the knowledge-intensive 
form of capitalism as an important subtext for inter-state relations and inter-
spatial competition. Hence, it seems it is high time to begin pondering what 
the interconnections between the knowledge-based economy and geopolitics 
look like. The purpose of my inquiry is analytical and conceptual: the goal is 
to raise new questions rather than answering old concerns.
When I began this project I soon realized the ambiguous nature of the 
term knowledge-based economy and some related terms such as knowledge 
economy, information economy, new economy or the like. The fact that the 
knowledge-based economy has become an idée fixe in political debates within 
the past two decades does not give proof of its value as a scholarly concept. 
Indeed, one may argue that the knowledge-based economy is a somewhat 
popular and hollow policy term and that the competition state, neoliberal-
ism, global capitalism, financialization, information capitalism or the like 
would work better in a geopolitical analysis of the contemporary political– 
economic condition.
My solution to this conceptual issue has been to think through the concept 
of knowledge-based economization. I thus shift attention from the economy toward 
processes of economization (see, in particular,  and Callon 2009). The 
concept of knowledge-based economization refers both to the material pro-
cesses of knowledge-intensive capitalism (including subject formation), and 
to the processes whereby this form of capitalism is constructed discursively 
through imageries and objectifying social practices. My central claim is that the 
phenomenon of knowledge-based economization includes significant geopo-
litical dimensions that can be exposed through an act of conceptualization and 
with the help of different research materials ranging from expert interviews to 




Geopolitics is almost invariably conjoined with the notion of territorial 
control of natural resources and territorial expansion as states vie for power 
and seek to exert influence on other states. Accordingly, geopolitics typically 
focuses on international power relations and power plays based on military 
influence within a set geographical area. Indeed, the very concept of geopoli-
tics is often associated with a dangerous militaristic form of political reasoning 
which may lead to all manner of violent events. Stefano Guzzini (2014), for 
instance, proclaims that the effect of a geopolitical world view is a fundamental 
militarization of states’ foreign policies.
In an orthodox view, geopolitics is treated as a synonym for politics of 
territorial force (and spheres of influence) and in particular for states as pri-
mary users of such “hard force” (see, e.g. Mead 2014, 69). More often than 
not, geopolitics is still understood to denote drawing state borders, build-
ing nations as definite territories, constructing domestic social order through 
spatial techniques of coercion and consent, controlling territorial spaces 
through new military technologies within and beyond a given state, as well 
as geographical and historical justifications of territorial claims (Moisio 2013). 
The concept of geopolitics is therefore almost without exception associated 
with the idea of the purportedly territorially consolidated twentieth-century 
European state and the wider system of military strategy and power which 
still characterizes the powerful imaginary of the “Westphalian” inter-state 
system. As a persistent form of reasoning, the classical geopolitical perspec-
tive discloses some of the key political characteristics of the “industrial era” 
of the nineteenth and twentieth century: command of territory and natural 
resources were understood as pivotal dimensions of inter-state rivalry and as 
fundamental constituents of territories of wealth, power, status, security and 
belonging (cf. Maier 2016).
Today, variants of classical geopolitics persist in the ways in which poli-
ticians, foreign and security policy experts, military strategists, scholars and 
the general public make sense of international affairs. However, it is similarly 
stressed that inter-state competition over territories belongs to the past, and 
that “democratic governments” operate through a qualitatively entirely new 
set of state strategies. Geoff Mulgan (2009, 2), the former director of policy 
under the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, states how
Past states wanted to grow their territory, crops, gold, and armies. Today 
the most valuable things which democratic governments want to grow are 
intangible: like trust, happiness, knowledge, capabilities, norms, or confi-
dent institutions. These grow in very different ways to agriculture or war-
fare. Trust creates trust, whether in markets or civil societies. Knowledge 
breeds new knowledge. And confident institutions achieve the growth 
and societal success that in turn strengthens the confidence of institutions. 
Much of modern strategy is about setting these virtuous circles in motion, 
whether through investments or programmes or by creating the right laws, 
regulations and institutions.
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This narrative on the shift from tangible to intangible “things” discloses a 
great deal of the key aspects of the transformation from natural resource-based 
national economies toward the so-called knowledge-based economies. The 
book at hand is an attempt to conceptualize the geopolitical in the latter con-
text. I argue that knowledge-based economization emerged gradually from the 
1980s onwards as a result of the turbulent era in world economy and politics 
(which began already in the early 1970s; for this crisis, see Hobsbawm 1996), 
and took an increasingly geopolitical form in the 1990s.
Towards a political geography of economic geographies
Developing a geopolitical perspective on the knowledge-based economy 
requires adopting a theoretically sophisticated notion of geopolitics which tran-
scends its pervasive orthodox connotations. Since the late 1980s, critical schol-
ars began to broaden the narrow understanding of classical geopolitics. John 
Agnew and Stuart Corbridge (1995, 211), to name but one example, referred 
to a geopolitical struggle which they conceptualized as an effort “by dominant 
states and their ruling social strata to master space – to control territories and/or 
the interactional flows through which modern terrestrial spaces are produced”. 
In such a view, geopolitics is about mastering both territorial and relational 
spaces and producing spatial orders through discourses and practices.
Notwithstanding the significant conceptual developments in the field of 
critical geopolitics over the past 30 years, it is not uncommon today to see the 
narrow territorial definition of geopolitics in scholarly literature – to say noth-
ing of public discourse. To illustrate, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and 
the political developments in eastern Ukraine in 2014 were rapidly scripted in 
terms of geopolitics. Politicians, commentators, journalists, civil servants and 
scholars in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) world and beyond were quick to classify the conflict as geopoliti-
cal. But in so doing, they also tended to place the term geopolitics in the past. 
While the crisis itself was interpreted in terms of twentieth-century geopolitics, 
this form of political action was nonetheless understood as entirely anachronis-
tic. It was argued that some states such as China, Iran and Russia (as opposed to 
the US and the EU) had never given up practicing hard territorial power and 
were now making “forceful attempts” to overturn the “geopolitical settlement 
that followed the Cold War”, as Mead (2014, 70) put it in Foreign Affairs. Mead 
continues revealingly how
So far, the year 2014 has been a tumultuous one, as geopolitical rival-
ries have stormed back to center stage. Whether it is Russian forces seiz-
ing Crimea, China making aggressive claims in its coastal waters, Japan 
responding with an increasingly assertive strategy of its own, or Iran trying 
to use its alliances with Syria and Hezbollah to dominate the Middle East, 
old-fashioned power plays are back in international relations. The United 
States and the EU, at least, find such trends disturbing. Both would rather 
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move past geopolitical questions of territory and military power and focus 
instead on ones of world order and global governance.
(Mead 2014, 69–70)
This quote is exemplary, not exceptional, of a logic according to which 
“ geopolitical competition” and “liberal world order” are opposite develop-
ments. In such a temporal articulation, whereas the twentieth century was 
characterized by the “dark geopolitics” of inter-state rivalry and “territorial-
ized” friend–foe relations, the contemporary era is experienced in Europe and 
the US as if it were marked by a relative inapplicability of state territory with 
respect to territorial conflicts and inter-state competition. This fact notwith-
standing, it has been remarkably rare to discuss the concept of the geopolitical 
in the context of those political imaginaries that frame the world in terms of 
economic expansion, connectivity and pace or global integration and connec-
tivity (cf. Sparke 2007). And yet, these imaginaries have become increasingly 
salient in state-centric political debates on national interests, national security, 
national identity and foreign policy. In such a perspective, the world is increas-
ingly becoming a network consisting of urban hubs, wider “network-regions” 
and what Ong (2006) calls economic zones in which surplus value is formed 
and which are pivotal in controlling the movement of money, information, 
talent and innovative human behavior. This perspective, therefore, effec-
tively reveals the geopolitics of relational spaces that partly, but definitely not 
entirely, characterizes the early twenty-first century and which is the topic of 
this treatise (Figure 1.1).
In public policy and mainstream academic spatial planning discourse, the 
nodes and hubs of the global networks through which the “global flows” 
are being actively re-territorialized have been, particularly since the 1990s, 
Figure 1.1  Simplified visualizations of the parallel worlds of the contemporary geopolitical 
condition.
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understood as cities, city-regions and urban spaces and related micro-spaces 
which together contribute to the building of “global cities”, “smart cities”, 
“creative cities” or “happy cities”. The development of these new spaces 
would not only significantly contribute to capital accumulation in the future 
but also render obsolete “geopolitics” such as the military control of vast terri-
torial spaces and strategic locations. Accordingly, the preceding state-centered 
era epitomized by the term geopolitics has been replaced by the notion of 
the international competitiveness of the state based on generating competitive 
advantages (of nations) through different kinds of spatial formations as well as 
through new kinds of citizen subjectivities.
Examples of this kind of geopolitical logic are not difficult to find. Indeed, 
a sort of global knowledge-production industry dealing with the novelty of 
the relational global political order has emerged concomitantly with the 
so-called knowledge-based economy. Khanna (2016a) writes in The New 
York Times how the US is actually reorganizing itself around “regional 
infrastructure lines” and “metropolitan clusters that ignore state and even 
national borders”, and that the problem is that a political system which still 
conceives of the US through its fifty member states “hasn’t caught up”. 
Arguing against such a territorial view, Khanna (2016a) goes on to say that 
these fifty states “aren’t about to go away, but economically and socially, 
the country is drifting toward looser metropolitan and regional formations, 
anchored by the great cities and urban archipelagos that already lead global 
economic circuits”. This serves as the rationale for Khanna (2016a) to make 
a normative policy recommendation. The author suggests that rather than 
channeling investments into “disconnected backwaters”, the US federal 
government should focus on helping the “urban archipelagos” or “super-
regions” to prosper.
It is interesting that this kind of geopolitical narrative, whereby particular 
infrastructural and economic connections are viewed as superseding traditional 
state-centered geopolitical markers, has become increasingly popular since the 
1990s (see, e.g. Ohmae 1993). Indeed, Khanna’s (2016b) Connectography is 
just one among the many attempts to tell a story about the ways in which the 
future is being shaped less by states/nations than by connectivities of hubs and 
flows in the age of knowledge-intensive capitalism. Accordingly, connectivity 
becomes a crucial resource in the emerging “global network civilization” in 
which “mega-cities compete over connectivity” and in which state borders are 
increasingly irrelevant. It is a de-territorialized world marked by conflict over 
internet cables, advanced technologies and market access; a new world where 
novel energy solutions and innovations more generally eliminate the need for 
resource wars:
The 21st century will not be a competition over territory, but over con-
nectivity – and only connecting American cities will enable the United 
States to win the tug of war over global trade volumes, investment flows 
and supply chains. More than America’s military grand strategy, such an 
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economic master plan would determine if America remained the world’s 
leading superpower.
(Khanna 2016a)
This view of the world goes to the heart of what in the book at hand is conceptu-
alized as the geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy. From the perspective 
of “connectography”, national interest is today defined differently than in the 
past, both socially and spatially. It is a new world in which the state is not only 
challenged, for instance, by global cities, global city-regions and megaregions 
(for a discussion of these, see Harrison and Hoyler 2015; Moisio and Jonas 2017), 
but also re-constructed through these spaces. It is a world in which large cities 
and urban agglomerations are conceived as crucial sites of a new type of global 
governance. So pervasive has the hub-centered imaginary grown that scholars are 
increasingly comprehending the new social organization of the world as indica-
tive of a geopolitical shift from sovereign territorial states to relational city net-
works (Jonas and Moisio 2016). Peter Taylor (2011, 201) states revealingly how
The prime governance instrument of the modern world-system has been 
the inter-state system based upon mutually recognized sovereignties of 
territorial polities. It is possible that we are just beginning to experience an 
erosion of territorial sovereignties and their replacement by new mutuali-
ties expressed through city networks. This is what the rise of globalization 
as a contemporary, dominant ‘key word’ might be heralding.
These processes may already be under way. But the preceding articulation 
is also a form of productive power: it reveals some of the dominant ways 
in which political agents in the OECD sphere in particular comprehend the 
transformation of global political conditions in the age of globalization. These 
agents also act upon such a comprehension. In other words, the “connectogra-
phy” view of the world is in essence a geopolitical one, and it plays an increas-
ingly important role in the context of contemporary strategies and ideas of state 
territorial restructuring.
I will argue that the hub and flow imaginary is at the heart of contemporary 
geopolitics. The link between these imaginaries, knowledge-based economi-
zation and the restructuration of the state is however rarely debated. This is 
the case because the geopolitical is often seen to be separate from the issue of 
regional development and policy, and because the distinction between geoeco-
nomics and geopolitics is still pervasive. Furthermore, the economic geograph-
ical literature since the 1990s has more or less naturalized the relational view 
that the shift toward a knowledge-based economy implies that the capability 
of regions and their nodal cities to support learning and innovation is a key 
source of competitive advantage of the state or nation (for a useful discussion, 
see MacKinnon, Cumbers and Chapman 2002).
The economic geographical understanding of the hub and flow nature of 
the contemporary world has played a tremendously productive role in the 
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political–economic developments that have taken place during the past three 
decades. This understanding is driven in particular by the needs of the purport-
edly knowledge-driven and conceivably global (understood often as existing 
above the nation state) economy. This is also disclosed by the fact that new 
urban formations and associated social experiments have been given a promi-
nent place in the political and policy agendas in the OECD states and beyond 
during the past decades.
One of the key claims of this book is that the contemporary geopolitical 
condition is characterized by two processes and related imaginaries. The first 
is centered on issues of territorial power and the associated purportedly old-
fashioned territorial power plays which take their motivation from military 
strategy, natural resources and territorially rooted identity politics. The sec-
ond is structured around “hub and flow imaginaries” concerned with the state 
and world that seem to make state territory and military conquest increasingly 
obsolete. This process and related imaginary touch less on natural resources and 
military calculation and conquest but also contain a significant amount of ter-
ritorial politics: it can be understood as a historically contingent process to pro-
duce territories of wealth, security, power and belonging. More importantly, 
the twin processes of the contemporary geopolitical condition are not mutually 
exclusive but take place simultaneously and may be entangled – generating 
various context-specific spatial formations, as well as tensions and contradic-
tions. In other words, territorial competition and the purportedly liberal world 
of knowledge-intensive capitalism are not mutually exclusive but rather paral-
lel developments that co-constitute the contemporary geopolitical condition. 
In sum, it is analytically untenable to conflate the ongoing territorial power 
plays solely with the ostensibly geopolitical world of the twentieth century, but 
it is equally problematic to comprehend the contemporary processes associ-
ated with hubs and flows as signaling some sort of post-geopolitical “geoeco-
nomic” condition. Questioning the teleological explanation of the progression 
toward the post-geopolitical geoeconomic condition is the first prerequisite 
for analyzing the geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy in general and 
knowledge-based economization in particular (Sellar et al. 2017).
This book seeks to geopoliticize the purportedly geoeconomic present, par-
ticularly as it unfolds in the strategies of knowledge-intensive capitalism and 
associated societal developments. The goal is therefore to conceptualize the 
geopolitical in a manner that highlights the entanglement of the economic and 
the political. I go on to argue that one of the critical challenges of contempo-
rary critical urban and regional studies is to conceptualize the focal geopolitical 
constituents of the ongoing knowledge-based economization, since it is argu-
ably this facet of the contemporary geopolitical condition which furnishes the 
very rationale for many of the key contemporary processes and reforms of 
foreign policy, as well as regional and urban development and planning.
My approach is characterized by what might be called a method of con-
stant observation. The analysis in the chapters which follow is informed by 
actively experiencing and observing the rapid emergence of the discourses, 
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practices, subjects and various material dimensions of the knowledge-based 
economy in the Finnish and in a wider European context for almost two dec-
ades. There is arguably much relevance in the Finnish context with respect to 
the wider geopolitical theorization of knowledge-based economization. First, 
it represents a geographical “site” where the governments since the 1990s have 
operated on the basis of a view that intangible assets and related innovation 
capital are the primary drivers of economic growth and national success (see, 
e.g. Ståhle 2016). So pervasive has the idea of an innovation-led growth been 
in the Finnish context that it is today a commonplace to argue that Finland 
has gone through agrarian and industrial stages and is now witnessing a stage 
of development which is characterized by a society of services, knowledge 
and experiences.
Second, Finland has been, for quite some time already, internationally 
acknowledged as an exemplary “information society”, combining aspects of 
the neo-corporatist welfare state and knowledge intensive capitalism. Manuel 
Castells and Pekka Himanen (see, e.g. 2004) have made the “Finnish model” 
popular in their writings which highlight Finland as a sort of political busi-
ness site which is characterized by exceptional rates of innovation. Third, the 
development toward a new society in Finland has been very rapid. Indeed, as 
Mulgan (2009, 2) writes, “Finland began the 1990s with its GDP declining 
by 7 per cent in a single year but ended it as a technological powerhouse”. 
Fourth, it is often retrospectively highlighted that in the Finnish context the 
knowledge-based economy was constructed as a sort of national survival strat-
egy (cf. Castells and Himanen 2004) and that this strategy proved to be very 
successful for a “small state”.
Finally, what makes this context interesting is also that a rapid restructur-
ing of the knowledge-intensive and high-technology dominated economy has 
taken place in Finland since 2007. This process has severely affected numerous 
locales, the national economy and the subjects of knowledge-intensive capital-
ism. As part of this process, the life of skilled labor has become increasingly 
characterized by job insecurity, and many of the Finnish locales have experi-
enced deepening economic and social problems.
But simultaneously with these rather challenging developments caused by 
economic restructuring, a new and a more pervasive form of knowledge-based 
economization has emerged both in Finland and in many other geographi-
cal contexts. Accordingly, Finland is in the process of moving through the 
different stages of knowledge-intensive capitalism. It was first at the stage of 
producing the requisite machines and technologies. Second, it entered a new 
stage which was characterized by earning through the use of information and 
communication technologies. According to the narrative, the entire nation 
state now seeks to enter the third stage in which economic success is based 
on a kind of omnipresent entrepreneurship, digitalization, global orientation 
and the production of ideas which sell. This latest phase is articulated as a new 
start-up culture or start-up economy and the associated capability of the new 
growth-oriented entrepreneurs to commodify digital formats and contents 
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(a kind of copyright economy based on the internet) as successful businesses 
for the success of the nation state. What is interesting in such a narrative on 
the shift of the political community called Finland from technology to content 
is that it gives rise to new city-and metropolis-centered spatial imaginaries 
of the state. Indeed, the start-up phenomenon is more often discussed and 
measured in the context of cities than states (see, e.g. the Startup Cities Index 
by Nestpick).
As there have been many different state developments in history that may 
be subsumed under the heading “Keynesian welfare state”, there are equally 
many “knowledge-based economies”. In order to trace some of the common 
geopolitical constituents of knowledge-intensive capitalism, I do not limit my 
analysis to the Finnish case. I also elaborate a particular type of geopolitical 
knowledge-production by branded international guru scholars and highlight 
the constitutive role of this knowledge-production in the wider process of 
knowledge-based economization. I thus argue that within such knowledge-
production certain seductive concepts and guiding imaginaries have condensed 
together as powerful discursive “instruction sheets” (Blyth 2013) and have 
become powerful manuals that contribute to knowledge-based economization 
in different geographical contexts.
Highlighting the geopolitical in the context of knowledge-based econo-
mization underscores that such an economy is neither apolitical nor a process 
whose final form is predestined. Rather, it can be understood as a geopoliti-
cal structuration which is premised on certain ways of knowing and thinking 
about the way the world works and how the world should work. It is for 
this reason why “knowledge” has three meanings in the context of knowl-
edge-based economization. First, knowledge refers to the role of ideas and 
related innovations in generating value in the production chain. Second, the 
attempts to commodify knowledge are coupled with knowledge-production 
by experts, professionals, academics and institutional actors on the knowledge-
intensive form of capitalism itself. This knowledge-production plays a cru-
cial constitutive role in knowledge-based economization. This is why Jessop 
(2005) connects the knowledge-based economy with what he calls a new 
economic imaginary which has performative and constitutive force. Third, 
knowledge refers to the ceaseless gathering of data on the development and 
performance of political communities as knowledge-based economies. This 
data is constantly employed in policy-making and territorial governance of 
political communities.
The discursive power of the knowledge-based economy is partly based on 
an active but not autonomous agency which tends to reify the imaginaries of 
the envisioned future systems of capital accumulation as if they already existed. 
The knowledge-based economy is hence tremendously future oriented in its 
representational aspects. The ways in which the knowledge-based economy 
is scripted at present as a future-oriented strategic world in which actors need 
to internalize particular types of action or conform to certain types of spatial 
understandings are hence crucial research foci of the book at hand.
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The structure of the book
The present book examines the geopolitical constituents of knowledge-based 
economization in different kinds of social practices and through particular 
ideational elements. It also scrutinizes the subtle ways in which the knowl-
edge-based economy seeks to affect the interior lives of citizens through, for 
instance, higher education.
The book proceeds through eight chapters. Chapter 2 integrates key ideas 
and literature from various fields and offers conceptual clarifications of what 
I call knowledge-based economization. The chapter thus brings together ele-
ments from discursive and material readings of the knowledge-based economy 
and concludes with a consideration of the cultural political economy approach 
(see, in particular, Sum and Jessop 2013), which can be understood as a central 
theoretical foundation of the book at hand. Chapter 3 discusses the relation-
ship between knowledge-based economization and the increasingly transna-
tional state apparatus. Chapter 3 also lays a foundation for comprehending 
the geopolitics of knowledge-based economization through three constitutive 
dimensions: geopolitical discourses, the production of geopolitical objects in 
calculative practices and geopolitical subjects. As such, Chapters 2 and 3 estab-
lish a theoretical and methodological framework for the book.
Chapter 4 begins the analysis of the constitutive role of expert knowledge-
production in knowledge-based economization. It scrutinizes the founding 
geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy through an inter-
rogation of imaginaries of territorial competition, competitiveness and global 
value chains. These discourses profoundly constitute knowledge-based econo-
mization as a major spatial accumulation strategy. In order to accentuate this 
claim, Chapter 4 interrogates Michael Porter’s seminal contributions on the 
ways in which political communities succeed in generating competitive advan-
tages in the age of knowledge-intensive capitalism. One of the goals of the 
chapter is therefore to demonstrate that management knowledge and related 
ideas have not only been disseminated into the realm of politics during the past 
decades, but also that management knowledge and related ideas are in itself 
deeply geopolitical by nature.
Many of the theories of knowledge-intensive capitalism actually argue 
that the transformation from “industrial societies” to “knowledge societies” 
also indicates a shift from particular survival values to more individualistic 
and entrepreneurial values of self-direction (e.g. Inglehart and Wetzel 2010), 
or that developing a society under the knowledge-based economy actually 
requires the emergence of a new type of political subject or human figure (e.g. 
Castells 2005). Chapter 5 scrutinizes geopolitical subjects of the knowledge-
intensive form of capitalism. By using the concept of the geopolitical sub-
ject, I refer to an organized set of human figures, understood to be equipped 
with particular desired skills, behaviors and orientations which can be har-
nessed in the production of territories of wealth, competition, status, power, 
security and belonging in the context of knowledge-intensive capitalism. 
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In the process of knowledge-based economization, the skill problem hence 
appears like a society-wide ‘we’ concern (Jones 2008, 391). The process of 
knowledge-based economization involves re-working people’s conduct, per-
ceptions, actions, motivations, skills and weaknesses vis-à-vis the purported 
requirements of global competition. In Chapter 5, I underline the constitutive 
interplay between knowledge-based economization, subjectivity/subject for-
mation and political space, and thus elaborate the ways in which the “useful” 
citizen-subject is geopolitically positioned in knowledge-based economization. 
I approach the above-mentioned thematic through the well-known academic 
theories of Manuel Castells on the nature of the networked world in the age 
of knowledge-intensive capitalism and concomitant technological advances.
Chapter 6 turns to the geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy in 
higher education, and furthers the analysis of the production of geopolitical 
subjects as a central issue in knowledge-based economization. Higher educa-
tion is here understood as a site in which subjectivities are reshaped through 
participation in a geopolitical assemblage (cf. Dittmer 2014, 495). Institutions 
of higher education are in the post-Fordist economy often considered funda-
mental sites within which human capital and related subjects and subjectivities 
(capitalist laborers) are forged both for the purposes of knowledge-intensive 
capitalism and the state. Indeed, the reshaping of subjectivities vis-à-vis the 
knowledge-intensive form of capitalism is arguably one of the central pro-
cesses of contemporary state spatial transformation. In order to exemplify the 
interplay between geopolitical subjects and the knowledge-based economy, 
Chapter 6 examines the ways in which nationally scaled professional citizens 
have been qualitatively re-inscribed within new spaces of higher education 
in Finland.
The case of Aalto University is analyzed to demonstrate the fundamental 
role of higher education within the knowledge-based economy and its re-
territorialization. Chapter 6 demonstrates how previously nationally scaled 
Finnish universities are in a process of being turned into transnational sites of 
learning – while still paradoxically serving national–territorial interests. The 
chapter thus provides an example of the kind of back-and-forth remaking of 
political spaces and associated subjectivities that characterizes the geopolitics of 
the knowledge-based economy.
Instead of juxtaposing mobility, flow and change of the urban space with the 
purported fixity of the territorial state, Chapter 7 discusses city–state relations 
through some of the highly popular urban theories of the link between creativ-
ity, knowledge and the post-Fordist capitalist era. I first go on to conceptualize 
“city geopolitics” before interrogating Richard Florida’s theory of the creative 
class from a geopolitical perspective. I argue that pervasive ideas such as crea-
tive class or creative city are not objective universal markers of progress but 
rather contribute geopolitically to knowledge-based economization. I analyze 
the ways in which cities and knowledge-based economization come together 
and inquire into the ways in which the theory of the creative class constitutes 
the purportedly knowledge-intensive form of economy geopolitically. This 
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chapter also includes an analysis of the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation’s 
attempt to build a museum in Helsinki, and the peculiarities of this project 
from the perspective of knowledge-based economization. Chapter 7 closes 
with a discussion of the spatial efforts to constitute the EU as a knowledge-
based economy. It builds on the previous work which has examined political 
space making in the EU context from the perspective of governmentality (see, 
e.g. Barry 1993; Moisio and Luukkonen 2015).
The concluding chapter presents a synthesis of the two forms of the geopo-
litical which characterize the contemporary condition: “territorial geopolitics” 
and “geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy”. The final chapter also 
singles out the basic geopolitical dimensions of the knowledge-based econ-
omy. Furthermore, it discusses the relationship between neoliberalization and 
knowledge-based economization, and makes some notes on the limits, possible 
policy failures, tensions, contradictions, crisis tendencies and issues of socio-
spatial equality inherent in knowledge-based economization. This question is 
pertinent given that as “knowledge” has become the key “resource” in efforts 
which seek to secure territorial competitiveness and maximize wealth creation, 
we may be witnessing the rise of a tyranny of a particular type of social relation 
related to the generation and use of knowledge. This tyranny may well emerge 
within the multiform processes of harnessing knowledge and skills (human 
capital in a broad sense), as well as in related practices of education and work 
which serve the needs of the market players.
This chapter acts as a springboard to Chapter 3 which will inquire into the 
 geopolitics of knowledge-based economization. It would be altogether impos-
sible, I believe, to deal with the geopolitics of knowledge-intensive capitalism 
without first delving into the concept of the knowledge-based economy. This 
economy is, as will be shown, not only a capitalist social formation but also an 
inescapably political process which structures socio-spatial practices, related politi-
cal decision-making and different kinds of strategy work across multiple scales and 
sites. This kind of knowledge-based economization structures the ways in which 
political actors perceive what drives economic growth and development, as well 
as overall societal development, and how these actors seek to enhance, regulate 
and govern this “economy” (cf. Leslie and Rantisi 2012, 458). The knowledge-
based economy has thus gradually become a sort of inescapable condition and a 
global social fact. In this capacity, it fundamentally influences policymaking.
The knowledge-based economy can be understood and defined in several 
ways. It is abstract yet concrete, a thing and a process, structured by practices and 
structuring practices, imagined and material, theorized and experienced. It refers to 
knowledge-intensive capitalism which has been debated under many other rubrics 
such as knowledge capitalism, learning economy, new economy, information 
economy, creative economy and knowledge economy (for altogether 57 different 
definitions of the knowledge-based economy, see Carlaw et al. 2006). The goal 
of this chapter is not to find the best definition of the concept of the knowledge-
based economy in the academic literature or to correctly present its development 
path in academic and policy discourse from the 1950s onwards, a task which has 
been undertaken elsewhere (see, e.g. Peters 2009). What seems to be typical of the 
many academic and policy definitions is however that they tend to
highlight the growing relative significance of knowledge compared with 
traditional factors of production – natural resources, physical capital, and 
low-skill labour – in wealth creation and the importance of knowledge 
creation as a source of competitive advantage to all sectors of the econ-
omy, with a special emphasis on R&D, higher education and knowledge- 
intensive industries such as the media and entertainment.
(Peters 2009, 4)
Three readings of the 
knowledge-based economy
From economy to economization
2
The knowledge-based economy The knowledge-based economy
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In this chapter, I seek to build a foundation for the concept of  knowledge-based 
economization. For this purpose, I elucidate the various processes, discourses 
and imaginaries of the knowledge-intensive economy through an inquiry 
into a selective set of literature which either implicitly or explicitly discuss 
the knowledge-based economy as a particular economic and political order. 
I highlight throughout that knowledge-intensive capitalism is constituted, 
through discourses and practices, not only as a particular kind of novel eco-
nomic strategy but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a political process 
with enormous societal and socio-spatial implications. I use the concept of 
knowledge-based economization to refer to this process. As a future-oriented 
political–economic process, knowledge-based economization affects the eve-
ryday lives of people as well as institutional structures within firms, states, cities 
and regions.
Within the following pages, my aim is to tease out some of the basic 
dimensions of knowledge-based economization. In order to make sense of 
the unavoidable complexity, ambiguity and slipperiness of the concept of the 
knowledge-based economy in both scholarly and policy discourses, I address 
three partly overlapping ways to comprehend it as a particular process of econ-
omization. I begin by discussing such an economy as a discursive construct. 
This is then followed by an examination of the knowledge-based economy as 
a material process. Thereafter, I will scrutinize knowledge-intensive capitalism 
from the so-called Cultural Political Economy (CPE) perspective. The latter 
approach brings together the discursive and the material and can be under-
stood as a loose theoretical-methodological frame through which the concept 
of the geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy is developed in subse-
quent chapters.
The knowledge-based economy as a discursive construct
As a process, knowledge-based economization proceeds through the practices 
of knowledge production by multiple actors operating within and through 
different institutional settings. These actors range from individual academics 
to powerful think tanks, business associations and international organizations. 
From this angle, knowledge-based economization can be dated back to the 
early 1990s. This was also a decade when academic scholars not only started 
to associate the term “knowledge economy” with “a new economic era” but 
also began to articulate its fundamental components and statistical features as an 
actually existing economy.
Interpenetration of scholarly concepts and policy discourses
The 1990s was a decade which witnessed the interpenetration of policy dis-
courses and the theoretical discourses of the knowledge-based economy 
(see, e.g. Miettinen 2002). A kind of knowledge-based economy reportage 
began to circulate within a loop of expertise that brought together academics, 
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policymakers and consultants, for instance. This was an important development 
in the emergence of knowledge-based economization as a social and politi-
cal phenomenon: theoretical, policy-relevant and interest-driven articulations 
were increasingly amalgamated and began to form a sort of knowledge-based 
economy talk. One may thus argue that knowledge-based economization, as 
it gradually developed in the 1990s, was discursively produced. This produc-
tion involved expert definitions and related scoreboards of indicators (Godin 
2006, 21). A range of societal processes, ideas and substances such as level 
of education, skills, human capital, investment patterns, research and devel-
opment investments and, more broadly, particular government interventions 
were associated with the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism in general 
and with the term knowledge-based economy in particular.
Even if the phenomenon of knowledge-based economization was arguably 
characterized by a relative conceptual fuzziness (see Godin 2006), since the 
mid-1990s policymakers in many geographical contexts and in many powerful 
international organizations have increasingly used terms such as the information 
economy and learning economy or the knowledge economy to guide political, 
social and economic strategies. Knowledge-based economization thus refers to 
a seemingly future-oriented policymaking which highlights the ways in which 
success can be both achieved and analyzed on the basis of its “knowledge-base”. 
As such, knowledge-based economization can be understood as proceeding 
through a set of strategic initiatives which include the tempting promise of 
limitless growth: an antidote to the various material and environmental limits 
to economic growth which had become obvious already in the 1970s. In this 
capacity, the discourses of knowledge-based economization are firmly bound 
to the ways in which capitalism has been represented since the 1990s as the only 
societal system capable of providing infinite growth and profit.
The first metrics and indicators directly linked to knowledge-based econo-
mization were made by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), an organization which had identified critical problems 
in the Atlantic Fordist accumulation system already in the 1970s. In the 1990s, 
the response of the OECD to the changing economic circumstances was a 
recommendation to prioritize transition to the knowledge-based economy as 
the logical next level in capitalist development (Sum and Jessop 2013, 277). 
As a policy organization, the OECD, together with a plethora of international 
organizations and consultant companies, has hence played a pivotal role in con-
densing and furthering the ideational basis of knowledge-intensive capitalism 
and increasing its persuasive qualities as a policy paradigm. The OECD alone 
has produced tens of reports and hundreds of factsheets on the knowledge-
based economy. In so doing, the OECD and other actors have since the 1990s 
fed policymakers, scholars, pundits and media a particular type of comparative 
information on the substances, nuances and development trajectories of such 
an economy across geographical contexts.
Academic circles have played a key role in the consolidation of the idea of 
the knowledge-based economy as a distinct system of capital accumulation. 
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In the 1990s, the OECD collaborated with several individual scholars whose 
 conceptual work became central to the emergence of the idea of the knowledge-
based economy. The consolidation of knowledge-based economization in the 
1990s was inherently tied up with economic ideas and scholarly sister concepts 
of the knowledge-based economy. One central notion was the concept of the 
National System of Innovation, or National Innovation System (hereafter the 
NIS), the dynamics of which were in policymaking comprehended as the key 
to effectively harnessing innovation to national economies. It was through the 
NIS and other related concepts that the processes of knowledge-based econo-
mization trickled down to policy-worlds as a constitutive statist idea, discourse 
and a broader system of thought. In short, from the 1990s, knowledge-based 
economization has been characterized by the mutually influencing and inter-
penetrating theoretical ideas and policy paradigms (cf. Jessop 2008, 20).
The NIS epitomizes the discursive power of theoretical ideas inherent in 
knowledge-based economization. These ideas play a central constitutive role 
in the constitution of knowledge-intensive capitalism as a spatial phenomenon 
that can be acted upon. The NIS can be understood as an ideational manifes-
tation of space for economy, a particular representation of space as Lefebvre 
(1991) would have it. The term NIS was originally developed by Bengt Åke 
Lundvall (together and separately with economist Christopher Freeman), who 
had worked with the concept already in the late 1980s and developed what 
would later become another widely influential policy concept: the learning 
economy (see Lundvall 1992).
The NIS is an example of what Reijo Miettinen (2002, 138) has referred 
to as a transdiscursive term. It embodies a capacity to draw together, subsume 
or connect seemingly separate things and knowledge in new ways. One of 
the key features of transdiscursive terms is their capacity to bring together or 
subsume the world of firms and political communities. This is an important 
dimension of knowledge-based economization. Miettinen argues that in the 
Finnish context the NIS evolved in the 1990s as a manifestation of the times, 
and regards the NIS as a thesis about sources of success and survival in the 
changing world (ibid., 139). Indeed, NIS theorizing provided policymakers in 
many geographical contexts with a world view and associated tenets that could 
be used to tailor policies for states, cities and regions in a supposedly new world 
of knowledge-intensive capitalism.
As a novel discursive element of the process of knowledge-based economi-
zation, the NIS soon became a productive state-centered imaginary for under-
standing and framing the relational spatial structure of the territorial state. It 
took hold as an alternative way to politically rationalize state space and its func-
tional hierarchy. Already in the 1990s, the NIS was adopted in Sweden and 
Finland, for instance, where it arguably became one of the key ideas through 
which the “urban” as a state territorial issue was re-articulated and activated in 
regional policy programs and wider state strategies.
Although he had an official position within the institutional fabric of the 
OECD, in this context it is nevertheless more relevant to recognize the key 
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message which Bengt Åke Lundvall developed in his peculiarly nation-state-
centered book National Systems of Innovation: “the most fundamental resource 
in the modern economy is knowledge and, accordingly, the most important 
process is learning” (1992, 1). This highly state-centered argument on the 
fundamentally social and, indeed, political nature of the NIS would come to 
characterize the academic and policy discourses constitutive of knowledge-
based economization for decades to come.
Why did conceptual developments constitutive of the ideas and practices 
of the knowledge-based economy take place in the early 1990s? Some authors 
have suggested that the rise of the concept of the knowledge-based economy 
was part of a larger discursive and material re-working of the political economy 
and associated social relations in the early 1990s. Accordingly, it has been seen 
as a political process that manifested itself as new economic and spatial terminol-
ogy, spatial discourses and spatial practices. Some critics of the concept of the 
knowledge-based economy have thus pointed out that nothing tremendously 
novel took place in the early 1990s with regard to the centrality of knowledge 
in the economy and that the concept was largely aimed at directing “the atten-
tion of the policy-makers to science and technology issues and to their role in 
the economy” (Godin 2006, 17; see also Miettinen 2002).
It is nonetheless easy to agree with those who highlight the productive 
nature of the ideas, concepts and discourses related to the knowledge-intensive 
economy. From the 1990s onwards, knowledge-based economization has pro-
ceeded through public policymaking in many geographical contexts. The cen-
tral ideas of the knowledge-based economy continue to have significant appeal 
among politicians, developers and planners across the globe. Knowledge-based 
economization therefore also refers to a peculiar discursive entrenching and 
to the capacity of these discourses to exclude alternative ideas as representing 
irrational behavior or negative development (cf. Laclau 1990). In this capac-
ity, the discourses of knowledge-based economization form a regulative struc-
ture which conditions policy practices across many geographical contexts. As a 
result, the knowledge-intensive economy is politically understood and framed 
as “the only option”. In other words, even if one may justifiably argue that 
the concept of the knowledge-based economy itself has remained analytically 
fuzzy and all-encompassing, or that it is merely a label or rhetorical concept, 
as a family of political ideas and processes knowledge-based economization 
embodies tremendous power and societal relevance.
The unique conceptual fuzziness of the knowledge-based economy and its 
sister terms is indeed constitutive of the power of knowledge-based economi-
zation. Knowledge-based economization has major implications with respect 
to the ways in which societies are conceived, planned, designed and re-worked 
both socially and spatially. As Godin (2006, 23) correctly argues, the knowl-
edge-based economy is not only fertile theoretically and empirically for many 
contemporary scholars who practice mainstream economic analysis but also 
hugely relevant politically because it can be used for any issue of science and 
technology and for society more generally.
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The above arguments point to the fact that knowledge-based economization 
can be understood as referring to both a historically contingent system of accu-
mulation and a discursive process. A discursive reading of knowledge-based 
economization considers knowledge-intensive capitalism as a process that inte-
grates institutional as well as administrative mechanisms with the production 
of knowledge. In such a conceptualization, knowledge-based economization 
renders the social reality of a given political community in a particular way.
Even though knowledge-based economization is a political phenomenon 
which has no clearly identifiable command centers and yet seems to be almost 
omnipresent, Western Europe and North America have functioned as the key 
geographical contexts of its discursive production and institutional bolting. 
The OECD, the World Bank and the EU have played a crucial role as well. 
Even individual universities such as Harvard University can be identified as 
particularly significant hubs in the process of knowledge-based economiza-
tion. And in many geographical contexts, fostering innovation-led economy 
became a sort of policy common sense in the late 1990s.
The basic discursive components of knowledge-based economization have 
remained relatively intact since the 1990s. The 1990s was characterized by dis-
cursive construction of knowledge-intensive capitalism, which took place within 
a gamut of state-authored restructuring projects which strongly emphasized sci-
ence and technology. During the past decade or so, this has been followed by a 
period of continued consolidation of these technological and science-centered 
discourses in various political projects across scales and sites. But the discourses 
of knowledge-based economization have also been slightly reformulated in 
such a manner that today they permeate a broad spectrum of social practices 
beyond purely technological and scientific matters. The contemporary discur-
sive omnipresence of knowledge-based economization can hence be regarded 
as a significant source of its political–economic power. In a sense, knowledge-
intensive economy has been normalized, routinized and depoliticized, and has 
fundamentally expanded beyond technology and science circles.
As part of the process of normalization, knowledge-based economization 
has gradually become more pervasive, all-encompassing and ubiquitous in the 
context of accumulation strategies but also in the context of managing and 
re-working political communities and producing human subjects and human 
capital. Thus, if knowledge-based economization of the 1990s represented a 
particular state-orchestrated, firm-supported and technology-driven attempt to 
respond to an economic (growth) and political (legitimacy and governance) 
crisis through “pure science and innovation”, the 2000s have witnessed a pro-
found stretching of the policy repertoire of this economization.
As a discursive process, knowledge-based economization has a self- actualizing 
quality. It produces a world which the discourses of such economization present 
as inevitable and which thus depoliticizes attendant societal development (see 
Moisio and Kangas 2016). The discourses of knowledge-based economization 
thus project a particular kind of future of necessity that is rooted in a conceived 
crisis of the present. In this capacity, the various structured projections of the 
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knowledge-based economy have inspired (and imposed) many far-reaching 
political programs of state spatial restructuring across a great number of regions 
and localities and thus set limits to policy thought and action. Nonbelievers 
of the knowledge-based economy are often dismissed as representing a false 
understanding and outmoded interpretation of the present.
Some discursive specificities of knowledge-based economization
As a dominant discursive process of state policy at least in Western capitalist 
polities since the mid-1990s, knowledge-based economization has some spe-
cificities which reshuffle the relationship between the state, regions and places. 
As such, this discourse shapes spatial policy paradigms and policy fields more 
broadly (cf. Jessop 2008).
One particular discursive element of knowledge-based economization has 
remained largely unchanged and unchallenged. Since the 1990s, knowledge-
based economization as a set of social, discursive and calculative practices and 
interwoven representations, as well as material arrangements, has been essen-
tially connected to the issue of economic growth. In the 1990s, knowledge-
based economization was already premised on particular theories of economic 
growth which take “knowledge base” as an important factor of production. 
Already in the 1990s, a standard OECD definition framed knowledge-based 
economies as “economies which are directly based on the production, distri-
bution and use of knowledge and information” (OECD 1996, 3).
The discourses of knowledge-based economization are therefore first and 
foremost geared around the issue of innovation-led economic growth. The 
dominant theories on the growth of national economy since the 1920s up 
until the 1980s were typically predicated on the idea that the construction 
and effectiveness of production is based on bringing together labor, natural 
resources and capital through available technologies. The dominant theories 
of economic growth from the 1990s onwards have, in turn, highlighted the 
sheer importance of human capital and knowledge creation in particular as 
both the central means of production and as the end products on which eco-
nomic growth and the success of the national economy are premised. Human 
capital and the issue of productivity have also been tightly tied together (see, 
e.g. Porter 1990). Both scholarly and public discourse thus often portray the 
knowledge-based economy as denoting an economy in which a significant 
share of the employees (often more than 40 percent) are working in high 
technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services, and in which 
the number and proportion of high-skilled jobs is rising. Since the 1990s, tel-
ecom, software, biotechnology, research, financial services, aerospace, health 
and educational services and many more, have become typical sectors in these 
framings. In the 2000s, these sectors have been forcefully accompanied by 
economic sectors that together form the so-called “creative economy” (for an 
interesting narrative on the rise and significance of this economy, see Howkins 
2001) or even “start-up economy”: advertising, toys and games, video games, 
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film, fashion, design, crafts, art, architecture, TV/radio, software, publishing 
and performing arts. Some of these sectors have become pivotal constituents of 
the emerging entrepreneurial start-up politics which highlights the capacities 
of individuals to exercise their imagination “fully” and to exploit its economic 
value. Indeed, the rise of the start-up politics in the 2000s marks a qualita-
tive shift within knowledge-based economization, and denotes an increasingly 
intensifying relationship between human “creativity” and economic value.
The public and scholarly discourses constitutive of knowledge-based econ-
omization more often than not underline the primacy of the private sector 
in the economic success of political communities. Rising employment in the 
financial services sector, particular skills of population, booming high tech 
industry, the ICT sector, media and the associated new media economy, broad 
cultural entrepreneurship, as well as “lifelong learning” ( Jones 2008, 387, 394–
395) are often picked up as indicators of success within the discourses of the 
knowledge-based economy.
Moreover, the discourses of the knowledge-based economy highlight the 
strategic role of higher education institutions and the production of scientific 
knowledge in generating both economic and political success. Knowledge-
based economization thus connects institutions of higher education firmly with 
the process of endless innovation. In an age of financial instability, sagging pro-
duction, credit crises and deepening environmental problems, the strategic role 
of institutions of higher education has only heightened. In the 2000s, and par-
ticularly since 2008, the discursive power of knowledge-intensive capitalism has 
thus become increasingly evident in the ways in which universities and even 
individual disciplines, and the “intellectual capital” they produce, are being 
explicitly positioned as particular agents for both the conceived and real needs 
of the knowledge-based economy as well as the associated production of inno-
vations. A particular consensus as to the “primacy of ideas” as the key source 
of innovation and productivity is thus located at the heart of knowledge-based 
economization as a discursive phenomenon (Peters 2009). The White Paper 
Success as a Knowledge Economy published by the British Government in 2016 
revealingly states how “for every £1 spent by the Government on research and 
development, private sector productivity rises by 20p annually, by perpetuity” 
(The British Government 2016, 16). Universities have also sought to conform to 
these new circumstances, and have thus gradually occupied a qualitatively new 
position within state strategies in the knowledge-intensive system of accumula-
tion. In other words, universities in different geographical contexts have begun 
to articulate themselves as if they occupied a central structural position within 
a new kind of inter-state competition and associated economic restructuring.
The materialist reading of the knowledge-based economy: 
the urban landscapes of technopolization and beyond
The knowledge-based economy may be considered as an active attempt to 
move from one industrial mode of organization to another (cf. Tremblay 
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1995). As a material process, knowledge-based economization hence needs 
to be elaborated upon in the context of the capitalist mode of production. 
In such a view, the knowledge-based economy is an economic and political 
process. It is a more or less coherent and concerted effort to respond to the 
crisis tendencies of capitalism – over-accumulation and attendant falling rates 
of profit, most notably – which surfaced on both sides of the northern Atlantic 
in the 1980s. The materialist ideas concerning the circulation and accumula-
tion of capital seem particularly relevant when parsing together the various 
elements through which the knowledge-based economy can be understood 
as an actually existing system of accumulation. This essentially relates to the 
notion of the three circuits of capital (see Harvey 1978; 1985), each of which 
can be comprehended as separate yet overlapping and entangled dimensions 
of the knowledge-based economy. Each of these dimensions will be briefly 
elucidated in the following pages (Figure 2.1).
The first circuit and knowledge-based economization
Within the capitalist mode of production, the capitalist class operates with 
money to buy things such as machines, labor force or natural resources in order 
to produce commodities. These commodities, in turn, are sold in order to gen-
erate surplus value or profit. The same process of surplus value creation may 
take place through a circuit of capital within which a portion of the profits are 
further invested in commodities (labor power and means of production) with 
Figure 2.1 The three circuits of the knowledge-based economy.
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the intention of producing additional profit. What arises from this process is 
the so-called primary or first circuit of capital (Harvey 1978).
Already in the 1990s, the rise of the knowledge-based economy was associ-
ated with (a certain class of) commodities, ranging from cellular phones and 
computers and related microelectronics devices to advanced materials, bioel-
ectronics and products of the pharmaceutical industry, for instance. In many 
geographical contexts within the OECD sphere and beyond, the production 
(including the mechanical assembly of products) of these conceivably “high 
tech” commodities was understood to signal the rise of a new economic condi-
tion. With regard to the production of these commodities, major changes how-
ever started to take place in the 1990s when multinational corporations began 
to relocate their investments in fixed capital. Because of the coercive laws 
of competition, many multinational firms invested increasingly in geographi-
cal contexts where the sufficient skills to assemble high-tech products were 
available but at much lower costs compared with so-called Western industrial 
societies. This process brought about an enormous geographical dispersal in 
the production process of the typical commodities of the knowledge-based 
economy. At the same time, the knowledge-intensive research and develop-
ment activities that are linked to these commodities, as well as the related 
knowledge-intensive business services, began to concentrate geographically.
Within the Western industrial states, the geographical reorganization of 
production prompted inter-spatial competition over investments in the upper 
rungs of the production process in which significant portions of surplus value are 
produced. As a result, this competition has conditioned the location of activi-
ties related to research and development, design and marketing, for instance, 
and has moreover manifested itself in investments in various built environ-
ments across a variety of geographical contexts. This connects the knowledge-
based economy with the so-called second or secondary circuit of capital.
The second circuit and knowledge-based economization
The second circuit of capital refers to portions of investments that grow out 
of the first circuit but are channeled into the production of various physical 
infrastructures. These infrastructures are needed in the processes of production 
and social reproduction. Thus, new built environments emerge through new 
investment processes. This makes the second circuit of capital an overlapping 
or parallel process of the first circuit. Since the classical conceptualizations by 
both Henri Lefebvre (1970/2003) and David Harvey (1978; 1985), the second 
circuit of capital, and the related process of real estate and land speculation, 
has been commonly treated as a process through which surplus value can also 
be achieved.
Knowledge-intensive capitalism can be comprehended as closely inter-
linked with particular built environments. This does not represent an unpro-
ductive flow of capital which merely facilitates the process in the first circuit; 
rather, these built environments become sites of the production of surplus 
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value. Accordingly, surplus capital is channeled into various physical infrastruc-
tures that are understood as quintessential in the knowledge-intensive form 
of capitalism. The construction of research and innovation centers, university 
campuses, technology institutes, technology parks, conference centers, high-
quality office spaces, all manner of knowledge-business improvement districts, 
telecommunications networks, infrastructures of digitalization and various cul-
tural spaces can also be understood as constituents of knowledge-based econo-
mization. Many of these built environments, such as the Skolkovo Innovation 
Center in Moscow, are initiated through a process that brings together the state 
apparatus and private stakeholders (see, e.g. Kangas 2013).
It is particularly notable that states (and local governments) have taken great 
pains to finance and guarantee large-scale and long-term projects with respect to 
establishing the conceivably crucial built environments of the knowledge-based 
economy. This discloses the fact that states remain vital institutional anchors of 
political power in the purportedly “global” knowledge-based economy, which 
is typically construed around urban agglomerations (Brenner 2004; Moisio and 
Paasi 2013). In the Scandinavian context, for instance, state institutions have 
played a significant mediating role in underwriting and enhancing flows of 
capital into the built environments of knowledge-intensive capitalism. As such, 
the built environments of the knowledge-based economy have bound together 
actors such as state ministries, multinational companies, local and international 
construction companies, real estate consultants, investors, accountants, banks 
and insurance companies in multiple tapestries.
The above-mentioned built environments are arguably infrastructures 
exemplary of what may be understood to symbolize the ongoing reign of 
knowledge-based economization. These highlight the ways in which the dis-
courses of the knowledge-based economy also materialize through feedback 
loops as infrastructures and new technologies. These local environments are 
construed around broader political discourses touching upon knowledge, skills, 
innovation, creativity, human capital and learning. The concept of the techno-
pole, which was popularized by Manuel Castells and Peter Hall (1994) in the 
early 1990s, brings together these physical constructions and wider societal 
discourses of knowledge-based economization. In using the concept of the 
technopole, Castells and Hall referred to the “emergence of a new industrial 
space, defined both by the location of the new industrial sectors and by the 
use of new technologies by all sectors” and argued that within such restructur-
ing “cities and regions are increasingly becoming critical agents of economic 
development” (Castells and Hall 1994, 6–7). Accordingly, this is because cities 
and regions have
a greater response capacity to generate targeted development projects, 
negotiate with multinational firms, foster the growth of small and medium 
endogenous firms, and create conditions that will attract the new sources 
of wealth, power and prestige.
(Castells and Hall 1994, 7)
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The term technopole, in a nutshell, denotes “innovative industrial milieux” 
which include “various deliberative attempts to plan and promote, within one 
concentrated area, technologically innovative, industrial-related production: 
technology parks, science cities and the like” (Castells and Hall 1994, 8). Even 
though many of the attempts to create such “specific forms of territorial con-
centrations of technological innovation with a potential to generate scientific 
synergy and economic productivity” (ibid., 10) have actually failed, the term 
technopole itself is very telling as a window into the world in the early 1990s. 
First of all, it discloses the increasing emphasis on the urban and regional in the 
accumulation processes of knowledge-intensive capitalism; knowledge-based 
economization and local growth coalitions have become seamlessly entan-
gled over the past two decades. Second, it seems reasonable to understand the 
concept of the technopole as indicative of a more general process in which 
capitalism builds physical infrastructures appropriate to its own conditions at a 
particular moment in time (Harvey 2001, 247). In the widest sense, the notion 
of technopole can be said to incorporate the technocratic idea of human com-
munity in opposition to notions of political community.
The temporal context of the early 1990s was characterized by the local con-
struction of the knowledge-intensive economy of innovations which involved 
noteworthy investments in new physical infrastructures that would signal a 
movement away from the resource-based and conceivably “low value” econ-
omy firmly construed around the state. The technopolization of the 1990s 
was thus an essentially urban process of creating new landscapes and broader 
technology-centered urban forms which were hoped to facilitate economic 
growth and symbolize new forward-looking political strategies. It is notewor-
thy that many state governments became thoroughly committed to the process 
of technopolization. It is not least because of the strong presence of the state 
orchestrated demand-side interventionism why the early forms of technopoli-
zation can be argued to represent Keynesian forms of policymaking and pub-
lic consumption.
Since early 2000s, technopolization has gradually transformed from its late 
Keynesian origins toward a more Schumpeterian form. Since the late 1990s, 
the new urban landscapes of technopolization have been linked with the rise 
and geographical concentration of the so-called knowledge-intensive business 
services sector, which became a weighty marker of knowledge-based econo-
mization, and more recently with the more subtle forms of start-up urbanism. 
These services and start-up activities likewise have been construed around new 
built environments.
In sum, one may argue that since the earliest technopolization, the knowl-
edge-based economy has been intimately connected to the secondary circuit 
of capital and to the production of concrete urban spaces and the associated 
urban experience. To recapitulate, knowledge-based economization also 
refers to materialization through fixed capital: investments in physical infra-
structures of science, education and culture, and built environment more 
generally. These infrastructures range from the re-constructed office spaces of 
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university researchers to large-scale urban formations and even supranational 
digital networks.
The third circuit and knowledge-based economization
As I argued above, the second circuit of capital brings together urban space and 
the physical as well as representational aspects of knowledge-based economiza-
tion. But knowledge-based economization can also be fruitfully discussed with 
regard to the tertiary or third circuit of capital, which Harvey conceptualizes 
as comprising
first, investments in science and technology (the purpose of which is to 
harness science to production and thereby to contribute to the processes 
which continuously revolutionize the productive forces in society) and 
second, a wide range of social expenditures which relate primarily to the 
processes of reproduction of labour power. The latter can usefully be 
divided into investments directed towards the qualitative improvement of 
labour power from the standpoint of capital (investments in education and 
health by means of which the capacity of the labourers to engage in the 
work process will be enhanced) and investment in cooptation, integration 
and repression of the labour force by ideological, military and other means.
(Harvey 1978, 108)
The tertiary circuit of capital hence refers to investments in education, science 
and technology, research and development and to knowledge production and 
human capital more broadly. Again, these investments usually take place via 
the medium of the state. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, the state has 
a particular role with respect to the organization and management of capi-
tal flows into the tertiary circuit. The conceivably “global” knowledge-based 
economy is thus essentially bound to the agency of the state, and to the ways in 
which investments are channeled into research and development and “into the 
quantitative and qualitative improvement of labour force” (ibid., 108).
The third circuit discloses how one form of capital can be invested into 
another type of capital. Of course, the third circuit of capital should not be 
confined only to knowledge-intensive capitalism, which can be dated back 
to the 1990s. However, the massive investments in human capital and skills 
formation and related social experiments during the 2000s illuminate the quali-
tative characteristics of knowledge-based economization as a process which 
is predicated on enhancing the productivity of the labor force through new 
means. It thus seems that the knowledge-based economization of the past two 
decades has involved what Harvey (1978, 113) calls “sectoral switching”: a 
detectable reallocation of capital from one sphere (fixed forms of capital) to 
another (e.g. education).
If technopolization, and the related innovative milieus of the “high tech 
industry”, characterized the late Keynesian knowledge-based economization 
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of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Rossi and Di Bella 2017), the more recent 
developments are manifesting in the increasing investments that seek to pro-
duce a new sort of human capital and skills. As an urban process, this gradual 
extending of the arrangements of knowledge-based economization can be 
conceptualized in multiple ways. To illustrate, Rossi (2016) argues that one 
of the key urban planning narratives, the smart city, has been broadened from 
its technology-centered focus of the 1990s to the more subtle narrative of the 
start-up city (which is equally technocratic and technological in nature, of 
course). The start-up city can thus be understood as a peculiar manifestation of 
the ongoing qualitative transformation of the discursive-cum-material process 
of knowledge-based economization. The start-up city represents the increas-
ingly self-governing enterprise society whereby urban environments acquire 
renewed centrality. It discloses a broad constellation of initiatives that bring 
together the state, local governments, a class of self-organizing entrepreneur-
ial societies, urban environments and multinational high-tech firms as central 
players. These actors are tied together by the conviction of bringing about a 
new kind of individualistic and entrepreneurial citizen-subject capable of self-
organization, thus resulting in an extended entrepreneurialization of society.
The investments in science, education and “learning” more generally 
are not only fundamental to governing the processes of the second circuit 
of capital but are also important in qualitatively re-working the relationship 
between human subjects and their skills, surplus value and the technologies 
through which the knowledge-intensive capitalist economy operates. During 
the past years, significant investments in higher education have been increas-
ingly debated in terms of their potential to contribute either directly or indi-
rectly to the accumulation of capital. These debates, which have taken place 
intensely across many geographical contexts, reveal that, from the perspective 
of capital, some types of investments in science and education are potentially 
unproductive. But the sometimes heated political discussions surrounding the 
economic potential (nowadays often dubbed somewhat misleadingly as “social 
relevance”) of higher education also disclose how investing in human capital 
is absolutely central not only in order to facilitate productivity within the pri-
mary circuit of capital. These investments in higher education are also being 
comprehended as pivotal in producing human subjects who are supposedly 
capable of generating knowledge or skills as new types of commodities that can 
be commercialized. The inherent challenge here is that, from the perspective 
of capital, some qualities of the labor can in a relatively short period of time 
become considered unproductive.
The new capitalist laborers of the knowledge-based economy are often 
produced with the wish that they would re-think the relationship between 
their work and wider societal developments also in transnational terms (that 
is, beyond the nation state) in such a manner that they would embrace a new 
liberal and conceivably “global” working culture. There are many possibilities 
to illustrate the scholarly and other debates surrounding this issue. For instance, 
the term “hacker ethic” (together with many related terms), as it was re-heated 
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in the late 1990s (see Himanen 2001), is illustrative in this context as it defines 
the working ethics and habits of a successful capitalist laborer in the so-called 
information age.
Cultural political economy of the knowledge-based economy
The so-called cultural political economy (CPE hereafter) perspective provides 
us with a coherent way to conceptualize the key processes of knowledge-based 
economization. As a post-disciplinary approach to capitalist social formations, 
it draws on ontological realism and epistemological relativism in order to exca-
vate the key materialist and discursive-semiotic aspects of the knowledge-based 
economy, and their co-evolution and confluence. The CPE thus not only 
highlights the material processes of the capitalist mode of production and the 
associated systems of regulation that have been gradually put in place since 
the 1990s, but it also devotes attention to the semiotic constitution and sta-
bilization of this economy in social practices and institutional forms (see in 
particular, Sum and Jessop 2013). Within such a frame, much of the impetus 
for the pervasiveness of knowledge-based economization seems to derive from 
two interrelated drivers, both of which result from the political context of the 
early 1990s.
First, the rise of knowledge-based economization stems from the crisis of 
the so-called Atlantic Fordist accumulation regime which had prevailed, in a 
more or less coherent form, from the 1950s as the dominant system of regu-
lation. Accordingly, there were a number of material preconditions out of 
which the knowledge-based economy arose as a partial and potentially unstable 
semiotic-material solution to the crisis of the existing system of accumula-
tion (Jessop 2004, 160). As a material solution, the knowledge-based economy 
should be seen as an actually existing economy whereby
the primary aspect of capital is the valorization of the general intellect in 
the form of knowledge- and design-intensive commodities (real or ficti-
tious). This involves the production, management, distribution and use of 
knowledge as a key driver of economic growth, wealth generation and job 
creation across the private, public and ‘third’ sectors. In a true KBE, it is 
suggested, knowledge is applied reflexively to the production of knowl-
edge and most sectors tend to become more knowledge-intensive.
(Sum and Jessop 2013, 284)
This broad definition of the knowledge-based economy underscores the many 
visions and institutionalized forms through which this economy has manifested 
itself beyond the world of production, business and firms. These range from 
e-governance and entrepreneurial universities to intellectual property rights, 
smart buildings/devices, start-up culture and creative/smart cities.
Within the CPE conceptualization, the knowledge-based economy, 
as outlined above, sprang up from a series of attempts by state authorities, 
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international organizations and the like to overcome the economic crises of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s with a fresh economic imaginary. The concept 
of the economic imaginary is notable in this context. It stands for a wide range 
of possible strategic visions in a given temporal context dealing with how to 
achieve political, cultural and economic success in the future. Jessop (2004, 
163) points out that “economic imaginaries identify, privilege, and seek to 
stabilize some economic activities from the totality of economic relations and 
transform them into objects of observation, calculation, and governance”. 
These imaginaries are discursively constituted and materially produced in cor-
porations, within academia and in numerous political organizations, and con-
stitute an integral part of the process of knowledge-based economization. At a 
particular rupture, when the prevailing imaginary is challenged because of the 
obvious crisis developments, a variety of alternative imaginaries are available. 
Only some of the economic imaginaries nonetheless become embedded in 
social practices and shape political–economic orders. These involve a particu-
lar performative force (the confluence of theoretical and policy paradigms) not 
least because they also affirm the material interdependencies of the capitalist 
system. In sum, each imaginary depicts the economic world in its own way, 
and those that “become hegemonic or sub-hegemonic help to shape eco-
nomic orders and embed them in wider ensembles of social relations” (Sum 
and Jessop 2013, 265).
The key point here is that only some of these imaginaries become selected 
in the process of semiosis, as political forces (be they public or private actors) 
operate through existing institutional structures, primarily but not exclusively 
through state structures. The selection of particular imaginaries in turn indi-
cates that these have been disseminated by and to central social forces. Once a 
given imaginary, or set of imaginaries, takes the form of a dominant imaginary, 
it begins to re-orient economic, cultural and political strategies and related 
practices. To make this happen requires that the constitutive theoretical and 
policy paradigms behind any imaginary are selected and retained to a certain 
degree. In other words, the theoretical and policy paradigms are entangled 
when imaginaries are translated into concrete policies, and when they hence 
become retained and stabilized in various forms, ranging from organizational 
cultures and state projects to built environments, for example.
What the above highlights is that economic imaginaries are potentially pro-
ductive in the context of the structuration of social practices. Since the 1990s, 
knowledge-based economization has been furthered through a somewhat coher-
ent set of political and economic strategies and projects, as well as related visions 
which guide and reinforce the legitimacy of particular political and economic 
actions (Jessop 2004, 168). This particular knowledge-based economy imaginary 
was hence selected over many other possible imaginaries as the fundamental basis 
of macro political strategies in many geographical contexts. It has been structured 
in the policies of competitiveness, for instance, and in particular social forms such 
as legislation, and even in built environments such as university campuses. Since 
the 1990s, the structuration of the economic imaginary of the knowledge-based 
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economy has in many geographical contexts proceeded to the extent that it can 
be argued to be a more or less distinguishable accumulation regime and a form 
of regulation (cf. Jessop 2004). The knowledge-based economy imaginary has 
thus shaped accumulation strategies, political strategies and policymaking more 
broadly across many policy fields, and on many geographical scales and sites. 
This also explains the success of the knowledge-based economy as a strategy for 
appropriation. In Finland, for instance, universities have been from the 1990s 
onwards increasingly re-oriented to serve the interests of private capital, and 
hence to serve the rationality of accumulation through re-appropriating purport-
edly “ill-used public investments”.
One particularly important aspect in the process through which the knowl-
edge-based economy has been selected and stabilized is the centrality of the 
discourse of competition and competitiveness. Indeed, all definitions of com-
petitiveness and all policy strategies of competitiveness are discursively pro-
duced. In particular, the tendency of the knowledge-based economy imaginary 
to universalize notions of competition and competitiveness (Sum and Jessop 
2013) is at the heart of the knowledge-based economization. The hallmark of 
the economic imaginary of the knowledge-based economy is thus a particu-
lar discursive framing on the nature of competition in world markets (more 
in Chapter 4). This framing not only touches upon competitiveness on the 
firm level but extends the idea of competitiveness to apply to the context of 
various social institutions and conditions. It is hence a framing that describes 
competition as being about the capacities of political communities to dominate 
the division of labor, commodity chains and financial flows on a world scale. 
Within such a discourse – which has been constituted largely through theoreti-
cal academic work on competition, competitiveness and competitive advan-
tages – the efforts of transnational corporations to position themselves within 
global division of labor becomes fundamentally entangled with the attempts 
of territorial political communities to promote their competitiveness through 
the production of attractive “local, regional, cross-border, national or multi-
national economic spaces” (Sum and Jessop 2013, 264–265). This theoretical 
paradigm is often translated into a wider policy paradigm whereby it is a politi-
cal imperative to modify social formations and the forms of the state in such 
a manner that these contribute to wealth creation in the face of international, 
interregional and intraregional competition. It is worth noting that it is exactly 
this form of policy paradigm which leads to the “discovery of triad regions, 
the ‘region state’, the ‘trans-national territory’, ‘entrepreneurial cities’ and so 
forth, as new phenomena and their naturalization on practical, if not norma-
tive, grounds” (ibid., 269).
From the perspective of the CPE, the idea of global competition and com-
petitiveness of political communities is of course a simplifying reference point 
for orienting economic action. But its significance lies, again, in its constitutive 
dimension. The typical discourse of competition and competitiveness that is 
built into the knowledge-based economy imaginary, conditions the ways in 
which political and economic actors circumnavigate the purportedly global 
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marketplace in their constant attempts to develop competitive advantages. 
Indeed, as Sum and Jessop (2013, 270) correctly point out:
official economic strategies – from towns, cities and regions through 
national states and supranational bodies like the European Union to more 
encompassing international agencies and global regimes – have increas-
ingly posited the rise of the KBE on a global scale, its centrality to further 
growth at all scales, and its critical role in long-term competitive advantage 
and sustained prosperity for new and old industries and services. This has 
been emphasized even more in the wake of the North Atlantic financial 
crisis and the Great Recession, with the promotion of knowledge-based, 
design-intensive or otherwise creative industries and services as the route 
to growth and full employment.
(Sum and Jessop 2013, 270)
As regards the last quoted sentence, entrepreneurialism and entrepreneurial 
culture more broadly have increasingly characterized the coming together of 
the economic imaginary of the knowledge-based economy and the discourses 
of competitiveness in recent years. At a more general level, there has been an 
interesting confluence of the discourses of competitiveness and the economic 
imaginary of the global knowledge-based economy. Whereas global competi-
tiveness in the context of the knowledge-intensive capitalist economy has been 
framed in various theoretical paradigms through capacities such as innovative-
ness, creativity and entrepreneurialism, state and other political communities 
are accorded a key role in implementing wide policy paradigms to promote 
exactly such “globally relevant capacities” in order to construct a well-func-
tioning economic territory or territory of wealth as “information economy”, 
“learning economy”, “creative economy” or the like.
Interim conclusions: the process of 
knowledge-based economization
The previous three sections have laid a foundation for the concept of 
 knowledge-based economization which highlights the political construction 
of the contemporary knowledge-intensive capitalist economy. When I use the 
concept of knowledge-based economization in the ensuing chapters, I refer 
to its contemporary neoliberalizing form. In this mode, knowledge-based 
economization represents at least a dominant approach to public policies. It 
may well be considered as a hegemony project of geopolitical economy (see 
Agnew and Corbridge 1995) which proceeds in strategic social practices and 
through expert knowledge claims, takes both intentional and unintentional 
forms, is manifested in policy-formation and is highly disciplinary by nature. 
Moreover, knowledge-based economization produces and defines centers and 
peripheries, and legitimizes certain actions, forms of reasoning and practices 
over others. Even if the process is partly rooted in national traditions, it also 
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embodies particular universal “explanatory power”: it narrates the reasons 
why the building of territories of wealth and power is in the contemporary 
political– economic condition more successful in one place compared to the 
other. Finally, because of the nature of knowledge-based economization, it 
generates and re-works institutional capacities.
On the basis what I have argued before, one may conceptualize knowledge-
based economization as referring to
1 the political rhetoric or argumentation in which knowledge-based econ-
omy, knowledge economy, information economy or the like are referred 
to as societal and economic ideals;
2 the formative role of knowledge-production and related imaginaries and 
ideas which qualify materialities, objects, substances and devices as con-
stituents of the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism (cf. alişkan and 
Callon 2009);
3 the production of ideas and theories in which certain human capacities, 
actions, orientations and behaviors are articulated as valuable in the opera-
tion of the knowledge-based economy;
4 the ways in which the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism gets con-
stituted in the circuits of capital, and how it proceeds in the spheres of 
production, built environment and human capital;
5 the role and interplay of public and private organizations, governmen-
tal bodies and institutions in the constitution of the knowledge-intensive 
form of capitalism; and
6 the production of abstract and concrete spaces of spatial planning and 
development which are legitimized as meeting the demands of the mate-
rial processes of knowledge-intensive capitalism.
A number of universal discursive features are inherently involved with knowl-
edge-based economization, but which inescapably manifest in variegated ways 
across a range of national and local contexts. The political significance of 
knowledge-based economization nonetheless rests upon the effective permea-
tion of the discourses of the knowledge-based economy throughout all policy 
sectors as well as throughout most fields of economic activity.
Since the 1990s, as a material and discursive process, knowledge-based econ-
omization has emerged as a response to particular social and political needs. 
Accordingly, the knowledge-based economy can be understood as an attempt 
by Western capitalist states and major international organizations connected 
to global capitalism to manage the economic and political crisis tendencies 
which emerged in the late 1980s. As a form of crisis management, knowledge-
based economization was about a particular envisioning of the future system of 
capital accumulation, wealth creation and economic and political success. Its 
short history and fragmented composition notwithstanding, the knowledge-
economy has proven to be a powerful discursive construct which has reshaped 
practices in both private and public sectors. As Jessop (2004, 168) contended 
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over a decade ago, the knowledge-based economy has become a dominant and 
even hegemonic discourse
that can frame broader struggles over political, intellectual and moral lead-
ership on various scales as well as over more concrete fields of techni-
cal and economic reform. The basic idea is being articulated on many 
scales from local to global, in many organizational and institutional sites 
from firms to states, in many functional systems such as education, science, 
health, welfare, law, and politics, as well as the economy in its narrow 
sense, and in the public sphere and in the lifeworld.
The dominance of the knowledge-based economy would not have been possi-
ble without the leading role taken by some of the major industrial states, inter-
national organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the OECD, supranational political actors 
such as the EU and major metropolitan regions in institutionalizing the basic 
discourses of knowledge-based economization. Needless to say, these political 
actors will continue to play a focal role as far as the future of the knowledge-
intensive capitalist economy is concerned.
Two brief conclusions can be teased from what has been said in this chapter. 
The first of these deals with the rather ubiquitous or even omnipotent nature 
of knowledge-based economization. It goes well beyond the narrow economy 
of knowledge-intensive business practices and the processes of production. 
Knowledge-based economization is, obviously, about technology and related 
products, which also provide a sort of symbolic dimension to knowledge inten-
sive capitalism. But it also proceeds through the built environment, which in 
similar vein symbolically lies at the core of knowledge-based economization. 
Moreover, knowledge-based economization encapsulates the whole issue of 
knowledge production and the related scientific and educational practices, to 
say nothing of the human capital produced in different institutional contexts. 
The latter also reminds us of the fact that the knowledge-based economy is a 
governmental technology which seeks to produce a particular type of human 
subject or capitalist laborer – information and knowledge workers – with spe-
cific skills and mindsets. In so doing, the knowledge-based economy can be 
regarded as a broadly societal phenomenon. Moreover, the state has remained 
a crucial anchor organization of knowledge-based economization, and it often 
acts as a medium through which the different projects constitutive of the 
knowledge-intensive capitalist economy take place.
Second, knowledge-based economization fundamentally re-orientates 
social and spatial relations and has manifested itself as a great variety of spatial 
experimentations and related terms such as creative city, smart city, intelligent 
city, triple helix, technopole, ecosystem of innovations, innovative milieu and 
global economic integration zone. One of the main reasons why the knowl-
edge-based economization is ultimately about the production of spaces goes 
back to the fact that contemporary knowledge intensive capitalism re-writes 
The knowledge-based economy 33
the nature of inter-state competition or, alternatively, it adds a new dimension 
to it (see Chapter 4). Since 1990s, the knowledge-based economy has provided 
governments with a new geopolitical vision of world politics as a new sort of 
global space that is not about clash of civilizations or inter-state wars but rather 
about existential survival within global networks and associated value chains.
The root logic of this vision can be found in many academic writings in 
the 1990s. Consider, for instance, the vision which was provided by Manuel 
Castells in the mid-1990s in his attempt to describe what he identified as the 
emerging international division of labor. Castells ultimately produced a map 
in which conventional terms such as North and South would not apply. He 
went on to divide the world into four megaregions on the basis of the supposed 
capacities of the states within these regions to operate in the global knowledge-
based economy: “producers of high value”, “producers of high volume”, “pro-
ducers of raw materials” and “redundant producers” (Castells 1996, 147). This 
vision nicely demonstrates the wider discourses of inter-spatial competition 
which are constitutive of knowledge-based economization and which have 
much to do with the transformation toward the “competition state” (Cerny 
1990) or “competitive statehood”. Such knowledge-based economization has 
both discursively and materially affected the state structuration process in many 
ways, not least through muddling the conceivably domestic and the increas-
ingly integrated transnational political and economic structures. Together with 
many other visions, the knowledge-based economy provides a modicum of 
factual solidity that a government may draw on to justify its responses to the 
perceived threats caused by the purportedly ungovernable global village of 
messy flows and networks.
On the threshold of the knowledge-based 
economy and the knowledge-based society
Peters (2007) argues that the terms knowledge-based economy and  knowledge- 
based society come together in policy circles where the master concepts bor-
rowed from the sociology and economics of knowledge have come to help 
shape and define policy templates for economic and social development and 
well-being. These twin terms operate like performative ideologies with consti-
tutive effects at the level of public policy, where they come together through 
a set of dominant and residual ideas that more or less effectively guide the 
actions of both economic actors and public policymakers. In policymaking, 
these terms thus not only describe how the world is but also how the world 
ought to be.
In academic literature, the knowledge-based economy and the 
 knowledge-based society have been widely interrogated in the fields of eco-
nomics and sociology in particular. Economic geographers, in turn, have 
been at pains to explain the context specificities of the success and failure of 
the knowledge-based economy in particular places and regions, resulting in 
a notable corpus of research on the spatiality of innovation systems, inno-
vations, learning and learning regions. They have also examined the shift 
from the post-Fordism of the 1990s to a new mode of capitalist economy. 
To illustrate, Allen Scott (2017, 120) writes about the rise of what he calls a 
cognitive-cultural capitalism. Even if this concept essentially highlights the 
qualitative aspects of work in both high-skill economic sectors and some 
low-skill service sectors, it resonates quite explicitly with the latest develop-
ments in the process of knowledge-based economization. Social geographers, 
in turn, have examined the social stratification of political communities 
from the 1990s onwards (e.g. Leslie and Rantisi 2012). Political geographers 
have only relatively recently started to examine the political spatiality of the 
knowledge-based economy (see Jones 2008; Luukkonen and Moisio 2016). 
This is regrettable given that knowledge-based economization is ultimately, 








This chapter sets an agenda for examining knowledge-based economiza-
tion in a geopolitical framework. The first point here is to rid ourselves of 
the technological and economic imperative that is built into the concept of 
the knowledge-based economy, and in so doing restore the importance of 
politics. Hence, we must not associate knowledge-based economization nar-
rowly with data creation, digitalization, wealth of information or information 
dissemination (cf. Drucker 1969), or more generally with economic and social 
processes which result from innovations in the field of information technolo-
gies or the so-called creative industries. Rather, and at the risk of repetition, 
knowledge-based economization can be understood as referring to a dynamic 
process which embodies certain productive power vis-à-vis political spaces and 
populace. Such a non-technological reading points to the inherent geopoliti-
cal processes of economization wherein the imaginaries and practices of the 
knowledge-based economy consolidate in spatial form in a particular temporal 
and geographical context (cf. Jessop 2008, 20).
In such a reading, knowledge-based economization represents a historically 
contingent phenomenon. One may of course argue that economy has always 
been knowledge-based characterized by a certain type of human innovative-
ness and means to maintain and enhance creative human action for various 
purposes. Similarly, knowledge has undoubtedly been developed and used 
throughout history for a variety of purposes, such as the mundane practices of 
governance, economy and business. However, during the past three decades 
a knowledge-based economization, which is associated with particular geopo-
litical rationalities and techniques of governance, has gradually emerged as a 
novel phenomenon.
Indeed, since the 1990s, the OECD sphere in particular has witnessed 
an unprecedented boom in re-construing cities and regions, states and even 
supranational polities according to the putative imperatives of the knowledge-
intensive capitalist economy. As a political formation, the knowledge-based 
economy has therefore emerged from the 1990s onwards in tandem with both 
the circuits of capital and political decision making. Many governments across 
the globe have re-worked their strategies to meet the supposed requirements 
of the day. In the preface to the third edition of the Coming of Post-Industrial 
Society, Bell (1999, x) notes revealingly how “the leaders of the Western nations 
consider their societies to be ‘post-industrial’ and that the problem facing the 
rest of the world is how to make the transition to the post-industrial state”.
The above-mentioned postulations, I hope, distance the knowledge-based 
economy not only from its pervasive technological-economic connotation 
but also from its influential developmental connotation whereby the knowl-
edge-based economy is viewed through a ladders-of-development lens. In 
the developmental reading, the knowledge-based economy is understood as 
referring to technologically and economically advanced political units. Within 
these political units, dynamic firms create extra value by harnessing highly 
skilled and supposedly “flexible” knowledge-worker-citizen-subjects, public 
and private infrastructures of research and education and flexible governance 
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structures for purposes of profit making. In such a perspective, the knowl-
edge-based economy appears as the result of a teleological process wherein 
an industrial nation state takes a perfectly logical step upwards in the imag-
ined ladders of state development and modernization. In the developmental 
understanding, which is conspicuous in the contemporary public discourse, 
political communities actually form a hierarchy within the conceived “global” 
knowledge-based economy in which movement up or down is ultimately 
based on the performance of corporations that operate within particular juris-
dictions. The developmental reading de-politicizes the contemporary condi-
tion, and thus the dynamic and complex geopolitical processes involved in 
such economization.
The state in the polycentric world
Since the 1990s, many OECD states have witnessed an unprecedented boom 
in re-positioning entire nation states as knowledge-based economies, and in so 
doing govern economic development, political spaces and populace according 
to the assumed demands of this economy. Knowledge and political communi-
ties, in short, have been coupled in ways that indicate a qualitative political 
change of the state with respect to the capitalist processes. Innovativeness, new 
knowledge, learning and human capital are today viewed not only as crucial 
components for the success of companies but also as key resources for nation 
states, regions and cities wanting to succeed in the contemporary “globaliza-
tion”. In other words, peculiar geopolitical notions of inter-state and inter-
spatial competition are built into knowledge-based economization. A world 
in which cities, regions, states and supranational polities are competing with 
everyone else for market share and market access is essentially geopolitical, 
albeit the logic, terminology and strategic discourses differ compared with the 
purportedly “earlier era” of military power and territorial conquest.
The latest round of state transformation in the OECD sphere is often stud-
ied with regard to the rise and consolidation of neoliberal political practices and 
related public policies (Brenner 2004; Peck and Tickell 2002). The tendency 
of neoliberal policymaking to favor the interests of transnational businesses and 
their local associates at the expense of the interests of local political commu-
nities is similarly widely reported. It is proposed in the ensuing chapters that 
the contemporary discourses and practices of knowledge-based economization 
resonate with the neoliberal developments. In the OECD sphere, the imag-
inaries of the knowledge-based economy often articulate critique of spatial 
Keynesianism and related state formations, and even of some variants of the so-
called competition state. In other words, rather than changing the nature of the 
capitalist mode of production, the discourses and practices of knowledge-based 
economization have since the 1990s contributed to the gradual spatial consoli-
dation of post-Keynesian national statehood and the associated emergence of 
new institutional, financial and regulatory landscapes of state power which also 
extend beyond state borders.
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Different labels have been used to define the new geopolitical condition 
we are presently living through. The arguments furthered in this book may 
bear a family resemblance to the idea of transnational liberalism as it was dis-
cussed by Agnew and Corbridge (1995) already more than 20 years ago. By 
this they referred to a de-centering and de-territorializing world character-
ized by overlapping sovereignties and networks of power which is run by the 
“new ideology of the market (and of market-access)”, which according to the 
authors is “being embedded in and reproduced by a powerful constituency of 
liberal states, international institutions, and what might be called ‘the circuits 
of capital’ themselves”. Their focus was on politico-economic practices related 
to such issues as the globalization of production and finance: they debated 
the internationalization of the state by arguing that the link between terri-
tory and state sovereignty was rapidly unraveling, and amalgamated the rise of 
transnational liberalism with the then increasingly dominant role of neoliberal 
ideational elements. But importantly from the perspective of the book at hand, 
they also went on to discuss the spatiality of the rising hegemony of transna-
tional liberalism as a network of overlapping powers and sovereignties which 
“define the world of internationalizing state activities” (Agnew and Corbridge 
1995, 193). The following quote summarizes one of their key claims about 
transnational liberalism:
The new hegemony of transnational liberalism is both polycentric and 
expansionist, and possibly unstable (in some respects) as a result. It is 
polycentric because power in the modern geopolitical economy is no 
longer (if it ever was) monopolized by nation-states. Economic, cultural 
and geopolitical power is now embedded in a network of dominant but 
internally divided countries (including the USA, Germany and Japan), 
regional groupings like the European Community (European Union), 
city-regions in the so-called Second and Third Worlds, international 
institutions including the World Bank, the IMF, GATT and the United 
Nations, and the main circuits and institutions of international production 
of financial capital. What binds these diverse regions and actors together is 
a shared commitment to an ideology of market economics and a growing 
recognition that territoriality alone is not a secure basis for economic or 
geopolitical power.
(Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 205–207)
During the past two decades, state strategies around the world disclose a num-
ber of efforts to create seemingly non-territorial spatial arrangements with the 
aim of securing the basis for political power through national economic suc-
cess. These strategies disclose what Demirović (2011) conceptualizes as the 
transnational network state. This is a state form which “consists of specific 
transnational state apparatuses, and on the other, it relies on regional and 
national state apparatuses permeated by transnational priorities and decision-
making processes” (ibid., 39). In the ensuing chapters, the polycentric world is 
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thus not understood as a field on which the state is competing for power against 
“regional groupings”, “city regions”, “international institutions” or “market 
players” – actors which would together or separately undermine state sover-
eignty. Rather, the state is comprehended as a contested terrain through which 
a range of political actors – be they political parties, social movements, trans-
national market players or international organizations – seek to extend their 
agendas and powers. To put it short and sweet: “the power of the state is the 
power of the forces acting in and through the state” ( Jessop 1990, 269–270). In 
other words, in knowledge-based economization the state remains a key social 
organization whose power and agency is constituted in the web of influences 
and struggles of the actors of the polycentric world.
The above-mentioned perspective draws on the strategic-relational theory 
of the state which highlights that the state as a political and social organiza-
tion is undergirded by economic processes (see, e.g. Jessop 1990, 2016; see 
also Kelly 1999). The state – and in some cases even a supranational polity 
like the EU – occupies a central stage in the socialization of economic orders. 
Accordingly, the state is a material consolidation of a relationship of forces 
which at a given time also makes it more responsive to particular strategies 
than others (Jessop 1990). The contextual nature of the state thus stems from 
the combination of forces acting in and through the state and the associated 
historically contingent selection and retention of policies. I argue in the fol-
lowing chapters that the geopolitics of knowledge-based economization sig-
nals the emergence of a transnational state apparatus as a particular relation of 
forces that brings together different “transnational” and “national” as well as 
public and private actors in the name of knowledge-intensive capitalism. The 
emergence of this transnational state apparatus epitomizes the ways in which 
the key forces of knowledge-based economization become central and form 
new kinds of relationships with and through the state. The power and perva-
siveness of knowledge-based economization is thus dependent on the concord 
between the dominant forces and their accumulation strategies, corresponding 
state forms and related hegemonic state projects.
The issue of de-geopolitization
A scholarly exploration of the geopolitical in the context of the knowledge-
based economy is long overdue. The various spatial articulations of the new 
technological world of hubs and purportedly slippery “soft” spaces that no 
longer respects state borders have been tirelessly repeated by business peo-
ple, management experts, urban developers, innovation specialists, consult-
ants, not to mention political decision makers and scholars, since the 1990s. 
And the closer we come to the present, the more salient these representations 
have grown. Analytically, what these representations indicate is that a pervasive 
conceptual opposition exists between the topological discourses of the knowl-
edge-based economy and the supposedly “outmoded” territorially organized 
world which is characterized by resource economy, territorial sovereignty and 
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a particular type of national citizenry. The discourses attendant to knowledge-
based economization thus possess notable capacity to frame contemporary 
political–economic conditions and state developments as non-geopolitical. 
This is perhaps one of the reasons why “global cities”, “innovation centers”, 
“special economic zones”, “global universities”, “high-tech development cor-
ridors”, “start-up spaces” and the like are rarely examined as geopolitical for-
mations. The de-geopoliticization of the present is obviously entangled with 
the more general de-politicization of public policies in the OECD world. This 
phenomenon requires sustained scholarly attention for a number of reasons, 
not least because it has potential political repercussions for how spatial policy 
formation across the spectrum of social life takes shape.
An exploration of the phenomenon of knowledge-based economization 
inescapably touches upon the relationship between the state, cities, populace, 
the wider world and capitalism. The aim of my geopolitical reading is to dis-
close and discuss these relationships. Indeed, the societal power of knowledge-
based economization derives partly from its capacity to introduce itself as a sort 
of natural force which brings about a particular type of new world and related 
spatial order. It is a world in which technological developments with regards 
to both physical and social spaces produce unforeseen political outcomes. And 
it is a world in which being visible and attractive, having a reputation for pro-
viding something distinctive to offer compared with other locales of the world 
political map, becomes a crucial component of political success and virtue. And 
it is a world in which examining the determinants and constituents of success-
ful economic environments, and providing policymakers and political elites 
with ideational tools to build and facilitate such environments for the sake 
of both political success and business growth, becomes common practice for 
scholars of regional development, spatial planning and economic geography.
The transcendence of knowledge-based economization does not diminish 
but highlights the role of the state in coordinating the construction of more 
localized competitive advantages. In so doing, the state authorities constantly 
occupy a central position in coordinating “national attempts” to claim a por-
tion of the global economic market. State authority is in such a world con-
stantly measured and analyzed with regard to the general competitiveness it 
embodies. This analysis simultaneously reifies the imagery of a particular us-
versus-them market-based competition. Failing to play the competitiveness 
game becomes depicted as nationally irresponsible and economically devastat-
ing political behavior – a symbol of government failure.
On the concept of geopolitics
The distinction between geopolitics and geoeconomics is not at the core of 
my analysis. It suffices, however, to say that the distinction between geoeco-
nomics and geopolitics is problematic from many angles, not least because it 
implies an analytically flawed and fallacious distinction between economy and 
politics. In the context of the geopolitics/geoeconomics divide, the distinction 
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between economy and politics is manifested in many ways. To illustrate, it is 
not untypical to argue that there are geopolitical “tools” or “means” (such as 
military force) that can be used for geoeconomic ends – whatever these may 
be. Or, alternatively, that there are economic tools, such as energy, that can 
be used geopolitically in the foreign policy arsenal of a given state. This latter 
approach draws its inspiration from the field of strategy, and has little to say 
about developments in capitalism (cf. Sparke 2017).
Another distinction between geoeconomics and geopolitics can be found 
in analyses that suggest an epochal transition from a sort of territorial-national 
geopolitics to (neoliberal) geoeconomics, that is, to globalizing capitalism and 
its expansionary tendencies. To illustrate, Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith 
(2009) argue that the contemporary world is characterized by a transition from 
the geopolitical social to geoeconomics, or, better, that geoeconomics is re-
casting rather than replacing geopolitical calculation. In such a perspective, 
the geopolitical social reverberates with the nation-state building, nationalism 
and statist practices that were associated with specific governmental techniques 
such as the extension of social security to all citizens, as well as with the acqui-
sition of territory and natural resources with the goal of accumulating national 
wealth. Cowen and Smith (2009) suggest that geoeconomic social forms and 
associated calculations are supplanting the geopolitical social in state-related 
practices. Accordingly, states increasingly seek to accumulate wealth through 
market control rather than through acquisition and control of territory (Cowen 
and Smith 2009, 31–32). As a consequence, the territory-resource-wealth 
nexus is bypassed by “non-territorial” attempts to control markets. In such a 
view, national territory is no longer aligned with national economic interest. 
The geoeconomic, in such a view, denotes the privatization of the state itself: 
“the state becomes an entrepreneur in its own right, a player in the market 
first and foremost rather than a regulator of the market’s ‘excesses’” (ibid., 41).
The Cowen and Smith’s (2009) argument is important in that it high-
lights the historically contingent production of territories of wealth as a crucial 
geopolitical issue. It is important to stress however that territories of wealth, 
power, security and belonging are also constantly produced and refashioned in 
the age of economic expansion, connectivity and global integration (cf. Sparke 
2007). Capitalist globalization indicates neither the hollowing out of national 
state territories and supranational territorial arrangements, nor an epochal shift 
to a world of geoeconomics. Rather, the contemporary de-nationalized pro-
cesses related to the hubs, flows and networks of globalizing capitalism are 
coupled with efforts to territorialize and nationalize such processes through 
political action. The materialist conception of geopolitics thus highlights the 
inherent tension between the social and economic logics in the space econ-
omy of capitalism in the context of the state in particular: a contradiction 
between territorial fixity and spatial expansion which potentially undermines 
“any structured coherence in a territory” (Harvey 2001, 329). In such a view, 
geopolitical conflict is characterized less by military confrontation and more by 
territorial transformation and the related tension between de-territorializing/
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de-nationalizing and territorializing/nationalizing processes of capitalism. A 
geopolitical reading of the knowledge-based economy enables one to re-think 
in particular the ways in which knowledge-based economization is a spatial 
process of state transformation.
The materialist conception of geopolitics makes the conceptual distinction 
between geopolitics and geoeconomics largely untenable. In such a view, capi-
talism is a dynamic geopolitical process that produces spaces and is re-produced 
through spatial configurations and human subjects. Furthermore, the restruc-
turing of spatial configurations is motivated by historically contingent ways of 
comprehending the nature of inter-territorial competition and conflict, the 
fundamental assets in such competition and the threats a given territorial unit is 
facing. Geopolitics, therefore, essentially denotes the production of economic 
value through spatial strategies, and of harnessing this value in the constitution 
and maintenance of territories of political power. In short, geopolitics refers to 
the production of territories of wealth, power, security and belonging, as well 
as to the conflicts and contradictions entailed therein.
At the risk of repetition, I would like to reiterate here that geopolitics of 
knowledge-based economization refers to a process which produces a spatial 
organization and related geopolitical subjects. Specific political forces seek to 
build a “new economy” which is based on innovations, high value, selective 
state spaces and particular segments of populace. This process is strategic in a 
dual sense. First, it is strategic in the sense of facilitating the circulation and 
accumulation of capital in the contemporary historical conjuncture through 
the creation of certain social, educational and physical infrastructures that allow 
the generation of surpluses. This re-making of capitalism produces cycles of 
territorial transformation, which Harvey (2001) associates explicitly with the 
geopolitics of capitalism. I suggest that this understanding of the concept of 
the geopolitical also involves crucial issues such as the relationships between 
states and cities, between political authorities and business firms and between 
nationalizing and transnationalizing political–economic forces.
Second, the phenomenon of knowledge-based economization is strategic 
in the sense of producing political territories of competition and subjectivities 
which can be harnessed to the circulation and accumulation of knowledge-
intensive capital. The geopolitics of knowledge-based economization thus 
refers to the emergence of “economic territories” as fundamental political 
issues. In knowledge-based economization, the qualities and effectiveness of 
these economic territories determine the very legitimacy of political power as 
well as the future of political communities as territories of wealth and power.
The geopolitical constitution of the 
knowledge-based economy
From the 1990s onwards, the material processes of the knowledge-based econ-
omy have been accompanied by political debates and scholarly literature on the 
development and nature of a new breed of territorial society. This is a telling 
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illustration of the ways in which knowledge-based economization is extended 
from a world of production to a wider societal phenomenon. Network soci-
ety, knowledge society, learning society and information society (for a critical 
interrogation of these terms, see Webster 2006) have in some respects become 
anchor concepts and terms in academic literature and in policy circles. Ideas on 
the ways in which society and the knowledge-based economy come together 
in the present political condition are thus not solely presented in academic 
literature. Different forces within state apparatus, city governments, regional 
authorities, diverse international actors such as the OECD, the WTO, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization and even transnational corporations 
have produced ideas on the role and meaning of this new society in the age of 
the knowledge-intensive and globally stretched economy. It has thus become 
a commonplace over the past two decades that the strategies of cities, regions, 
states and supranational actors explicitly articulate territorial entities vis-à-vis 
the knowledge-based economy. This is a peculiar process whereby different 
kinds of actors seek to locate political communities within the world of busi-
ness firms, yet at the same time place these corporations within the fabric 
of political communities. This duality characterizes knowledge-based econo-
mization, and it can be easily found in contemporary state strategies across 
the globe.
The following quotes by the Organization of American States, the EU 
and the Government of Canada can be considered exemplary, definitely 
not exceptional, efforts to translate the knowledge-based economy into 
the language of territorial politics, citizenship and inter-territorial rivalry. 
All the quotes bring together a set of diverse elements which position a 
given political community as confronted by purportedly changing political– 
economic circumstances.
A knowledge-based society refers to the type of society that is needed to 
compete and succeed in the changing economic and political dynamics of 
the modern world. It refers to societies that are well educated, and who 
therefore rely on the knowledge of their citizens to drive the innovation, 
entrepreneurship and dynamism of that society’s economy.
(Organization of American States 2014)
The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from 
globalization and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. 
These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and require 
a radical transformation of the European economy. The Union must 
shape these changes in a manner consistent with its values and concepts 
of society.
(European Council 2000)
Our vision for 2017 calls for a Canada that is known as the “Northern 
Tiger” due to our prowess in productivity and innovation. In the coming 
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decade, Canada will have seen the largest growth in productivity of any 
developed economy. By leveraging Canada’s advantages as an open econ-
omy which supports free trade, a diverse and innovative society, a strong 
regulatory framework, and capacity for research and development (R&D), 
Canada will be seen as an attractive country in which to invest. By raising 
the average skill level of Canadians, we will be better prepared to transi-
tion into new jobs and markets that currently do not exist and thereby 
transform traditional Canadian industries through the uptake of technol-
ogy. The managerial and entrepreneurial skills of Canadians will be recog-
nized internationally.
(Government of Canada 2016)
As becomes clear in these quotes, knowledge-based economization denotes a 
number of things in political strategies in different contexts. What these quotes 
also reveal, however, is that knowledge-based economization is associated with 
the production of new political spaces and new kinds of political subjectivities. 
There are also other significant commonalities in these formulations, which 
bring together seemingly diverse elements such as particular understandings of 
the contemporary world-political condition, citizens and their skills, the role 
of technology, human capital and innovation in both economic and politi-
cal success, as well as the importance of an “attractive society” or state and 
related “branding” as key factors in international competition. The knowl-
edge-intensive form of economy therefore emerges as a core factor in defin-
ing the political ideal type through a diverse set of components. In a scholarly 
analysis, these need to be identified and examined as interrelated elements 
that are both connected and constitutive of the phenomenon of knowledge-
based economization.
An emphasis on the interrelations and interactions among the different ele-
ments of knowledge-based economization obviously resonates with the con-
cept of assemblage, a concept which has recently gained credence in human 
geography and cognate fields (e.g. Acuto and Curtis 2013a; Anderson and 
McFarlane 2011; Donovan 2016; for a critical overview, see e.g. Allen 2011) 
to the degree that “almost everything is today ‘assembled’ – made up of pre-
carious socio-material relations” (Müller and Schurr 2016, 217). The roots of 
assemblage thinking are multiple and there are many ways to think with the 
concept of the assemblage. Rather than engaging in the debate on the nuances 
of the concept itself, I employ assemblage thinking similarly to Sassen (cit. 
Acuto and Curtis 2013b, 18–19) as an analytic tactic for singling out and bring-
ing into focus initially disparate but actually co-functioning and co-constituted 
elements that play a role in knowledge-based economization.
The idea of co-constitution and co-functioning is congruent with many 
of the key ideas of the cultural political economy insofar as these touch upon 
issues such as the “discursive” and “non-discursive” as well as efforts to denatu-
ralize economic imaginaries (for the latter, see Sum and Jessop 2013, 147–194). 
In such a view, knowledge-based economization evolves as a combination of 
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material and social entities that are separable only analytically. In my usage, the 
geopolitical constitution of the knowledge-based economy refers to interac-
tive “wholes” that consist of heterogeneous components such as institutions, 
procedures, concepts, analyses, reflections and different kinds of objects and 
subjects (Moisio 2015).
The geopolitical in the context of knowledge-based economization boils 
down to three interlinked, constitutive and co-functioning issues (cf. Dittmer 
2014; Müller 2015). First, geopolitical discourses articulate the nature and logic 
of the conceivably knowledge-intensive world within which political com-
munities are located. Second, objectifying calculative practices constitute and 
reify political communities and their components as units of competition in 
a global innovation game. These objectifying practices co-function with the 
geopolitical discourses. Knowledge-based economization thus involves analy-
ses through which a city, region, state, supranational polity or even a university 
can be understood as a geopolitical unit of competition. Third, geopolitical 
subjects are produced in educational and other practices to align with the geo-
political discourses and objectifying calculative practices of knowledge-based 
economization. These three constitutive elements are bound together in the 
constant efforts to produce territories of wealth, power and spatial belonging, 
and in the accumulation and circulation of capital (Figure 3.1.). By draw-
ing a distinction between geopolitical discourses, geopolitical subjects and 






















territories of wealth and power
- the production of business and management
  knowledge regarding inter-territorial competition
  and competitiveness in a post-Fordist setting
2. Geopolitical subjects
- the production of skilled labor (i.e. global
  entrepreneurs) in higher education and related
  spaces
- the relationship between human creativity and
  urban space
3. Objectifying calculative practices
- the constitution of geopolitical objects of
  inter-territorial competition
- the constitutive and governing role of metrics,
  indices, analyses, mappings etc.
1. Geopolitical discourses
Figure 3.1 Constitutive geopolitical elements of knowledge-based economization.
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and populaces come together and constitute the geopolitical in the process of 
knowledge-based economization.
Brief interim conclusions
What, then, is the benefit of associating knowledge-based economization with 
the concept of geopolitics? As Anni Kangas and I have argued elsewhere (Moisio 
and Kangas 2016), geopolitics serves as a necessary antidote to the highly de-
politicized representations which portray the knowledge-based economy, and 
associated social practices ranging from spatial and urban planning to higher 
education policies, as a mere pragmatic and technocratic enterprise. Tracing 
the geopolitical in the context of knowledge-based economization accentuates 
the post-Fordist economy as a site of strategic action where different politi-
cal forces and actors, state and non-state institutions alike, pursue their strate-
gies and realize their goals. Second, the concept of the geopolitical denotes 
processes of re-territorialization; it motivates one to focus on the role and 
composition of various micro- and macro-spaces where ideas, rationalities and 
technologies intersect in attempts to manage flows of capital (cf. Agnew and 
Corbridge 1995; Kangas 2013; Moisio and Luukkonen 2015). Third, the geo-
political perspective also motivates one to scrutinize the relevance of these 
spaces with respect to forms of geopolitical subjectivity. In so doing, a geo-
political analysis of knowledge-based economization involves an interrogation 
of the intertwining of the spaces of capitalism with politico-legal spaces which 
are not necessarily conjoined in the territorial form of the state (Mezzadra and 
Neilson 2013).
Knowledge-based economization manifests itself as a set of political strat-
egies, governmental projects and modes of calculation and analysis which 
“operate on something called the state” (Jessop 2007, 37). In this capacity, 
the knowledge-based economy is an instantiation of state power and rep-
resents a kind of distributed political authority which is constituted and re-
made by private actors, formal state institutions, international organizations 
and supranational political bodies (Sassen 2008). One may thus argue that 
the knowledge-based economy represents a particular institutionalization 
of political power relations around the state, albeit in a manner which does 
not resonate with national borders exclusively or with public authority 
solely. Rather, this institutionalization encompasses actors such as manage-
ment consultants and scholars, people employed in international organiza-
tions such as the OECD, civil servants working at all levels of governance, 
politicians, urbanists, think-tank debaters, representatives of business firms 
and lobby organizations. It is therefore difficult to characterize the phe-
nomenon of knowledge-based economization in conventional terms such 
as public/private, domestic/foreign or left/right. Rather, knowledge-based 
economization epitomizes the ways that state power increasingly mani-
fests itself as hybrid formations of private and public authority (Allen and 
Cochrane 2010) as well as associated spatial formations and practices. Thus 
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policy networks, both domestic and international, are crucial in the context 
of knowledge-based economization, as ideas and policies as well as policy-
makers and advocates travel within these networks.
Finally, knowledge-based economization is characterized by to-and-fro 
dynamics between the processes of de-territorialization (de-stabilization, often 
articulated with the concept of the global) and re-territorialization (often artic-
ulated with the concept of the nation or local community). In this capacity, 
knowledge-based economization resonates with the notion of the transnational 
state apparatus (cf. Demirović 2011). Knowledge-based economization repre-
sents a gradual condensation of the relations of political forces that operate on 
the basis of particular transnational priorities in the context of the state, cities 
and regions. It proceeds through projects that are predicated upon issues such 
as innovativeness, creativity, high-value jobs, urbanization, higher education, 
internationalization, globalization, flexibility and entrepreneurship, as well as 
through geopolitical discourses of the contemporary capitalist condition.
In 2004, I had an interesting conversation with a prominent Finnish spatial 
planning officer. He argued that the main goal of state-orchestrated regional 
planning was rapidly changing. According to the officer, all public govern-
mental interventions were increasingly being tailored in such a manner that 
they would enhance the development of innovation-driven local and regional 
economies. This change was, according to him, the result of globalization and 
the related shift in the ways in which the success of nation states is achieved. 
This was neither the first nor the last discussion with key state policymakers in 
which the name of Michael Porter was mentioned, or a more implicit refer-
ence made to concepts such as clusters and competitiveness.
This chapter takes stock of the above-mentioned thematic and makes three 
main arguments. First, I argue that knowledge-based economization is con-
stituted through a set of routinized geopolitical discourses which render the 
world thinkable and amenable to political programming in a particular manner. 
These discourses thus describe the spatiality of the contemporary condition 
in a manner which enables various actors to engage in the proverbial knowl-
edge-intensive capitalism. They are the raw material on the basis of which the 
knowledge-intensive form of capitalism is practiced in calculations, metrics, 
indices, mappings, analyses and comparisons which, in turn, define territorial 
units as geopolitical objects of competition.
Second, I suggest that the popular management knowledge developed by 
Michael Porter and his colleagues has contributed to the emergence of the geo-
political discourses through which the process of knowledge-based economi-
zation proceeds. Given the constitutive power of these management theories, I 
suggest that an analysis of Porter’s theories on the competitiveness of nations in 
particular uncovers some of the pivotal geopolitical discourses constitutive of 
the knowledge-intensive capitalist economy. My analysis seeks to demonstrate 
that these geopolitical discourses are contrived upon a unique type of spatial 
imaginary which diverges from the “land based” discourses that characterized 
most of the twentieth century. The geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-
based economy portray a new relational yet territorialized spatial drama on a 
putative global scale. In so doing, these discourses provide a meaningful but 
highly demanding condition for political leaders to act upon and demonstrate 
their statesmanship, and for spatial planners to manage regional transformation.
Geopolitical discourses 
and objects of knowledge-
based economization
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Finally, I suggest that these discourses are fundamental prerequisites which 
make the governing of the knowledge-intensive economy possible in the first 
place: they translate the economy into meaningful spatial objects and economic 
and cultural qualities that can be managed, controlled and manipulated politi-
cally. Geopolitical discourses thus both structure and effect the ways in which 
the contemporary form of knowledge-intensive capitalism is conceived and 
acted upon in different places.
Geopolitical discourses of knowledge-based 
economization: production sites and actors
Knowledge-based economization does not entail a shift away from the world 
of geopolitics, territorial politics and power to a sort of non-spatial postmodern 
world of “geoeconomy” and related imaginaries (cf. Van Ham 2001, 2, 6). 
Rather, the knowledge-based economy is constituted within geopolitical dis-
courses which frame territorial politics in a relational manner and which are in 
a co-constitutive relationship with the other geopolitical elements of knowl-
edge-based economization.
Critical geopolitics typically aims to deconstruct the hegemonic or coun-
terhegemonic geopolitical representations and geopolitical discourses (for a 
useful critique, see Müller 2008) of security and foreign policies as crafted 
by political elites or in popular media (ÓTuathail 1996). Perceived through 
a critical geopolitical lens, the spaces, objects and subjects inherent in the 
process of knowledge-based economization are produced discursively in 
representations and social practices. The knowledge-based economy is thus 
constituted in knowledge production, mapping exercises and strategic plan-
ning, and is practiced and acted upon in meetings, conferences and networks 
of action more generally. In particular, the conceivably uncertain world of 
knowledge-intensive global capitalism is constantly spatially ordered through 
analyses and associated concepts and ideas which make a connection between 
the putatively knowledge-intensive capitalism and territorially defined politi-
cal communities.
The role of geopolitical discourses in the constitution and co-constitution 
of geopolitical objects and subjects of the knowledge-based economy is cru-
cial. These discourses connect individuals and populations, along with their 
capacities and skills, to geopolitical objects of competition such as states, cities 
and regions. At the same time, the metrics, analyses, mappings, indices and 
other calculative practices that constitute geopolitical objects as units of global 
territorial competition (universities, cities, regions, states) reify and contrib-
ute to the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy. These 
geopolitical discourses thus provide the plot of the spatial drama of the con-
temporary capitalist condition and a necessary subtext on the ways in which 
the purported new economy represents a challenge to political communities. 
The geopolitical discourses and related imaginaries of the knowledge-based 
economy hence spatialize knowledge-intensive capitalism as a world that is 
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characterized by specific places, populations, events, processes and founding 
logics (cf. ÓTuathail and Agnew 1992, 192).
A geopolitical analysis of knowledge-based economization examines how 
and where these geopolitical discourses are produced and how they are dis-
seminated through actors such as scholars and other experts, political lead-
ers, consultants, advocates and advisors, for instance (Moisio 2015; cf. Dalby 
1990; ÓTuathail 1992). It hence not only scrutinizes the representations of 
the spatial specification of politics (Dalby 1991) but also examines the different 
actors who produce geopolitical knowledge in the context of the knowledge-
intensive form of capitalism. A geopolitical analysis also interrogates the ways 
in which geopolitical discourses are disseminated in wider society through par-
ticular infrastructures such as the media. Finally, it examines the mundane 
enactments of geopolitical discourses in policy circles and various micro-spaces 
such as universities and schools.
The geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy are produced 
by and large in certain sites, such as prestigious universities, private and public 
think tanks and international organizations. These sites have a clear constitutive 
role with respect to the ways in which the contemporary capitalist condition 
is understood as a distinctive spatial epoch. They are the command centers of 
authority which possess notable “socio-economic resources” (Agnew 2013), 
making their sense-making exercises influential. The actors producing the geo-
political discourses of the knowledge-based economy are thus often connected 
with well-known academic institutions, and their actions reflect the material 
structures of contemporary capitalism. In any case, these actors are not mere 
“mouthpieces” (Müller 2008, 326) but have a constitutive role in the process 
of knowledge-based economization.
Geopolitical discourses and related spatial imaginaries are produced in par-
ticular sites, but in addition there are infrastructures through which this knowl-
edge circulates. Prestigious periodicals with a global reach, such as Harvard 
Business Review and The Economist, are influential because of the reputation 
they enjoy in the fields of business, leadership, management and policymak-
ing. They contribute to the consolidation and routinization of the geopoliti-
cal discourses of the knowledge-based economy. These magazines form part 
of the intellectual infrastructure through which the geopolitical discourses of 
the knowledge-based economy are disseminated among various professionals, 
managers, business elites, officials, political decision makers and policy pundits. 
Since the 1990s, the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy 
have been circulated also in several of the classical geopolitical “airport peri-
odicals” such as Foreign Affairs.
The consumption of the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-intensive 
capitalist economy in turn indicates the ways in which academic and quasi-
academic theories not only shape policymaking in a given locale but also how 
these are transformed in the context of political decision making and planning 
(see. e.g. Kuus 2007). This moves the point of focus away from the represen-
tationalism of the geopolitical discourse and toward “the work of discourse” 
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(Thrift 2000, 385), that is, toward analyzing the place-bound social practices of 
translation and learning of geopolitical discourses.
Geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based 
economy: the role of management knowledge
Drawing on Thrift’s (2005) arguments, one may propose that from the 1990s 
onwards, knowledge-based economization has been intimately entangled 
with what had been dubbed the first “concerted global discursive operation 
of the cultural circuit of capital” and its efforts to engender “fast thought” 
among policymakers and political leaders (cf. Thrift 2005, 12, 13). In such 
a view, the geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy does not refer 
primarily to the interaction between business and academia. Perhaps more 
importantly, knowledge-based economization has been characterized by the 
interaction between public authorities, the management academe and man-
agement consultants.
Arguably, a particular type of management knowledge production or manage-
ment theorizing has played an essential role in ordering, reproducing and trans-
forming capitalist social formations in the age of putative knowledge- intensive 
capitalism ( Jessop 2004, 159). I suggest here that the geopolitical discourses of 
knowledge-based economization can be examined and hence brought to light 
through an analysis of popular management theories. Since the late 1980s, the 
management literature has grown in tandem with the rise of the imaginaries of 
the knowledge-intensive economy and has been embraced by many state and 
city governments, as well as agencies and political institutions such as the OECD, 
IMF, EU and WTO. The management literature has also extended the political 
and normative understanding of knowledge-intensive capitalism to the rest of 
the economy and across geographical and social spaces (cf. Thrift 2005). I sug-
gest below that a particular type of management knowledge has contributed to 
the geopolitical discourses which re-frame territorial competition.
The geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy are produced 
within epistemic communities which do not operate in the traditional seats of 
geopolitical reasoning such as military academies, security policy think tanks, 
international relations departments and ministries of defense. Rather, these 
communities operate in business and management schools and various public 
and private think tanks and other related organizations such as consultant com-
panies. The geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy are thus 
archetypically produced in elite business schools such as Stanford, INSEAD 
and Harvard (cf. du Gay 1996), international consultant companies with a 
focus on management and through the efforts of management gurus. These 
elite business and management schools, management consultancies and gurus 
produce the bulk of management knowledge central to the progression of 
knowledge-based economization. Within this idea industry, management pro-
fessionals produce the rudimentary ideas which are effectively developed and 
packaged by both universities and management consultancies.
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The packaged management knowledge represents lucrative business oppor-
tunities and is disseminated in periodicals, general and special media outlets, 
blogs, reports, books, videos and seminars, and is consumed not only by business 
leaders but also, and perhaps more interestingly, by politicians, policymakers and 
government officials. This also discloses how knowledge-based economization 
is constituted in the processes of production and communication of ideas.
Infrastructure such as management seminars, within which particular man-
agement knowledge and related fads are disseminated and consumed, represent 
a fundamental link that bridges business and government in the process of 
knowledge-based economization. Thrift (2005, 90) correctly argues that these 
seminars are a fundamental part of business life. But it is not only business lead-
ers who use these seminars to make sense of the supposedly chaotic and con-
fusing operational environment of contemporary knowledge-intensive “global” 
capitalism. Policymakers and political leaders, too, utilize seminars and confer-
ences to cope with the purportedly fast, uncertain, complex and tumultuous 
political–economic condition.
Indeed, if knowledge-based economization is marked by the rise of a new 
breed of business leader as a “cultural diplomat” (Thrift 2005, 43), it may not 
be overly bold to suggest that it is similarly characterized by the emergence of 
management politicians and management officials who comprehend knowl-
edge as the ultimate source of competitive advantage for political units in the 
age of global competition. Through seminars and other media, politicians, poli-
cymakers, administrators and officials become trained geopolitical agents who 
are converted to the fundamental importance of spatial and societal change in 
the age of knowledge-intensive capitalism. For these geopolitical agents, “accu-
mulation becomes the very stuff of life, through persuading the population to 
become its own prime asset” (ibid., 94).
Management knowledge is not geopolitically neutral, and policy practices 
which are premised on such knowledge produce, reproduce and transform 
states, cities and regions. Management knowledge does not of course repre-
sent a singular body of thought. Nonetheless this knowledge is geopolitical 
in nature and highly subjectivating (for the formation of “economic” subjects, 
see Larner 2012). The management theories I refer to below constitute and 
legitimate some spatial policy practices and policies of citizenship while mar-
ginalizing others (cf. Clegg and Palmer 1996, 3) and are arguably central to 
the emerging transnational “consciousness” which characterizes contemporary 
policymaking communities (see Peck and Theodore 2015, xv).
Porterian geopolitical reasoning: 
nationalizing inter-local competition
Knowledge-based economization has proceeded concomitantly with the rise 
of particular management theories. Theories concerned with the manage-
ment of globalizing business organizations in particular have been broadly 
 utilized in managing political communities since the 1990s. At the same time, 
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knowledge production that treats states, cities and regions as if these were 
quasi-business organizations has become salient and influential. Employing 
different management vocabularies in the context of political communities 
likewise contributes to knowledge-based economization and raises the promi-
nence of managerial professionals and other experts of management in the 
governmental attempts to stabilize the conceived uncertainty of contemporary 
global knowledge capitalism.
Geopolitical management theories constitutive of the process of knowl-
edge-based economization meld together innovation, entrepreneurialism, 
technology, information, flexibility (as opposed to bureaucracy), learning, 
growth and the politics of space. These theories serve as ideational frame-
works which articulate the way the world works, how it ought to work and 
how the success of not only firms but also political communities is created 
and sustained in the age of knowledge-intensive capitalism.
Since influential management theories are productive in the context of 
knowledge-based economization, an analysis of these theories offers the poten-
tial to uncover the geopolitical discourses which are embedded in these theo-
ries. Indeed, there has been only very scant interest in a geopolitical reading 
of the management literature. This is regrettable given that these manage-
ment theories effectively spatialize the global knowledge-based economy and 
articulate it as a world of its own logic and specificities. These management 
theories thus involve a geopolitical reasoning which rationalizes certain forms 
of policymaking.
The rest of the chapter elaborates the work of Harvard University Professor 
Michael Porter. My claim is that a Porterian form of geopolitical reasoning is 
an essential discursive constituent of knowledge-based economization. Porter 
began to articulate political communities in relation to their capacity to pro-
duce economic value in specific settings in the late 1980s, and an analysis of 
his work discloses the ways in which political success in this political con-
text increasingly came to be understood as occurring through the capability of 
firms to produce high value and the capacities of governments to support their 
activities in specific locales.
Michael Porter is one of the best-known management gurus, public 
intellectuals and academic policy advisors of the post-Fordist capitalist con-
dition. His work signals the coming together of notable business schools 
(with their skillfully commodified products), management consultancies 
and management gurus (as people who invent and distribute ideas, con-
cepts and insights). The intellectual figure of Porter thus uncovers some 
imbricated aspects which are worth mentioning in the era of academic 
management gurus.
First, the work of Porter signals how effective management knowledge is 
grounded on a certain academic quality label. Management gurus often work 
as educators in prominent universities and business schools, where their stu-
dents are inculcated with new ideas and insights. The prestigious university 
brand increases the symbolic status of particular management theories and 
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related packaged knowledge commodities. Indeed, one may consider the 
2001-founded Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness (ISC) at the Harvard 
Business School as the foundry of the process of commodifying, marketing and 
circulating the key ideas of Michael Porter and his colleagues in the worlds 
of business and policy. This Porter-chaired institute belongs to a continuum 
of development at the Harvard Business School, which already in the 1980s 
began to organize symposiums to promote particular strategic business plan-
ning approaches to urban government.
Magretta’s (2012, 7–8) claims that “Porter occupies a unique position”, 
that “his frameworks have become the foundation of the strategy field” and 
that Porter’s key theories are being taught “in every serious business program 
around the world” may not be terrible exaggerations. Porter has been awarded, 
for instance, the Global Management Guru Award, the Thinkers50 Lifetime 
Achievement Award, and has been ranked twice on the top of the Thinkers50 
biannual ranking list of the “world’s most influential management thinkers” 
(Thinkers50 2015). In mid-2017, Google Scholar records c. 340,000 hits for 
Porter’s publications, which makes him undoubtedly one of the most cited 
business and economics scholars in the world.
Second, Porter’s key concepts form the backbone of a packaged manage-
ment knowledge that is rather user friendly and which can be sold, circulated 
and consumed not only by firms but also political communities. His theory 
on the competitive advantage of nations, for instance, is tailored in such a 
manner that it “can be applied to any particular nation” (Porter 1998a, xv). 
Porter’s key concepts and related ideas are widely accepted, adopted and 
applied in policy circles. One of his basic intellectual questions – “why are 
some countries or regions more successful than others” (Magretta 2012, 1) 
in innovation-driven economic development – has been particularly appeal-
ing to governments in the OECD sphere and beyond after the crisis of 
Atlantic Fordism.
Porter’s ideas on innovation-driven growth have been widely disseminated 
in policymaking. Together they comprise a seemingly non-political and com-
pact toolkit which state and local governments can use to nurture their competi-
tiveness, productivity and economic efficiency. To illustrate, Porterian national 
competitiveness and cluster ideas have been discussed and analyzed in the con-
text of Korea, Italy, Sweden, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Britain, the US, 
Denmark, Germany, India, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru and Rwanda. Furthermore, 
Porter’s team has undertaken competitiveness assessment and national studies 
in Armenia, Bermuda, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Finland, Britain, Hong Kong, Ireland, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Kazakhstan, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Taiwan, Tartarstan, the UK and Venezuela. Moreover, Porter has conducted 
extensive studies of economic strategy for the governments of Canada, India, 
Kazakhstan, Libya, New Zealand, Portugal and Thailand (Porter 1998a, xxiv–
xxv). In 2000, Porter lists economic development initiatives, based on the clus-
ter concept, that include 29 nation states, 14 major regions, states or provinces 
54 Geopolitical discourses
and 11 cities or large metropolitan areas (Porter 2000, 31). The list has become 
more extensive since year 2000, of course.
The World Bank embraced cluster work as its core strategy in late 1990s, 
and numerous chambers of commerce, regional banks and city govern-
ments have circulated Porterian concepts and underlying reasonings. In 1988, 
Porter was recruited to President Ronald Reagan’s Commission on Industrial 
Competitiveness, which sought to examine the national competitiveness of the 
US. Porter’s more recent contributions to the actions of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) and its national competitiveness indicators further illustrate the 
historically contingent and profound policy influence of his work. Since the 
1990s, Porter’s conceptualizations of the nature of the contemporary capitalist 
condition have been normalized and routinized through conferences, con-
sultancies, books, seminars, appearances, the WEF and the like. The latter in 
particular has significantly contributed to the normalization and routinization 
of the concept of competitiveness in the context of nation states.
In sum, Michael Porter has acted as a policy advisor to tens of governments, 
ranging from local to supranational, and played a key role in policy networks 
which bring together consultants, policymakers, political leaders and the execu-
tives of international organizations and businesses. Many of the Porterian ideas 
on productivity, value creation, competitive strategy and clusters have become 
axiomatic for nation-state governments across the globe since the 1990s and 
particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. The multitude of 
state projects which can be connected to Porter’s concepts demonstrates the 
applicative and flexible nature of these management fashions or “knowledge-
brands” (Sum and Jessop 2013). These may function as neoliberal therapy in 
the context of nation states, cities and city-regions, and the same concepts can 
also be used to justify attempts by state governments to internationalize and 
de-border nation states.
The point here is not to interrogate whether the adoption of Porterian 
frameworks have had positive or negative economic and social impacts in dif-
ferent geographical contexts or whether the adoption of such expert knowl-
edge has led to the annihilation of democratic policymaking and to the related 
emergence of consultocracy (see, e.g. Kantola and Seeck 2011). The nature of 
Porter’s work is discussed in this book by virtue of the fact that it constitutes 
more generally many discursive elements of knowledge-based economization. 
His work also signals how innovation-driven management ideas cross and 
stretch the border between the world of business firms and political communi-
ties, and in so doing bring business and management effectively into the realm 
of politics and government. This is, of course, also a fundamental element in 
the process of knowledge-based economization.
Porter’s work on the competitive advantage of nations can be consid-
ered as a sort of big bang which was followed by a mushrooming of aca-
demic scholarly literature on territorial competition and competitiveness. The 
conceptual frameworks and the related indices Porter and his colleagues at 
Harvard University and elsewhere have developed in books, articles, talks and 
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conferences from the 1980s onwards are characterized by a notable endurance 
which cannot be explained without understanding the historical milieu within 
which these frameworks have been invented. The Porterian theories of ter-
ritorial competition must therefore be comprehended as a historically contin-
gent phenomenon.
Porter’s work, which is at least loosely Schumpeterian, found a fertile 
ground in the context of the crisis of Atlantic Fordism and contributed to the 
rise of the putative knowledge-intensive form of capitalism. In other words, 
the Porterian geopolitical discourses provided a destination point in the new 
post-Fordist spatial condition to strive for at exactly the moment when the 
Western industrial states were experiencing low growth, high inflation and 
rising unemployment. Porter’s work ultimately highlights the growing promi-
nence of innovation, learning and human capital for the purposes of firms in 
such a manner that facilitates the production of nation states but also cities and 
“regions” as innovation-driven economic territories or territories of wealth.
Porterian geopolitical reasoning and 
knowledge-based economization
The geopolitical discourses inherent in knowledge-based economization are 
premised on diverse forms of idea-work and analysis which touch upon issues 
such as innovation, networking, learning, creativity, entrepreneurship and 
competitiveness in the context of territorial entities. These discourses frame 
the relationship between political community and political strategy in a spatial 
manner, and they furnish the ideational and symbolic capital that enable the 
political elites to act in the name of the state, city and region.
Michael Porter’s work in the 1990s on the nature of territorial competition 
and related ideas such as the diamond model and cluster concept presumes 
a particular relationship between the state and global knowledge-intensive 
capitalism. An analysis of Porter’s theories on strategy, competition and the 
competitive advantage of nations in particular brings to light some of the geo-
political discourses through which knowledge-based economization proceeds.
The rest of this chapter provides a geopolitical reading of a selected set of 
Porter’s work in the 1990s and early 2000s. The focus is on texts on competi-
tion, competitiveness and the competitive advantage of nations. These works 
mark a transition in Porter’s work from firm strategies and competitive advan-
tages of industries and companies to the competition between nations (the 
so-called nation states), regions and cities. This corpus of work also marks a 
qualitatively new kind of Schumpeterian emphasis which places innovations 
and technological change at the core of the geopolitical strategy of nation states.
This shift in interest from companies to the relationship between business 
firms and states is most explicitly articulated in The Competitive Advantage of 
Nations (first published in 1990), one of the most influential management texts 
of our time. In this book, Porter extends his earlier firm-level approach to 
competition (in particular Porter 1980; 1985) to nation states, and in so doing 
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places the issue of national economic competitiveness at the heart of national 
interest. Porter’s work particularly aims at those states which are trying “to 
move away from dependence on cheap labor and natural resources” (Porter 
1998a, xxviii). This is one of the reasons why Porter’s work on territorial 
competition and competitiveness entails some of the geopolitical discourses 
that are crucial constituents of knowledge-based economization. In order to 
uncover these discourses, I single out five overlapping imaginaries central in 
the Porterian geopolitical reasoning.
Epochal shift to the era of innovations: the 
new age of territorial competition
First, the Porterian concept of national competitiveness is tightly connected 
to the purported knowledge-intensive phase of capitalism. Articulating an 
epochal shift to a new form of inter-territorial competition is not only a fun-
damental discursive characteristic of Porter’s work but also reveals one of the 
central discursive constituents of knowledge-based economization as a spatial 
phenomenon. Porter suggests that
although location remains fundamental to competition, its role today dif-
fers vastly from a generation ago. In an era when competition was driven 
heavily by input costs, locations with some important endowment – a 
natural harbor, for example, or a supply of cheap labor – often enjoyed 
a comparative advantage that was both competitively decisive and per-
sistent over time. Competition in today’s economy is far more dynamic. 
Companies can mitigate many input-cost disadvantages through global 
sourcing, rendering the old notion of comparative advantage less relevant. 
Instead, competitive advantage rests on making more productive use of 
inputs, which requires continual innovation.
(Porter 1998b, 78)
Within the process of knowledge-based economization the new world is thus 
constituted as a vast field of innovations, profit and success or failure of entire 
nations. It is a field on which nation states compete through their strategies 
and through the performance of “their” firms. In this inter-state competition, 
nation states are not in danger of being conquered militarily by other states, nor 
are they in danger of disappearing from world political map entirely. Rather, 
nation states are in danger of losing their political–economic basis and related 
status, prestige and reputation among states. Furthermore, this articulation of 
inter-state competition includes the promise that less “developed” nation states 
may climb the ladders of the political–economic development hierarchy of 
states and in so doing change their status entirely. In such a view, the recent 
restructuring of world affairs is premised on competition between firms and 
political communities as “economic territories” (Brenner and Wachsmuth 
2017, 86). This kind of reasoning not only draws on Joseph Schumpeter’s ideas 
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on the role of innovations in competition and strategy but also represents a 
form of geopolitical realism descendent from the strategic management school 
of thought – and to a lesser extent from international economics. Echoing the 
geoeconomic reading of world affairs that appeared in the early 1990s (see, 
e.g. Thurow 1992), for Porter the state represents a strong self-interest and a 
clearly defined national interest. Within such a frame, states seek to maximize 
outcomes within their borders, regardless of how other nation states are affected 
(Moisio 2017).
The Porterian geopolitical reasoning can be comprehended as a form of 
geostrategy which discusses the capacity of the state to act strategically in order 
to strengthen its place and region-specific economic potentials. In this capac-
ity, the Porterian geopolitical reasoning is premised on an idea of inter-state 
rivalry over the capacity to produce economic value. This capacity, in turn, 
determines the overall success of a nation among its competitor nations if rated 
on the basis of prosperity, affluence and “development” (Moisio 2008). In 
sum, this inter-state rivalry is not about mastering strategic locations in physi-
cal geographical terms but rather touches upon the active strategic locating of 
the state in the spaces of a global economy of innovations and the associated 
hierarchy of states.
Global inter-state competition, or a contest 
of local business environments
Knowledge-based economization is constituted through an imaginary of the 
global. Porter’s work articulates inter-state competition on the global scale as 
being the core dimension of the contemporary capitalist condition. Because 
“global competition nullifies traditional comparative advantages and exposes 
companies to the best rivals from around the world” (Porter 1998, 87), inter-state 
competition is inescapably global in nature. Porter fabricates a world in which 
the relationship between corporations and governments is a key issue for nations’ 
competitiveness and hence for their fate in the global setting. Accordingly,
factor inputs themselves have become less and less valuable in an increas-
ingly global economy. Neither is competitiveness secured by size or mili-
tary might, because neither is decisive for productivity. Instead, prosperity 
depends on creating a business environment, along with supporting insti-
tutions, that enable the nation to productively use and upgrade its inputs 
….  Failure to understand the distinction between comparative advantage 
and the new competitive advantage of nations is one of the root causes 
of problems in economic development. Merely using the resources avail-
able, or assembling more resources, is not enough for prosperity …. In the 
modern global economy, prosperity is a nation’s choice. Nations choose 




An analysis of Porter’s work discloses another important discursive component 
of knowledge-based economization: inter-state competition is not portrayed as 
a zero-sum race to the bottom, for “many nations can simultaneously improve 
their productivity, and with it their health” (Porter 1998a, xxii).
Porter’s work is premised on the idea that the contemporary world is 
marked by “a broader struggle over profits, a tug-of-war over who will cap-
ture the value an industry creates” (Magretta 2012, 9). The basic concern 
in Porter’s theory of national competitiveness and inter-state competition is 
hence why firms and industries which are located in one particular nation state 
territory innovate and thus create more value than firms and industries which 
are located in another state territory. Comprehending how some industries 
are more successful, productive and competitive in some states rather than in 
others ultimately informs the notion of territorial competition. The same logic 
of comprehending forms the basis for state-based Porterian competitiveness 
indexing, comparisons and related benchmarking, which similarly constitute 
knowledge-based economization. Inter-territorial competition in knowledge-
based economization is premised on an imaginary of “winning” states which 
attract a particular type of investments and companies and provide them with a 
putative unique environment that differs from those offered by territorial rivals. 
The declaration of winners and losers in comparative practices like “competi-
tive indexing” indeed normalizes the concept of competitiveness at the scale of 
the nation state (Fougner 2006).
The concept of cluster conveys a number of the qualities of the geopolitical 
discourses that in part constitute the process of knowledge-based economiza-
tion. Cluster refers to “a geographic concentration of competing and cooper-
ating companies, suppliers, service providers, and associated institutions”, and 
often include governmental or other institutions such as universities (Porter 
1998b, 78). The concept highlights not only the role of geographical concen-
trations of firms but also the need of nation states to attract companies to locate 
within their borders. Porter (2000, 16) argues explicitly that “new influences of 
clusters of competition have taken on growing importance in an increasingly 
complex, knowledge-based economy”. Because the “basis of competition has 
shifted more and more to the creation and assimilation of knowledge”, Porter 
(2008, 171) goes on, “the role of the nation has grown”.
The geopolitical discourses constitutive of the process of knowledge-
based economization portray the nation state as a set of localities which 
either have or do not have the potential to thrive in global competition. 
Indeed, a constant local-global-national interplay is a fundamental feature 
of knowledge-based economization. Porter argues how “the enduring com-
petitive advantages in a global economy lie increasingly in local things – 
knowledge, relationships, and motivation – that distant rivals cannot match” 
(Porter 1998b, 78). It is in this context that the concept of cluster contributes 
significantly to the geopolitical concept of national competitiveness which, 
in turn, challenges the traditional idea of comparative advantages and related 
territorial specialization.
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Porter (1998b, 78) argues that clusters are a “striking feature of virtually 
every national, regional, state, and even metropolitan economy, especially in 
more economically advanced nations”. The concept of cluster therefore dis-
closes a world of knowledge-based economization, a world of absolute advan-
tages and related competition over investments, income levels and profits. It is 
a quality of “advanced nations” in particular to be capable of enhancing value 
production in local milieux. The concept of cluster and the associated notion 
of advanced nations, together produce one of the central geopolitical discourses 
of the knowledge-based economy: the understanding of the world as if it were 
characterized solely by firm-based economic growth and micro-economic 
business environments and associated critical masses (Porter 1998b, 78).
In the Porterian geopolitical reasoning, firms, their interaction and the 
political support they get, emerge as key political issues through which inter-
state competition plays out. The keys to national competitiveness are func-
tional geographical micro-spaces which have a particular political–economic 
anatomy. Clusters facilitate the productivity of companies and bring them into 
interaction. This kind of Porterian understanding of agglomeration economies 
is constitutive of the process of knowledge-based economization. Accordingly, 
geographical concentrations are fundamental elements of national competitive-
ness because they include multiform innovation potential that can be harnessed 
by business firms. They increase the productivity of companies based in these 
locales and stimulate the birth of new businesses.
The role of the state in governing global 
competition in the world of innovations
The concept of cluster is a key element of knowledge-based economization. 
The concept produces a world of national micro-spaces – the strategic magnets 
of economic activity that provide the necessary social bases and economic as 
well as cultural incentives (a will to compete but also cooperate) not only for 
innovation and related utilization of knowledge but also for inter-territorial 
competition – which determine the nation’s fate as a territory of wealth and 
power. In the Porterian state-centered geopolitical reasoning, if the state gov-
ernment is successful in providing politically stable and economically moti-
vating framework conditions (e.g. through taxation and public investments) 
through both micro- and macro-economic means, the success of these micro-
spaces translates into national wealth (Porter 2000).
Rather than downplaying the role of government and politics, knowledge-
based economization highlights the role of public institutions in governing a 
nation’s fate as a territory of wealth. According to Porter (1998a, xxiii), this 
implies “a minimalist government role in some areas (e.g., trade barriers, pric-
ing) and an activist role in others (e.g., ensuring vigorous competition, provid-
ing high-quality education and training)”. One might actually argue that in 
knowledge-based economization wealth generation is placed at the core of 
“national interest” and understood as governed by productivity.
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The Porterian reasoning highlights the need for political coordination 
and action in the generation of political success. The geopolitical discourses 
of knowledge-based economization actually responsibilitize governments in 
two noteworthy respects: governments are compelled to both invest public 
money in innovation-driven growth and coordinate productivity in all sectors 
of human life and economic activity. Political actors need to understand that 
“productivity, not exports or national resources, determines the prosperity of 
any state or nation … Recognizing this, governments should strive to create an 
environment that supports rising productivity” (Porter 1998b, 89).
The cluster concept expresses the spatiality of the constitutive discourses 
of knowledge-based economization. Porter’s “diamond model”, in turn, fur-
ther highlights the role of the state. The four factors of the diamond – factor 
(input) conditions, demand conditions, context for firm strategy and rivalry 
and related and supporting industries – also become key factors in inter-state 
competition (Porter 2000, 20). The co-evolution of the supply-side factors, in 
turn, creates the micro-economic foundations of national success that enable 
“national” firms to gain and sustain competitive advantages. This is where the 
diamond model and the cluster concept come together: the micro-foundations 
of prosperity are strongest when they form a cluster. Geographical concentra-
tion enhances interaction among the four factors in the diamond model and 
boosts productivity, growth, employment and, hence, national competitive-
ness. The diamond model and cluster concept not only allow Porter to argue 
for enhancing competitiveness vis-à-vis competitor states but also disclose an 
important discursive dimension of knowledge-based economization: namely, 
an understanding that states can contribute to their competitiveness through 
political interventions which motivate firms to take risks. Moreover, it is the 
responsibility of the state and other public authorities to construct a business 
environment which enables increases in firm productivity, profits and, thus, 
national wealth.
In this context, one important qualitative dimension of the geopolitical dis-
courses of knowledge-based economization is worth highlighting: the respon-
sibilization of governments to invest in innovation-driven growth. Indeed, 
public policies in the OECD states have been characterized by attempts to 
increase support for industries through public research-and-development 
funding and to enhance the development of Porterian clusters since the early 
1990s in particular (Sum and Jessop 2013). The geopolitical discourses which 
highlight global inter-territorial competition thus seem to have effected what 
Mazzucato (2013) calls the entrepreneurial state.
Mazzucato (2013) discloses the fact that states have effectively acceler-
ated innovation and associated technological developments since the 1980s. 
Governments have played a pivotal role in creating businesses based on 
innovations. Accordingly, governments have created framework conditions 
which have been effectively utilized by business corporations in high tech and 
beyond. Even though this fact is almost invariably neglected by neoliberal pro-
tagonists of knowledge-based economization, various supply and demand-side 
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governmental interventions and associated national projects have been crucial 
to furthering the development of the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism 
during the past three decades.
One may argue that the process of knowledge-based economization has 
largely advanced through states which have acted as risk-takers at times of 
political–economic uncertainty. These governments have provided “patient” 
strategic funding for corporations, universities and the like but have also tai-
lored policies in order to create markets. In so doing, such governments have 
fundamentally furthered innovation-driven societal development in the age of 
putative global inter-territorial competition. Within the past two decades or 
so, this has brought about a sort of innovation state that channels notable public 
investments into various intangibles, and provides opportunities for business 
firms to tap into public coffers.
The spatial flexibility of territorial competitiveness, and 
the global value chain as a geopolitical space
The economic imaginaries of territorial competition and competitiveness related 
to knowledge-intensive capitalism are spatially flexible. They may highlight 
the role of cities, city-regions, metropolitan areas or regions. The Porterian 
clusters may even “cross national borders” (Porter 1998b, 79). Linking the 
performance of a business firm to its location and eventually nationalizing this 
location nonetheless expresses one of the basic tenets of not only Porterian 
geopolitical reasoning but also the process of knowledge-based economization 
more broadly. Accordingly, governments should think of their entire territo-
ries as business environments within which particular potentials of innovation 
can be harnessed for effective use (Porter 1998a, xxiii). In other words, even 
if the contemporary world requires thinking beyond national frameworks and 
innovating for an increasingly global market, knowledge-based economiza-
tion is produced in geopolitical discourses that highlight the role of the nation 
state as a strategic space of action in the context of global competition. The 
subordination of cities and regions to the “national” objectives of the inno-
vation state has manifested itself in a number of ways. One may for instance 
argue that state governments which embrace knowledge-based economization 
constantly responsibilitize cities and regions to develop innovation-driven local 
economies and associated projects or risk being ineligible for the public money 
available through various state-orchestrated funding schemes.
Within the process of knowledge-based economization, cities and regions 
are often constituted as facilitators of national competitive advantages and units 
of competition which are subordinated to the state. Their legitimacy, per-
formance and very existence is defined and measured on the basis on their 
economic competitiveness. This kind of geopolitical reasoning fuses the idea 
of the competitiveness of political communities and firms so that different fac-
tors ranging from the price and cost competitiveness of a business firm to the 
role of public authorities in engendering and enhancing the role of economic 
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micro-spaces become crucial issues in public policymaking. Accordingly, vir-
tually all public policymaking should contribute to national competitiveness.
The Porterian geopolitical reasoning highlights that the success or failure 
of the state and related political forces can be measured on the basis of their 
efforts to enhance the competitiveness of firms. In the geopolitical discourses 
of the knowledge-based economy, the nation state is constituted ultimately as 
a facilitator of the profitability of capital and labor. The primary goal of the 
nation state is to act strategically in order to facilitate the accumulation of capital 
within its territorial jurisdictions. This can be done through creating a support-
ive and attractive political–economic environment for business activities, and 
through maximizing the availability of a highly skilled and flexible workforce. 
In addition, the state needs to ensure that there are no major politically created 
obstacles to innovation-driven growth. Within such a frame, the national inter-
est is basically a moving object: a constant attempt to achieve the status of the 
knowledge and innovation-driven “economic state”, a sort of highest category 
of states which have successfully situated themselves within global value chains.
In the process of knowledge-based economization, the global value chain – 
another central concept in the contemporary management literature – appears 
as a pivotal strategic space to which states are compelled to position themselves. 
In other words, the global receives its meaning through the seemingly firm-
centered and stateless global value chains as well as the related value hierarchy of 
such chains. Indeed, the ubiquitous policy debate on the need to attract a par-
ticular kind of “high value” foreign direct investment is a perfect illustration of 
the emergence of the global value chain as a state-centric strategic space. It is a 
space in which a variety of governance functions have been delegated to private 
actors (see also Mayer and Phillips 2017). Similarly, relaxing taxation regimes 
and implementing policies of competitiveness, lowering investment costs, cre-
ating exceptional business spaces and using subsidies to boost the attractiveness 
of territorial economies to multinational corporations are today widely pro-
moted as fundamental means to re-position a “nation” with regard to the global 
value chains. These strategic acts receive their justification from the geopolitical 
discourses constitutive of knowledge-based economization. Accordingly, entire 
territorial states can be re-positioned relative to their competitor states (Granas 
and Nyseth 2007). For instance, the recent efforts to brand states or nations can 
be understood as one of the manifestations of the emergence of the global value 
chain as a geopolitically meaningful strategic space.
Productivity and the fate of nations
Finally, internalizing the elements of competitiveness in a particular manner con-
tributes to the process of knowledge-based economization. The pivotal ques-
tion in Porter’s conceptualization of national competitiveness is how to increase 
productivity. He singles out various factors of national competitiveness, and lists 
diverse infrastructure issues such as housing stock, health care, cultural institu-
tions, transportation systems and resources such as a nation’s human capital 
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resources and the availability of investment capital. Porter proposes that every 
nation should analyze its competitiveness and ensure that all national institutions 
contribute to nurturing national competitiveness through enhancing processes 
that seek to increase productivity (Porter 1998b, 74–91). Low productivity 
thus signals that a nation’s political institutions are not working properly in 
the face of global competition. Accordingly, the political institutions have not 
been able to facilitate the movement toward the innovation-driven economy 
both in terms of technological change and compelling individuals and popula-
tions to act more productively. The generation and maintenance of jobs in 
high tech, health care, marketing, finance, consulting, biotechnology, telecom-
munications, digital networks, electronics, automation, energy and aeronautics 
thus requires political forces to develop particular business environments and a 
related culture of competition in order to increase productivity.
In sum, knowledge-based economization is constituted through imaginaries 
that couple the issue of productivity with national fate. Accordingly, it is the 
role of every government to elevate “the national priority placed on competi-
tion” (Porter 1998b, 681) through creating incentives for its populace. Nation 
states and their populaces are hence connected to the global competition for 
prosperity through the idea of productivity, which, in turn, is a decisive factor 
of political success. Productivity is an issue which requires national govern-
mental action because a nation which loses its ability to compete in a range of 
high-productivity and high-wage knowledge-based industries is in a constant 
danger of losing its standard of living and its status as a territory of wealth. 
Porter (2008, 177) hence argues that “it’s the type of jobs, not just the ability 
to employ citizens at low wages, that is decisive for economic prosperity”.
Some implications of Porterian geopolitical reasoning
To summarize what has been said on the previous pages, the competitive 
advantage of nations refers to the national attributes that foster competitive 
advantage in particular industries and to the implications both for firms and for 
governments (Porter 1998a). I have suggested that such a theory contributes to 
the process of knowledge-based economization.
But Porter’s theory has also sparked serious academic criticism. Krugman 
(1996, 18), for instance, laments that
while influential people have used the word “competitiveness” to mean that 
countries compete just like companies, professional economists know very 
well that this is a poor metaphor. In fact, it is a view of the world so much in 
conflict with what even the most basic international trade theory tells us that 
economists have by and large simply failed to comprehend that this is what the 
seemingly sophisticated people who talk about competitiveness have in mind.
Krugman proclaims that under conditions of relatively open trade, nation 
states are never in a fundamental win-lose competition against each other. 
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Accordingly, states should not be understood as wealth-creating social organi-
zations either in policymaking or in research. For Krugman, national competi-
tiveness is a “dangerous obsession” and, at best, only a “poetic way of saying 
productivity” (Krugman 1994).
Scholars have also pointed to the contradictory nature of the Porterian idea of 
substantial inter-state competition in the post-Fordist world. They have argued 
that the new capitalist condition is characterized by specialization through local 
or regional concentration of economic and business activities in the high-tech 
sector, for instance. Agnew (2003, 78) argues that in such a context “national 
economies (as opposed to more localized ones) are even less likely to be in 
‘competition’ than they were in the past when industries were more organized 
on a national rather than a transnational basis”. Bristow (2005) proposes that 
regional competitiveness – a variant of the Porterian concept of competitive-
ness – is a chaotic concept and much overvalued in policymaking. Kitson et al. 
(2004) observe that the concept of regional competitiveness is elusive and has, 
harmfully, become almost naturalized as one of the core phenomena of modern 
capitalism. Brenner and Wachsmuth (2017, 86), in turn, criticize the concept 
of territorial competitiveness both in academic research and in policymaking. 
Accordingly, they argue, it leads to a kind of “competitiveness trap”. For them, 
territorial competitiveness is premised on “flawed intellectual assumptions”; 
it serves largely as “a means of ideological mystification in the sphere of local 
policy development” and results in “socially polarizing policies”.
Irrespective of the many relevant critiques, Porter’s conceptualizations of 
the ways in which territorial nation states compete through their internal 
spaces in the post-Fordist context have had major implications with respect to 
how policy goals and contents, policy instruments and policy programs have 
both been articulated and taken shape in different geographical contexts during 
the past 20 years.
The geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy highlight the 
idea that coming to terms with the fundamental uncertainties of contemporary 
capitalism requires effective national strategy work. The policy relevance of the 
Porterian geopolitical reasoning is hence at least partially based on the effec-
tive nationalization of local and regional concentration of economic activities, 
related assets and profitable human behavior. The geopolitical discourses of the 
knowledge-based economy touch upon the issue of how the economic suc-
cess of a nation determines its political success as a territory of wealth and how 
economic success is ultimately based on local economic milieus. This renders 
world affairs understandable in such a manner that political leaders become 
increasingly prone to define their states as entrepreneurial business actors and 
to articulate their national interest on the basis of inter-state economic rivalry 
(Moisio 2008; Browning and de Oliveira 2017).
The idea that more or less coherent territorial nation states are involved in 
economic competition was somewhat paradoxically placed on the agenda by 
the crisis of the Keynesian-Fordist mode of capital accumulation. It thus found 
its momentum in the context of the fear of the unraveling of the “national” 
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mode of accumulation. In the 1998 version of The Competitive Advantage of 
Nations, Porter (1998a, xxvi) revealingly looks back on the early 1990s and 
explains the success of the book:
The book appeared at a time of growing competition in virtually every 
nation …. Whether prosperous or mired in poverty, nations, states, and 
regions all over the world were searching for ways of coping.
That the theory of the competitive advantage of nations provided a seemingly 
actionable framework for how to improve the state’s competitiveness is one 
of the reasons why it has been so welcomed by practitioners of government.
But an analysis of Porter’s theory on the competitive advantage of nations 
also exposes a duality which characterizes the process of knowledge-based 
economization more generally. It underscores the increasingly localized 
and regionalized basis of economic performance within industrialized states. 
Simultaneously, it highlights the fundamental need to politically advance 
such localization and regionalization as a state-centered strategy. Knowledge-
based economization is indeed constituted through geopolitical discourses that 
nationalize the inter-city or inter-urban competition which many argue is the 
fundamental characteristic of post-Fordism (see, e.g. Scott 2001).
Indeed, the geopolitical discourses of national competitiveness clearly have 
particular affective qualities, as they address “national” anxieties, pride, threats 
and social tensions, linked to growth or decline, as well as related pressures of 
the economic restructuring of states “in a globalized information age” (Sum 
and Jessop 2013, 305). Porter’s work on the competitive advantage of nations 
is not only impregnated with affective and highly contextual qualities but also 
evinces an understanding that the nation state can and should be articulated 
through concepts which were previously used predominantly in the context 
of business firms.
It would be hence an understatement to argue that national competitiveness 
is merely a contemporary buzzword, or that it is a mere ideological fantasy 
or conceptual fallacy (Brenner and Wachsmuth 2017, 100). It should rather 
be treated as a combination of economic imaginaries that contribute to the 
formation of the essential geopolitical discourses of the contemporary capital-
ist condition. The concept territorializes the economic processes inherent in 
the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism. It also motivates governments to 
imagine that sub-national territories, cities and city-regions “must compete 
with one another for economic survival through the attraction of transnation-
ally mobile capital investment” (ibid., 85).
The geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy produce 
the state discursively as an active and coherent agent – even if the state is 
inescapably characterized by many different objectives, agendas and agents. 
Competitiveness has nonetheless become a nationalizing and territorializing 
policy object in itself, and it can be connected to many different policy fields 
and articulated in many situations. Even though ideas and practices related to 
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territorial competition date back centuries, the Porterian geopolitical reasoning 
that emerged in the 1990s has played a critically constitutive role in the process 
of knowledge-based economization during the past three decades.
Geopolitical discourses which highlight territorial competition and com-
petitiveness and the role of local clusters in engendering the competitiveness of 
nation states have had implications in spatial planning, too. In policymaking, 
the Porterian ideas of competitiveness – which are premised on the inter-
play between nationalization, localization and urbanization of national inter-
est – were in the early 1990s still related to late managerial Keynesian state 
interventionism. The Porterian geopolitical reasoning materialized in different 
geographical contexts in the form of technopoles, industrial parks, innovation 
parks and the like. This late Keynesian knowledge-based economization was 
already spurred by the idea of national territorial competition in the purport-
edly new kind of innovation-driven global capitalism. It manifested itself as 
efforts to build spaces of competition through state-orchestrated but locally 
manifested planning initiatives that often focused on built environments and 
related land use.
The role of land use planning in the building of national competitive advan-
tages through local geographical concentrations has not altogether diminished. It 
has nonetheless been increasingly coupled with centrally and locally orchestrated 
(soft) strategic planning which is premised on the goal of constructing a diverse 
set of economic potentials through urban space. This has resulted, it must be 
stressed, in the production and imagining of various “soft spaces” and ubiqui-
tous geographical nodes or spots of innovation. In other words, the Porterian 
imaginaries of territorial competition and competitiveness are still to be found 
at the core of state policies and local development policies, albeit nowadays in a 
qualitatively different fashion compared with the situation in the 1990s.
The concepts of national competitiveness and the state’s international com-
petitiveness remain axiomatic notions in policy circles across the globe, but 
the emphasis on industrial clusters has been increasingly accompanied by new 
strategic planning and related vision work concerning start-up ecosystems, 
commodified urban spaces, spaces of experiments and stratified techniques of 
increasing the innovative potentials of the nation state populace. There is an 
ongoing shift therefore from built environments to the putatively deeper spaces 
of economy which the term ecosystem of innovations is often used to depict. 
This shift is manifesting itself in a number of states and cities as the increasingly 
prominent role of a kind of “economic potential planning”. One may thus 
argue that during the past 10 to 15 years new wine has been mixed in the old 
bottles of competitiveness.
Time, space, location and interaction in geopolitical 
discourses of the knowledge-based economy
I have suggested in this chapter that the geopolitical discourses of knowledge-
based economization, easy to find in mainstream academic writings, highlight 
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that the ways in which state success and the sought-after system of capital 
accumulation come together in a particular historical conjuncture is a matter 
of politics, policy and geography. These discourses are essentially structured 
around particular notions of time, space and “strategic interaction”. I provide 
a brief summary of these below.
The first of these elements, time, highlights the rupture within the organi-
zation of the economy in general and the “national economy” in particular. 
Accordingly, the knowledge economy can be placed within the long develop-
ment of the market economy within which
the main source of wealth in market economies has switched from natural 
assets (notably land and relatively unskilled labour), through tangible cre-
ated assets (notably buildings, machinery and equipment, and finance), 
to intangible created assets (notably knowledge and information of all 
kinds) which may be embodied in human beings, in organizations, or in 
physical assets.
(Dunning 2000, 8)
The temporal component of knowledge-based economization effectively 
highlights the knowledge economy of intangible assets as a sign of progress 
and as the main source of wealth augmentation. This is then juxtaposed with 
the perceived economy of the past which was construed through natural 
resources or created tangible assets. The transition from, say, a hydrocarbon-
based national economy to an economy which uses and produces technology 
effectively through knowledge and highly educated workforce is a significant 
and positively loaded aspect of the discourse. In other words, knowledge-
based economization creates and is premised on peculiar ladders of develop-
ment among states, cities and regions with the knowledge-intensive “learning 
economy” representing the most advanced driver of societal development.
The stark contrast between the old economy and the advanced new econ-
omy portrayed in the geopolitical discourses of knowledge-based economiza-
tion adds a new element to the ways in which inter-state competition has from 
the 1990s onwards been conceived among policymakers and other actors. The 
fundaments of knowledge-based economization are predicated on a particular 
Schumpeterian idea on the centrality of technology and technological innova-
tions in producing economic growth, overall societal progress and, thus, ter-
ritories of wealth and prestige. It does not come as a revelation therefore that 
the inter-state competition within the geopolitical discourses of the knowl-
edge economy is often articulated as if it were highly technology based. It 
is nonetheless evident that this comprehension of inter-state competition is 
a continuation of older logics of inter-state rivalries: technological advance-
ments in industry were particularly in twentieth-century geopolitical thought 
taken up as signs of “national strength” (for instance the role of the automo-
bile industry was enormous for the symbolic status of a state). Knowledge-
based economization, however, qualitatively alters the relationship between 
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state success and technology. It emphasizes the centrality of political regula-
tion which encourages the private (and public) sector to embrace cutting-edge 
technological developments and to abandon old technologies and associated 
modes of behavior and thought.
Second, the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy add 
a significant political-geographical element to complement the above-men-
tioned temporal dimension. The geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-
based economy thus not only divide spaces as old and new but also touch upon 
the spatial organization of the knowledge-intensive capitalist economy. Almost 
invariably, the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy denote 
the mirror image of a “fully territorialized” economic activity characterized 
by comparative advantages whereby “economic viability is rooted in assets 
(including human practices and relations) that are not available in many other 
places and cannot easily or rapidly be created or imitated in places that lack 
them” (Storper 2000, 43). The ubiquitous emphasis on mobility and related 
spatial relationality, which is often articulated as a departure from the nation-
state-centered territorialized economic activity of the past toward the present 
economic activity of relational spaces which are characterized by created com-
petitive advantages, is one of the central features of the geopolitical discourses 
of the knowledge-based economy. Accordingly, “assets, far from being largely 
fixed and immobile as in bygone days, are now eminently increasable and 
mobile” (Dunning 2000, 9).
It is particularly for this reason that the geopolitical discourses of the knowl-
edge-based economy are seductive. They hint that success in the knowledge-
driven economy can in principle be attained by anyone and that such economy 
can flourish almost everywhere where certain human, institutional and admin-
istrative capacities come together in particular combinations. The geopolitical 
discourses of the knowledge-based economy are thus enormously concrete and 
tempting for elites in states, cities and regions who vigorously reject “that they 
are condemned to live within the old logic of spatial division of labor that locks 
them into particular functions determined by events long time ago” (Castells 
and Hall 1994, 8). This quality of knowledge-based economization is more 
generally one of the reasons why many places have during the past two dec-
ades worked hard to become first “technopoles” and later “start-up capitals” of 
their host nation or even of the wider world.
The third crucial aspect of the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-
based economy is that they not only articulate a distinction between the past 
and present, and between the territorial and relational nature of this new econ-
omy, but also re-define the nature of a kind of “strategic interaction” between 
a firm and political communities. One of the constitutive undercurrents of 
the phenomenon of knowledge-based economization is an understanding that 
the success of a political community, be it a nation, city or region, can be 
measured through its economic prosperity with respect to performance in the 
economy of intangible assets. The basic dimension of the interaction between 
a firm and society is thus bound to the dynamics of asset-seeking foreign direct 
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investment (FDI). In such a discourse, society appears as an active competi-
tive unit which seeks, for instance, to minimize the dynamic transaction costs 
of firms (those related to learning and the coordination of innovation-related 
tasks, for instance).
In the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy, multina-
tional companies (MNE) in particular try to match their strategic needs for 
profit making with political communities such as states and cities. As a conse-
quence, such communities appear in these discourses as apolitical investment 
landscapes or sites for investments which embody a particular type of natural-
ized behavior and related “economic” actorness. Accordingly, communities 
of various kinds inevitably seek to “respond” to the purportedly increasingly 
important locational strategies of the MNEs (i.e. quest for desired intangi-
ble assets) by offering the “most congenial complementary immobile assets” 
(Dunning 2000, 29). Even if firm and society both appear as strategic economic 
agents within the mechanisms of knowledge-based economization, the geopo-
litical discourses of the knowledge-based economy disclose a somewhat uneven 
interaction between firm and society in such an economy. It is the firm whose 
strategic decision-making dealings with investments and locations make visible 
the success or failure of policies tailored within given political communities.
The geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy also touch 
upon the “hubization” of the territorial state. This is a pivotal component of 
these discourses given that it portrays the world ultimately as a field of compet-
ing locations which seek to offer specific resources and innovation capabilities 
within their borders. This is exactly how knowledge-based economization, 
even if at first glance it may look like a firm-centered one, is ultimately about 
political communities and their decision-making. Given that the geopolitical 
discourses of the knowledge-based economy represent the position of a state in 
global value chains as the central aspect which determines the social and politi-
cal future of states, cities and regions, state and local governments are forced 
to refashion themselves as anchorages that can meet the needs of the mobile 
knowledge-intensive firms
as the core competencies of firms become more knowledge-intensive, yet 
more mobile across space, so the choice of location in the production, 
organization and the use of those assets is becoming a more critical com-
petitive advantage. To the national and regional policy-makers the chal-
lenge is to offer, both to indigenous and foreign-owned firms, the spatially 
anchored resources and capabilities within their jurisdiction, which are 
perceived by these firms to be at least as attractive complements to their 
own ownership-specific advantages as those offered by other countries 
or regions.
(Dunning 2000, 7)
Finally, one dimension in the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based 
economy is what may be called the responsibilization of public authorities 
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at different institutional contexts. Accordingly, it is exactly the heightening 
mobility of firm-specific core competencies which requires that various micro-
regional authorities take increasing responsibility to ensure the availability and 
quality of the requisite location-bound complementary assets to attract the 
right kind of mobile investments. Competitive advantage appears within such 
an understanding as dependent on both the provision of basic infrastructures 
in places and regions, and on the “identification and promotion of a set of the 
specific unique advantages which cannot be easily imitated by other regions” 
(Dunning 2000, 29).
Through channeling particular responsibilities to public authorities with 
regard to the conceived qualities of “mobile firms” and “mobile assets”, the 
geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy lay the fundamental 
rationale for place marketing and country branding, for instance. These have 
emerged as significant features of knowledge-based economization during the 
past decades. The responsibilizing quality of the discourses of the knowledge-
based economy is crucial. It seduces, motivates and forces the national, supra-
national or local policymakers and authorities to localize the mobile knowledge 
economy through finding and developing putative “unique advantages” which 
stem from their places and regions, advantages which the local actors strive to 
define as ones that cannot easily be created in other locales.
The production of political communities as geopolitical 
objects of competition in virtual spaces of comparison
In this section I call for drawing greater attention to the production of geopo-
litical objects and the related practices of measuring, modeling and indexing 
which constitute the knowledge-intensive economy as a distinguished field 
of action and competition. I highlight such issues because knowledge-based 
economization involves the production and consolidation of political com-
munities as if they were geopolitical objects of competition in global knowl-
edge economy.
The production of these objects of competition occurs in calculative 
social practices, and such production enables, restricts, disables and poten-
tially transforms knowledge-intensive capitalism. It is nonetheless clear that 
the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy and the pro-
duction of geopolitical objects of competition are two sides of the same 
coin. One may argue that the production of geopolitical objects of compe-
tition sparks geopolitical discourses of territorial competition and competi-
tiveness into life. Without such production, inter-territorial competition 
in global knowledge-intensive capitalism would lose a critical part of its 
epistemic base. The geopolitical object of competition is thus “force-full”; 
it does things (Meehan et al. 2013, 3) in the process of knowledge-based 
economization. In short, the production of geopolitical objects of competi-
tion provides the necessary base for discussing cities, regions and states as 
actors of the knowledge-based economy (also Kitchin et al. 2015).
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Public and academic debates of the global knowledge-intensive form of 
capitalism are often connected to political communities, with this or that polit-
ical unit succeeding or failing in global competition. This kind of articulation 
and analysis thus reveals a pivotal element of knowledge-based economization: 
the calculative practices that initially enable political actors to compare and 
act upon political communities as if they were meaningful units of the global 
knowledge-based economy. In the ensuing pages, I discuss the role of indices, 
graphs and related things in the production of geopolitical objects of knowl-
edge-based economization. These objects are thus connected to and generated 
in significant social practices that play a central role in the territorialization of 
knowledge-intensive capitalism.
The social practices which produce the geopolitical objects of competi-
tion visualize the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based economy 
by means of calculation. In these practices, the knowledge-based economy 
is translated into metrics, indices, graphs, figures, maps of all sorts and tables. 
Furthermore, these practices of measurement locate cities, regions and states in 
the purportedly fierce international competition for affluence, political prestige 
and vitality. Inasmuch as the socio-technical practices also measure “strengths” 
of political communities in terms of human capital/resources, these practices 
form a direct link between the geopolitical subjects and geopolitical discourses 
of the knowledge-based economy.
The practices which assemble the knowledge-based economy as a reality 
through a set of measurable geopolitical objects collectively embody what 
some authors call virtual spaces of comparison (Larner and Le Heron 2002) or 
a global space of competition and emulation (McCann 2008, 896). These are, 
ultimately, peculiar spaces of inter-spatial learning in which relations proliferate 
not only between policy worlds but also between places (Prince 2015): states, 
cities and regions are positioned with reference to one another with respect to 
the various prerequisites and associated variables of the knowledge-based econ-
omy. These issues and variables are, in turn, firmly predicated on what Castells 
and Hall (1994, 7) dub “comparative international experience”. Already in the 
early 1990s they revealed the pivotal logic of these virtual spaces of comparison 
in early knowledge-based economization by arguing that
Those areas that remain rooted in declining activities – be they manu-
facturing, agriculture, or services of the old, non-competitive kind – 
become industrial ruins, inhabited by disconsolate, unemployed workers, 
and ridden by social discontents and environmental hazards. New coun-
tries and regions emerge as successful locales of the new wave of innova-
tion and investment, sometimes emerging from deep agricultural torpor, 
sometimes in idyllic corners of the world that acquire sudden dynamism. 
Thus, Silicon Valley and Orange County in California; Arizona, Texas, 
Colorado, in the western United States; Bavaria in Germany; The French 
Midi, from Sophia-Antipolis via Montpellier to Toulouse; Silicon Glen in 
Scotland; the electronics agglomeration in Ireland; the new developments 
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in Southern Europe, from Bari to Malaga and Seville; and, above all, 
the newly industrializing countries of Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia) that in two decades have leapt straight from 
traditional agricultural societies – albeit with high levels of literacy and 
education – to being highly competitive economies based on strong elec-
tronics sectors.
(Castells and Hall 1994, 7)
It would be interesting to interrogate the development paths of the states, 
regions and places mentioned in this quote. But I believe that the geopoliti-
cal message of the quote is more pertinent. The virtual spaces of comparison 
are based on construing the global knowledge-based economy as a particular 
hierarchy of places. In such a hierarchy, some places and regions become what 
Castells and Hall (1994, 7) call “role models”. This is not a politically innocent 
hierarchy but rather one with a sort of compelling normative and affective 
function. These role models, they go on to argue, “have a dramatic influence 
on the collective consciousness of countries, regions, and localities, as well as 
on the development projects of their respective governments” (ibid., 7). In the 
context of knowledge-based economization, these role models therefore have 
constitutive effects on how different actors perceive the deep spatial logics of 
the knowledge-based economy. The virtual spaces of comparison are thus not 
only descriptive but also, and more importantly, highly affectual, productive 
and even disciplinary with respect to other social and governmental practices.
To be fair, different kinds of virtual spaces of comparison existed before the 
1990s. To illustrate, during the Cold War the strength of the state was meas-
ured in terms of natural resources, the size of population, army size, “national 
homogeneity” and the size of particular industries such as machinery and 
steel production. These state resources were also represented through various 
media. It should be also noted that the OECD first started producing state-
based statistics, indicators and comparisons on gross domestic expenditure on 
R&D (the so-called GERD index) already in the 1960s. However, the logic, 
intensity and role of the virtual spaces of comparison have changed drastically 
since the 1990s. The miscellaneous competitiveness, creativity, innovativeness 
and productivity indices and related reports have not only gradually replaced 
the Cold War territorial and militarist league tables in public debates. In their 
capacity to uncover and visualize “false policies” in various representations 
these indices and reports have also become highly influential in the context 
of public policymaking. In other words, these indices seem to offer a sort of 
universal set of tools with which “responsible” governments may manage a 
political organization as a knowledge-intensive territory of wealth.
The new virtual spaces of comparison have been produced by scholars, 
global consultant companies, international organizations and foundations with 
the help of new computational techniques and data-collecting procedures. 
These virtual spaces of comparison fundamentally render knowledge-based 
economization possible, and often reify the Porterian geopolitical rationality 
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which I analyzed earlier in this chapter. These spaces are bound to techniques 
and practices of measuring and calculating and, importantly, have the capac-
ity to translate complex processes of knowledge-intensive capitalism into suc-
cinct numerical figures. This “elegance of the single figure” (Miller 2001, 
382) enables both business circles, policymakers and politicians to monitor, 
debate, praise, criticize or justify policymaking in the context of cities, regions 
and states.
The different indices and metrics constitute the knowledge-based economy 
as a set of territorial objects in numerous ways. Many of these are produced 
through advanced methodologies for gathering, analyzing, sorting, quantifying 
and distributing data. The indices and metrics may arrange individual research-
ers, faculties, entire universities or even states in order of ranking. Or they may 
rank cities and states on the basis of their “overall competitiveness”. Some of 
these indices mix economic and political indicators, thus effectively pairing 
economic performance with particular political conditions. And then there 
are the world-known and widely distributed annual reports which contain an 
extensive set of state-based analysis on the different facets of the competitive 
advantage. Consider, for instance, the Global Competitiveness Report which is 
published annually since 1979 by the WEF. It evaluates and compares pro-
ductivity, prosperity and economic growth prospects in 140 states through 
various indices and circulates its findings in the form of infographics, interac-
tive “heatmaps” and basic datasets through seminars, videos, publications and 
blogs (World Economic Forum 2016). These indices are widely reported in 
the media across the globe, and have particular appeal among policy circles 
(Bristow 2010). The WEF annual report thus epitomizes the ways in which 
international actors assemble the knowledge-based economy in charts and 
tables, or scoreboards (cf. Barry 1993), as consisting of territorial objects of 
competition. Many of the related reports, such as the one developed by the 
Swiss-based World Competitiveness Center of the Institute for Management 
Development in early 2000s, unfold the same way of objectifying the territorial 
units of competition in knowledge-intensive capitalism.
What characterizes these different indices and reports is that most have 
emerged since the 1990s in tandem with the discourses and material processes 
of what Thrift (2005) calls “soft capitalism”. Consider, for instance, the well-
known Industry and Technology Scoreboard of Indicators which was first published 
in 1995. It is a booklet that includes economic and science and technol-
ogy indicators which rank countries on different dimensions. Today, there 
are more than 100 similar kinds of indices which, in one way or another, 
assemble the knowledge-based economy in territorial terms. Some of these 
indices – such as the Knowledge-based Economy Index, the Knowledge Economy 
Index, the Knowledge Index, the World Knowledge Competitiveness Index and the 
Global Innovation Index – are indicative of the growing field of indexing, the 
relevance of which is based on their comparative and manipulative content. 
Beyond the commercial activity, different kinds of international organizations 
contribute to the virtual spaces of comparison, and thus, to the formation of 
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the knowledge-based economy as a set of competing territorial objects. In 
2006 alone, the OECD measured and analyzed the effectiveness of the ter-
ritorialized knowledge economy through nearly 60 different indicators (Godin 
2006). In sum, international consultant companies, international organizations, 
public and private think tanks and rating agencies and different kinds of social 
movements that are structured around famous public intellectuals (such as the 
Creative City Movement) or individual consultants (see Prince 2012) all con-
tribute to the production of the virtual spaces of comparison. In this capacity, 
they are notable contributors to knowledge-based economization.
The virtual spaces of comparison and emulation exemplify relational spati-
ality. But at the same time these relational spaces function territorially. They 
provide a relational space of comparison within which the knowledge-based 
economy appears as a set of objects that can be acted upon. These spaces 
re-work the territorial state with an emphasis on institutions, places and spatial 
exceptions as strategic sites through which the political and economic success 
of the state is possible to generate (cf. Sassen 2013, 28).
This chapter interrogates the geopolitical subjects of knowledge-based econo-
mization in which the skill problem appears like a society-wide “we con-
cern” (Jones 2008, 391). The process of knowledge-based economization 
thus involves re-working people’s conduct, perceptions, actions, motivations, 
skills and weaknesses vis-à-vis the purported requirements of “global competi-
tion”. This process proceeds through governmental interventions which bring 
together the regulation of population and space (cf. Legg 2005; Moisio and 
Paasi 2013). One may thus argue that the production of these self-managerial 
subjects belongs to the sphere of economic subjectification. In these govern-
mental interventions particular images are invoked of the profitable/useful self/
citizen who potentially fits not only contemporary but also future mechanisms 
of capital accumulation. What ensues is an attempt to engender a population 
with particular capacities, and to structure the behavior and performance of 
particular segments of population through certain educational and other tech-
niques. A geopolitical analysis of knowledge-based economization analyzes the 
ways in which such economization involves manipulating and guiding bodies 
and lives spatially in the age of conceived war over talent.
Theories on the information society, post-industrial society and network 
society are premised on the notion of an increasingly fluid transnational space 
of knowledge-intensive capitalism, but these are often articulated and analyzed 
through discreet spatial entities such as states, cities, regions and megaregions. 
For any analysis of the phenomenon of knowledge-based economization, these 
theories are highly interesting as they effectively bring together the knowl-
edge-intensive economy and a particular geopolitical subject.
By using the concept of the geopolitical subject, I refer to an organized set of 
human figures, understood to be equipped with particular desired skills, behav-
iors and orientations which can be harnessed in the production of territories of 
wealth, competition, status, power, security and belonging in the context of 
the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism. These figures together represent 
a kind of collective geopolitical subject of the knowledge-based economy. 
They are ideal figures which encapsulate the spatial tenets of knowledge-based 
economization and related territorial identities and citizenships. In the fol-
lowing pages, rather than inquiring into how a human subject develops an 
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understanding of herself/himself as a political subject of the knowledge-based 
economy, I examine the ways in which a particular collective geopolitical sub-
ject is envisioned, defined and assembled in influential academic writings that 
arose in the 1990s.
I approach the above-mentioned thematic through the well-known aca-
demic theories of Manuel Castells on the nature of the networked world in 
the age of knowledge-intensive capitalism and concomitant technological 
advances. Before entering the thematic of the geopolitical subject, it is neces-
sary to examine some of the spatial foundations of Castells’ theory, as well as 
to discuss the role of territories and the state in his writings on “informational 
capitalism”. I seek to show that the ways in which the network society is 
argued to bring together de-territorializing and re-territorializing dynamics, 
perfectly portrays some of the geopolitical discourses out of which a particular 
geopolitical subject has gradually emerged as a socially and politically meaning-
ful phenomenon.
Rather than considering the impressive work of Manuel Castells as sim-
ply describing the nature of contemporary societies, I treat his work also as 
prescriptive. The academic theories of Castells and other distinguished aca-
demic gurus of the new economy and society thus are seen to exert a produc-
tive power over societal dynamics. In so doing, these academic contributions 
not only greatly influence the thinking of contemporary social scientists and 
policymakers but also throw into relief the ways in which the knowledge-
based economy is geopolitically constituted. These academic theories therefore 
embody both productive and analytical power. They illuminate how academic 
theories which appeared in the 1990s make some of the recent developments 
on the society-economy-technology-business-citizenship interface meaningful 
in spatial terms and provide a basis for imagining and tailoring policy tools to 
cope with the new world which these theories portray as emerging or already 
in place.
The social theories tailored by the illustrious voices of social science such 
as Castells disclose how particular ideals about the future are brought into the 
present, and how these theoretical projections also potentially re-work the 
present when they are acted upon in policy circles. And yet, these theories are 
not produced by autonomously acting individuals who “have manipulative 
control over the structural conditions for their action” (Müller 2008, 325). 
Rather, geopolitical discourses speak through these individuals (and their theo-
ries), who have been arguably implicated in the rise of knowledge-intensive 
capitalism since the 1990s (cf. Thrift 2005, 21).
Spatial foundations of the new geopolitical subject
Knowledge-based economization is almost invariably clustered around the 
concept of the network. Network is a historically contingent projection of the 
world, one which seems to exist in a co-constitutive relationship with knowl-
edge-based economization which took a geopolitical form in the 1990s. One 
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must thus discompose the idea that the world is really made up of networks 
and succumb to the notion that geopolitics is embedded in such an assump-
tion (see Walters 2012). In other words, network is not only a catchword of 
contemporary management texts, regional development literature and politi-
cal speeches more generally, but also a geopolitical narrative which re-works 
political communities spatially vis-à-vis the supposed relational spatiality of 
markets. I claim that the geopolitical subjects of knowledge-intensive capital-
ism are co-constituted with geopolitical discourses which highlight the fluid 
surface of mobile, unstable, loose and informal linkages extending beyond the 
purportedly rigid hierarchies of the territorially fixed nation state, and which 
are premised on ideas of flexibility, spatial selectivity, fierce competition and 
related extreme vulnerability.
In order to illustrate this point more thoroughly, I inquire into the realm of 
recent social theory. Since the 1990s, the nature of the new economy and soci-
ety has been widely debated and theorized in scholarly circles, both explicitly 
and implicitly in parallel concepts. These conceptualizations can be compre-
hended as serious attempts to describe the changes of the post-Second World 
War Fordist-Keynesian-national industrial society and accompanying territo-
rial political order. Concepts such as information society, post-industrial society 
(Bell 1973/1999) and network society (Castells 1996) have been used to depict 
the purportedly unprecedented political–economic changes that started to take 
place in the 1990s in particular. These concepts both de-territorialize and re-
territorialize the global knowledge-based economy in a particular manner.
One of the most notable scholarly debates has surrounded the idea of the 
information or network society. Both of these stand for the rapid development 
of information and communications technologies over the past decades, and 
the role of these technologies in storing, disseminating and processing informa-
tion in particular. The various roles of information in the formation of knowl-
edge that can be exploited economically in production or in the wider field 
of human activities is similarly located at the heart of these academic theories. 
Daniel Bell’s (1973/1999) ideas on the rise of the information economy can 
be considered as an early attempt to scrutinize the processes wherein a kind of 
novel information hegemony transforms classical industrial society. Bell envi-
sioned a post-industrial society in which the societal dynamics of the industrial 
society would be forged anew.
The vision of Bell and his followers on the nature of this imagined post-
industrial society is premised on the importance of knowledge and information 
in economic activities, which they see as capable of transforming entire social 
fabrics. Bell’s (1973/1999) ideas on the nature of socio-economic change were 
also premised on a view that knowledge would become the most important 
factor of production and business competitiveness. Knowledge, according to 
Bell, is also the basis of the exercise of power. In similar vein, Manuel Castells 
(1996, 17) employs the term informationalism to point out how the appli-
cation of knowledge upon knowledge itself had by the 1990s become the 
primary source of productivity and a backbone of both a new economy and 
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society. Here, the term informationalism refers to a pervasive process wherein 
the societal and cultural forms of industrial capitalism are replaced by new 
social formations:
The generalization of knowledge-based production and management to 
the whole realm of economic processes on a global scale requires funda-
mental social, cultural, and institutional transformations that, if the other 
technological revolutions are considered, will take some time. This is why 
the economy is informational, not just-information-based, because the 
cultural-institutional attributes of the whole social system must be included 
in the diffusion and implementation of the new technological paradigm, as 
the industrial economy was not merely based on the use of new sources of 
energy for manufacturing but on the emergence of an industrial culture, 
characterized by a new social and technical division of labor.
(Castells 1996, 91)
Since the 1990s, Manual Castells has undeniably been one of the most influ-
ential academic writers and commentators on the knowledge-intensive form 
of capitalism. His concept of the network society (Castells 1996) is particularly 
revealing in this context, and his later insistence in arguing that the contempo-
rary world is already a network society (see, e.g. Castells 2005) has been politi-
cally influential in many geographical contexts. Accordingly, the information 
age is built on networks which link states, institutions and individuals in differ-
ent tapestries. But rather than producing a flat world, differentiation between 
those who are and those who are not part of the networks of informational 
capitalism characterizes the contemporary condition. The network society thus 
consists of new network enterprises, states, places, regions and subjects, and is 
both integrating and fragmenting.
The network society is highly spatial in nature. Castells (2005) uses the 
spatial term “global” to define the contemporary condition. In Castells’ words:
because the network society is based on networks, and communication 
networks transcend boundaries, the network society is global, it is based 
on global networks. So, it is pervasive throughout the planet, its logic 
extends to every country in the planet.
(Castells 2005, 4)
Even if the network society diffuses throughout the entire world, it does not 
include all people: it is characterized by a growing gap between winners and 
losers. Castells in fact argues that the network society “excludes most of human-
kind, although all of humankind is affected by its logic, and by the power rela-
tionships that interact in the global networks of social organization” (Castells 
2005, 5). The network society hence represents a sort of non-territorial impe-
rialism, a world in which highly uneven processes are predicated on a division 
of those who are interacting in global networks and those who are interacted 
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with or affected through these networks (Castells 1996). The network soci-
ety has no clearly identifiable center of power; rather, it is characterized by 
links that connect nodes (metropolises) with each other and with hinterlands. 
The spatiality of the network society is, therefore, ultimately shaped by pro-
cesses that potentially marginalize places within the highly developed countries 
as well.
The key features of the geopolitical subject of the knowledge-based econ-
omy are conditioned by a set of key ideas about the fiercely competitive spatial 
and urban nature of the network society. Castells (1996) highlights that an 
actor’s capacity to connect him/herself to networks is a fundamental resource 
in the network society. The different capabilities of actors to secure connected-
ness leads to fierce competition and deleterious uneven development within 
the network society. This competition is not based on the classical under-
standing of inter-state competition among bounded territorial units. The new 
race to the top is based on a fear of being marginalized outside of networks, 
“the widespread fear of a jobless society” (ibid., 201). The complexion of the 
network society is thus not only characterized by fierce competition. It is also 
marked by an understanding that business firms, cities and states are all equally 
vulnerable in the face of the ubiquitous networks and the related space of flows.
Castells’ (1996) concept of the space of flows ultimately depicts a world in 
which nobody is completely secured; unpredictability characterizes the new 
geopolitical condition. Essentially every corporation, state and city is con-
stantly threatened by the deep processes of the space of flows, to the extent that 
both private and public organizations and even individuals need to constantly 
develop their adaptive capacities and be ready for different kinds of shocks. 
Castells thus conceives of the world as “constantly rolling over, continually 
on the brink” (cf. Thrift 2005, 97). Cities, for instance, are brought onto an 
“urban roller coaster” which “illustrates both the dependence and vulnerability 
of any locale, including major cities, to changing global flows” (Castells 1996, 
384). Strategic political action in the network society is about re-organizing 
and managing circulation within the global network: diminishing the bad and 
maximizing the good circulation in the context of a given political commu-
nity. Failure to take this kind of strategic action with regard to the global flows 
and circulations invites the risk that things will fall apart, bringing about misery 
and poverty.
Irrespective of the “global” emphasis on networks, Castells’ (1996) ideas on 
the network society in fact territorialize the global knowledge-based economy. 
Some passages of his three-volume study, The Information Age, translate the key 
tenets of the knowledge-based economy into a kind of territory talk. Castells 
(1996) articulates re-territorialization mainly through cities and states. Given 
that Castells is a notable urban theorist, it is no surprise that the concept of 
the space of flows denotes primarily a system of interconnected cities – or 
rather their business districts and innovation centers – which forms a hierarchy 
and is characterized by “fierce inter-city competition” (ibid., 382). Major cit-
ies are nodal points (ibid., 378–387) of networks through which information 
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flows and capital accumulates. The most important cities are portrayed as glob-
ally connected “development engines” (ibid., 409) or “command and control 
centers” of informational capitalism. By way of interacting with each other 
these cities possess relative autonomy from state territories. The ways in which 
Castells both territorializes and de-territorializes the state vis-à-vis the network 
society in this context is particularly telling and characterizes the process of 
knowledge-based economization more generally:
The global city phenomenon cannot be reduced to a few urban cores at 
the top of the hierarchy. It is a process that connects advanced services, 
producer centres, and markets in a global network, with different inten-
sity and at a different scale depending upon the relative importance of the 
activities located in each area vis-à-vis the global network. Inside each 
country, the networking architecture reproduces itself into regional and 
local centers, so that the whole system becomes interconnected at the 
global level. Territories surrounding these nodes play an increasingly sub-
ordinate function, sometimes becoming irrelevant or even dysfunctional.
(Castells 1996, 380)
The emphasis on the dysfunctionality of the territorial state has significant fam-
ily resemblance with Kenichi Ohmae’s (1993) critique of the “equalizing” 
political management of state spaces. By following at least implicitly this form 
of reasoning, Castells argues that certain “new industrial spaces” or “milieus of 
innovation” indeed determine the success and failure of political communities 
in the network society (ibid., 386–393). These new kinds of territories, which 
essentially “deborder territoriality” (Sassen 2013), are integral ingredients in 
the geopolitical assembling of the knowledge-based economy.
Even though the state is portrayed as massively challenged by all sorts of de-
territorializing flows and global mobilities as well as by new territorializations 
around cities and semi-autonomous “regions”, the state appears in Castells 
theory as a notable anchor institution of the network society. The statiza-
tion of informational capitalism thus stands out as an important feature of this 
theory. The ways in which Castells (1996; 1997) articulates the role of the 
state in the network society are hence particularly interesting (many of the 
statistics Castells provides are indeed state based). He describes the welfare state 
as badly challenged and threatened not only by the forces of global competi-
tion and associated uncertainties – some of which emanate from the nature of 
networked informational capitalism and the related volatility and mobility of 
money capital – but also by the networked spaces of “informational politics” 
which challenge the very ideas of territorially delineated democratic politics.
Irrespective of all these pressures, the state nonetheless plays a role in the 
network society. It is an institution that is both explicitly and implicitly, and 
sometimes ambiguously, articulated throughout Castells’ (1996; 1997) treat-
ment of the network society. Castells (1996) however destabilizes the coherent 
understanding of the modern nation state, which must now operate in new 
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circumstances. Already in the first edition of the Rise of the Network Society, 
Castells (1996) portrays the network society as involving a peculiar reor-
ganization of the international division of labor around “geographical con-
centrations”, the borders of which “do not coincide with countries” (ibid., 
147). Accordingly,
What I call the newest international division of labor is constructed around 
four different positions in the informational/global economy: the produc-
ers of high value, based on informational labor; the producers of high vol-
ume, based on lower-cost labor; the producers of raw materials, based on 
natural endowments; and the redundant producers, reduced to devalued 
labor. The differential location of such different types of labor also deter-
mines the affluence of markets, since income generation will dependent 
upon the capacity to create value incorporated in each segment of the 
global economy.
(Castells 1996, 147)
This seemingly de-statist perspective on the international division of labor 
becomes nevertheless politically meaningful through statization. Castells argues 
that all states are “penetrated by the four positions indicated because all net-
works are global in their reality or in their target” (ibid., 147). What this means 
in policy terms is that state governments should develop a sort of variable 
geography which maximizes the share of the production of high value within 
their jurisdictions.
The new division of labor also indicates that for Castells the state is not 
spatially what it used to be. He argues that as a political institution the territo-
rial state faces a significant de-territorializing and de-nationalizing geopolitical 
transformation, and that it is in the process of taking the form of a “network 
state” (Castells 2005). This is a state which is marked by both heightening 
domestic divisions and increasing integration with what Castells calls “global 
affairs”. The key geopolitical logic of this transformation is explicitly articu-
lated in the following lengthy quote:
The rise of a new form of the state gradually replaces the nation-states of 
the industrial era. This is related to globalization, that is, the formation 
of a network of global networks that link selectively across the planet all 
functional dimensions of societies. Because the network society is global, 
the state of the network society cannot operate only or primarily in the 
national context. It has to engage in a process of global governance but 
without a global government … Furthermore, to connect the global and 
the local, nation-states have asserted or fostered a process of decentrali-
zation that reaches out to regional and local governments, and even to 
NGOs, often associated to political management. Thus, the actual sys-
tem of governance in our world is not centered around the nation-state, 
although nation-states are not disappearing by any means. Governance is 
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operated in a network of political institutions that shares sovereignty in 
various degrees and reconfigurates itself in a variable geopolitical geom-
etry. This is what I have conceptualized as the network state.
(ibid., 15)
This “statization” of knowledge-intensive capitalism discloses the more general 
ways in which the fluidities inherent in knowledge-based economization are 
territorialized to take the form of separate, territorially re-shuffled and compet-
ing states whose governments are rendered responsible for certain tasks.
Bringing labor into space
The knowledge-based economy is constituted in efforts to bring into being 
new and useful kinds of “productive subjects” that suit the conceived contem-
porary and future spaces of the knowledge-intensive economy. In the process 
of knowledge-based economization both managers and workers are reconfig-
ured as subjects of accumulation as well as useful citizens. The new spatiality of 
the network society and the new division of labor in particular, brings into the 
picture a new geopolitical subject: the “informational labor” (Castells 1996) 
which holds together the processes of informational capitalism. Castells sug-
gests that the position of a state within the new international division of labor 
is not based on the “characteristics of the country” but on the “characteristics 
of its labor” and “its insertion into the global economy” (Castells 1996, 147). 
What thus characterizes the geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy is the 
mode of government which seeks to seize opportunities through policy exper-
imentation on select segments of its populace. Skill formation in particular is 
at the core of these experiments. Governments which are at pains to reconfig-
ure political communities as knowledge-based economies thus pay particular 
attention to certain social practices related to human engineering through edu-
cation and research. Within the past 20 years, the knowledge-based economy 
has indeed been actualized in policy initiatives and state strategies that focus 
precisely on the institutional design and strategic re-orientation of education, 
skill formation and higher education more generally (Jessop 2008).
The geopolitical subject of the knowledge-based economy refers to a par-
ticular collective agency. This agency, I believe, has emerged as a crucial 
geopolitical resource for states which seek to manage global circulation and 
to connect themselves with the conceived global networks and related value 
chains. Accordingly, the future of the state or any other political unit can 
be controlled by manipulating the characteristics of labor, including its spatial 
orientations and capacities. Indeed, the production of the new “informational 
labor” (Castells 1997) involves the dissemination of what Sue Roberts (2003) 
calls “global strategic visions”. These visions, which often refer to the net-
work as a new way of conceiving political space, are essential in the making 
of the global as an actually existing sphere of action in the process of knowl-
edge-based economization. Again, these visions are produced and mobilized 
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by prestigious (and also less prestigious) universities and business schools, think 
tanks, lobbying organizations, consultants and management gurus, who reflex-
ively circulate ideas and ideologies on this new phase of capitalism (see also 
Jones 2008, 382).
The geopolitical subject of the knowledge-based economy is embodied by 
what Castells (1996, 196) terms the “spirit of informationalism”. It refers to 
how the collective of information workers who are effectively networked and 
loaded with a creative and adventurous ethos as well as unabashed personal 
drive. They are “producers of informational capitalism” or “knowledge gen-
erators and information processors” whose contribution is most valuable to the 
economy (Castells 1997, 345). These figures are thus characterized by their 
expertise and skills in the fields of technology, communication and strategy, 
and are anxious to engage in different kinds of knowledge-intensive businesses 
and activities. Alternatively, they may dedicate themselves to ensuring the suc-
cess of a large corporation or take personal risks to found a start-up company. 
They nonetheless embody both the ability and eagerness to produce innova-
tions in the domains in which they happen to work (Stalder 2006). Qualities 
such as excitability, adaptability, openness to relocation and appreciativeness 
of a sort of “global hustle” or “global chisel” characterize these producers of 
informational capitalism. The following quote from Castells (2005, 18, empha-
sis in original) depicts some of these qualities:
At the source of the entire process of social change there is a new kind of 
worker, the self-programmable worker, and a new type of personality, the 
values-rooted, flexible personality able to adapt to changing cultural mod-
els along the life cycle because of her/his ability to bend without breaking, 
to remain inner-directed while evolving with the surrounding society. 
This innovative production of human beings … requires a total overhauling 
of the school system, in all its levels and domains. This refers certainly to new 
forms of technology and pedagogy, but also to the content and organiza-
tion of the learning process. As difficult as it sounds, societies [states] that 
will not be able to deal with this issue will encounter major economic and 
social problems in the current process of structural change.
Particular skills and more general qualities together constitute the geopolitical 
subject inherent in knowledge-based economization. This subject is composed 
of professionals who are capable of connecting themselves to different kinds of 
global networks and of utilizing information networks to conduct all manner 
of global affairs. These skills and qualities are also important, for they empower 
the “informational labor” to cope in the network society, within which “the 
notion of a stable, predictable, professional career is eroded” (Castells 2005, 
9) and “flexibility” emerges as a notable personal and collective property. The 
geopolitical subject of the knowledge-based economy is thus familiar with 
the “individualization of work” and the “fragmentation of societies” (Castells 
1996, 201).
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Well-educated and project-oriented informational labor runs the key func-
tions of the knowledge-based economy. This class of labor is a carrier of a new 
geopolitical rationality and initiative. In this capacity, this labor becomes the 
key societal force within political communities, and also a central governmen-
tal concern. Over the past two decades, the sheer strategic emphasis on the 
informational labor issue is one of the reasons why knowledge-based economi-
zation is characterized by a polarizing social structure. The rise of this new geo-
political subject thus makes the generic industrial labor of the “industrial state” 
disposable, or at least strategically less important than during high Fordism 
(Castells 1996). This is irrespective of the fact that manufacturing activity is 
not disappearing, and that the generic workforce remains the actual majority.
At the pinnacle of the knowledge-based economy are the “dominant mana-
gerial elites” who share cosmopolitan mindsets and particular lifestyles, possess 
extensive local and global connections and congregate in major cities (Castells 
1996, 415). One author suggested revealingly in the Harvard Business Review in 
1993 that in an age in which knowledge is the key competitive resource and 
information “the new raw material”, and in which “knowledge workers” and 
the organizations they inhabit form an infrastructure for such resources, the 
“manager’s job is to create an environment that allows knowledge workers to 
learn – from their own experience, from each other, and from customers, sup-
pliers, and business partners” (Webber 1993).
In sum, the new geopolitical subject of the knowledge-based economy, the 
informational labor or “knowledge workers”, brings together the relational 
and the territorial political spaces. This subject embodies capabilities to operate 
effectively in global networks, and occupies a central position in wealth crea-
tion and in generating the political success of the state, city or region. The new 
geopolitical subject of the knowledge-based economy is a collective which 
brings together managers and skilled workers, as well as firms and political 
communities. It is composed of what Castells (1996, 244) calls the command-
ers (strategic decision-makers), researchers (innovators), designers (packag-
ers of innovation), integrators (particular amalgamators) and operators of the 
knowledge-based economy. Even though the strategic position of these figures 
differs within the production process, as widely articulated ideal types they all 
represent a kind of individualized economic nomadism indicative of the new 
managerial, technical and professional occupations which overcome the con-
tained spaces of the industrial era and associated nationalized state spaces and 
mindsets. This type of a “Silicon Valley subject” thus fundamentally differs 
from the place-bound and thus fixed generic labor of nation-state-centered 
capitalism. It discloses political efforts to produce “standardized forms of indi-
viduality” (Alvesson and Willmott 2007, 2) characterized by certain desired 
personalities, beliefs, preferences and tastes that are understood to fit to the 
needs of contemporary capitalism.
The geopolitical subject of the knowledge-based economy is territorially 
disruptive in its nature. It represents a sort of revolutionary (but not necessarily 
progressive) agency which was considered potentially de-stabilizing and thus 
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dangerous during the Cold War rivalries between capitalism and communism. 
The consolidation of the state around the figure of the loyal national citizen 
capable of contributing to industrialization and related state modernization has 
of course not been entirely replaced in the new territorial consolidation process 
or by the rise of the new ideal subject. 
Rather, the new globalizing citizen figures of the knowledge-based 
 economy signify the rise of social engineering or human resources and human 
potential management in the age of knowledge-intensive capitalism. This kind 
of management has the potential to bring about the fragmentation of citizen-
ship and the further destabilization of national homogeneity.
Since the late nineteenth century, political strategies have often highlighted the 
role of education as being at the forefront of societal change. Education has 
been an integral part of nation-building, state-building and economic develop-
ment. Similarly, the role of education as one of the central practices of con-
structing the state as a territory of wealth and belonging is undisputed.
Education and higher education were essential elements in the genesis of the 
Keynesian national welfare state as a particular geopolitical unit (cf. Nordin and 
Sundberg 2014). If anything, the construction of the Keynesian welfare state 
was characterized by a remarkable expansion of education, both spatially and 
across social classes. Provision of education became a form of universal social 
engineering and one of the key mechanisms through which what is customar-
ily known as the welfare statehood unfolded. Primary and secondary school 
systems were homogenized, spatial networks of higher education institutions 
expanded and curricula developed on the basis of particular national needs. 
This was the case in the OECD sphere in particular. One may thus argue that 
the spatial modernization of the state and the constitution of educational sys-
tems took place concomitantly. The state was simultaneously constituted as a 
compartment of space and educational systems.
The bond between the geopolitical construction of the state as a territory of 
wealth and education as a particular type of social engineering has not unraveled 
despite the gradual evaporation of Keynesian national welfare statehood. This 
link has rather qualitatively transformed from the 1990s onwards. The goal of 
the rest of this chapter is to discuss the ways in which the geopolitical can be 
understood in the context of universities. The starting point in such a perspec-
tive is that universities are complex societal organizations whose purposes and 
actions extend well beyond producing pure scientific progress. Moreover, uni-
versities change qualitatively in the course of time. I suggest in this chapter that 
the knowledge production, educational practices and societal interaction of 
universities are still understood as a key source of national success and national 
prosperity (also Kerr 2001). Simultaneously, however, universities increasingly 
contribute to the construction of a de-territorializing, transnational societal and 
political order, thus “globalizing” or “internationalizing” the state.
As a testament to the above-proposed notion, there is a vast consensus today 






Subject formation in higher education Subject formation in higher education
Subject formation in higher education 87
Subject formation in higher education
are widely presumed to produce scientific excellence that can be harnessed and 
commercialized by business firms. Universities, in such a view, are increasingly 
approached as active agents in the knowledge-based economy. Simultaneously, 
universities form a decisive strategic-political infrastructure of competitiveness 
for political communities which strive for competitive advantages. Universities 
are thus not only considered engines of economic growth, competitiveness and 
employment, but also strategic political spaces. The discourses of the knowledge-
based economy have therefore fundamentally structured, but not entirely deter-
mined, higher education policy formulations in different geographical contexts. 
As cities, states and regions seek to position themselves within the global value 
chains and in the upper tiers of all manner of rankings, universities have been 
fundamentally re-worked as political and, as I will suggest, geopolitical sites.
My experience in the Finnish and in some other European contexts is that 
major societal re-structuring is today at work in universities. Indeed, within 
the increasingly axiomatic discourses of the global knowledge-based economy 
universities are no longer given a merely supporting role as “national” organi-
zations of such economy. Rather, universities are increasingly conceived of 
as pivotal actors of the global knowledge-based economy. They inculcate 
global geopolitical subjects with “skills and vision”, and perform as partners to 
business firms. Moreover, they may even become lucrative “national” busi-
nesses themselves.
Universities as geopolitical sites
Globally, there are more than 17,000 institutions of higher education, and 
many of these call themselves universities. Some are state institutions, others 
more or less autonomous organizations which are nonetheless funded primarily 
from public coffers. Then there are private universities which are funded from 
many different sources and which enjoy significant organizational autonomy. 
Only a relatively small portion of universities operate in more than one coun-
try. Moreover, only a relatively tiny portion of the universities in the OECD 
sphere have founded large-scale external campuses abroad.
Irrespective of their organizational form or funding basis, universities have 
been gradually re-worked since the 1990s, at least in the OECD sphere. 
Universities have undergone a significant administrative and institutional re-
structuring during this period. Simultaneously, various political forces have 
sought to internationalize universities and even entire national university sys-
tems. And yet, most universities still operate in a characteristically national 
context, under the control and tutelage of state ministries.
In the ensuing pages, I conceptualize universities as key contributors to 
knowledge-based economization. First, these institutions are political tech-
nologies through which the geopolitical subjects of the knowledge-based 
economy are educated. Universities operate within and through particular 
geopolitical discourses and their functions are tightly tied up with particular 
types of knowledge formation. Second, universities appear as political objects 
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in a number of calculative socio-technical practices such as university rankings. 
In my reading, universities are geopolitical sites of knowledge-based econo-
mization, the dimensions of which can be charted in a number of ways. I 
scrutinize three overlapping dimensions below: universities as learning envi-
ronments, universities as scaled sites and universities as geopolitical objects.
Learning environments
Universities are a particular type of discursive and material learning environ-
ment. The learning environments of universities are constantly re-negotiated 
and contested, and, accordingly, an inquiry into these environments offers 
a useful lens for understanding the changing societal and wider geopolitical 
agency of universities, as well as their endeavors to bring about societal change. 
A university, in short, has many uses (Kerr 2001).
Since the 1990s, the discourses and practices of the knowledge-based 
economy have arguably had fundamental implications for higher education in 
diverse geographical settings. The uses of the university have become tightly 
aligned with the political practices and business trends of knowledge-intensive 
capitalism. The links between the knowledge-based economy and higher edu-
cation have gradually become more active, pervasive and salient. During recent 
years in particular, institutions of higher education have hence been increas-
ingly re-imagined and harnessed as growth-facilitating political institutions but 
also as resources in the profit-seeking strategies of private companies. This has 
happened in an age of political economy which is undergirded with terms such 
as human capital, triple helix, human creativity, talent, intangible assets, entre-
preneurialism and the state’s international competitiveness.
There is very little research at present on the ways in which the imperatives 
of knowledge-intensive capitalism have manifested themselves in the learning 
environments of universities. This is regrettable given that the reconstruct-
ing of universities in the name of the “new economy”, “globalization” and 
“national competitiveness” has involved notable efforts to construct new learn-
ing environments for higher education.
The notion of learning environment refers here to the material, physical, 
symbolic, intellectual and political spaces within which both the substance of 
higher education as well as the more informal extracurricular activities are situ-
ated. Technology, pedagogy and space are taken together within the learning 
environments of universities. The learning environments of universities are 
important as they function as a central component in the efforts to re-work 
the capacities and orientations of students and staff through different kinds of 
physical environments, technologies and spatial arrangements. The learning 
environments are thus explicitly germane to the content and organization of 
the learning process itself (cf. Castells 2005). In such a view, a learning envi-
ronment is a political technology through which education, by ordering not 
only knowledge but also the experience of learning, can be said to control 
human beings (Müller 2011, 2).
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Learning environments can also be considered as mediums through which 
universities communicate with different societal, political and economic actors 
and seek to create favorable external images or brands. Indeed, within the past 
few years, universities have actively transformed their physical environments 
and visual images in order to develop “connectivity” with different actors of 
the knowledge-based economy – including other universities. New innovation 
centers, business accelerators, start-up spaces, nontraditional learning spaces for 
students (with new affectual elements) and a class of post-industrial lecture 
halls have recently been constructed in many universities across the globe. As 
a vice-rector of a university I once interviewed stated (2016), the new physi-
cal environments of universities should “breathe” creativity and embody the 
university as a physical and spiritual “ecosystem”. According to this individual, 
this new ecosystem signals the departure from the old factory or school type 
of university that belongs to the industrial era and should be forgotten. This 
distinction between the environments of the “industrial university” and the 
“new university” is revealing and by no means exceptional. At the heart of this 
distinction is the axiom that universities should educate a new class of laborers 
by estranging them from the purported practices, orientations and manners of 
the Fordist industrial era. Indeed, the ethos of these learning environments is 
actively promoted in the official marketing materials of universities across the 
globe. As a result, the visual, textual and symbolic features of universities have 
taken an increasingly transnational and entrepreneurial form.
However, a university as a learning environment is not a monolithic com-
monplace but rather a contested political space. Different public and private 
forces constantly seek to operate through these environments, which also con-
tain a particular type of historically contingent epistemic goals. Historically 
speaking, these environments have thus been intimately connected to what 
Castells (2005, 18) calls the “innovative production of human beings”. This 
connects the learning environments of universities to the issue of the geo-
political subject of the knowledge-based economy, that is, the informational 
laborer. Indeed, the gradual consolidation of the university-industrial complex 
in the name of the state’s international competitiveness is a picture of the 
times. In other words, the knowledge-based economy has become a powerful 
policy paradigm not only for the institutional re-working of universities and 
the wholesale re-designing of their learning environments, but also in terms of 
skill formation (also Jessop 2008).
Stimulating creativity and innovation in new ways, so as to foster these in 
virtually all domains of social life, has in fact become one of the central epis-
temic elements of the learning environments of universities. Considering the 
contemporary university as a geopolitical site brings us therefore to the central 
ideas of the so-called creative economy. The well-known debater and adviser 
on creative economy and creative business, John Howkins, for example, is 
explicit in making a distinction between what he labels “the ordinary econ-
omy” and the “creative economy”. The former operates with scarce mate-
rial resources and competition is based on prices. Within the latter form of 
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economy, in turn, individuals and firms use intangible resources which are 
purportedly infinite, and yet the actors still compete also via price. At the heart 
of the creative economy is an understanding that we have moved to a world of 
increasing returns based on the infinity of possible ideas and, accordingly, the 
individual’s faculty to (ingeniously) use these ideas to generate new products 
and transactions (Howkins 2001, 130–131).
The ways in which the learning environments of universities have been re-
designed in many geographical contexts are explicitly structured by the above-
mentioned understanding of a shift in the logics of returns, and the role of 
resources vis-à-vis these returns. Moreover, the widespread acceptance of the 
colossal significance of this economic shift enhances the value of particular 
management knowledge on managing and guiding the creativity process of 
both individuals and collectives with respect to the administration of universi-
ties but also individual academic programs. But the supposed shift in the global 
economy also highlights the role of universities as physical-spiritual test sites 
within which the creative mindset can be manufactured. The perennial rise of 
the culture of teamwork (shared office spaces, etc.), “deals and hits” and busi-
ness clusters, as well as the emphasis on the creative entrepreneur in higher 
education practices must be situated within the rise of the imaginaries of the 
knowledge-based economy and the creative economy as one of its impor-
tant components.
Universities as scaled geopolitical sites
Universities can be regarded as scaled geopolitical sites. Universities are scaled 
in political decision making, policymaking and in scientific and educational 
practices by different actors. Higher education was central in the building 
of the Keynesian national welfare state as a geopolitical object. Indeed, the 
nationalization of higher education in post-Second World War Europe and 
beyond created a strong cultural understanding according to which institutions 
of higher education are important factors in competition with other states or 
“nations” (Välimaa 2004). The construction of the Keynesian welfare state 
was thus characterized by a remarkable expansion of higher education, both 
spatially and across social classes. Provision of higher education became not 
only one of the markers of national strength but also a particular form of social 
engineering. Higher education thus became one of the mechanisms through 
which welfare statehood evolved both domestically and internationally.
In post-Second World War Europe, universities were “nationalized” 
through state funding and regulation, university networks expanded in many 
of the OECD states and curricula developed on the basis of conceived national 
needs. National industries, national societal orders and the health problems of 
national populace were closely connected with universities as geopolitical sites. 
During so-called high Keynesianism, the notion of the “national university 
system” came to symbolize the link between the nation, the territorial state and 
higher education in a number of countries.
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There already exists a raft of insightful research analyzing the recent “neolib-
eralization” (Pike 2012), “corporatization”, “privatization”, “marketization” 
and “internationalization” (Knight 2006) of universities as well as the birth of 
the “entrepreneurial university” (Clark 1998). However, the manner in which 
universities have become scaled in the face of the dictates of knowledge-inten-
sive capitalism has only recently come under systematic scrutiny (Koch 2014; 
Moisio and Kangas 2016). This is regrettable given that the scientific, educa-
tional and administrative practices of the Fordist-Keynesian national university 
constitute the substrate through which the essentially “Schumpeterian” and 
“internationalizing” educational and scientific practices are currently being 
introduced (see Belina et al. 2013).
At the level of both symbols and epistemic contents, the contemporary 
university is a peculiar combination of nationalizing and transnationalizing ele-
ments. Even state universities have nonetheless increasingly rid themselves of 
nation-centrism and selected more globally oriented strategies in terms of their 
stated values and the priorities of their actions, as well as their organizational 
compositions. But at the same time a strong cultural understanding according 
to which institutions of higher education are important for competition with 
other nations has remained strikingly strong. In any case, as geopolitical sites of 
the knowledge-based economy, universities are being de-nationalized in part 
through logics that ostensibly reflect a particular transnational consensus. In 
such a view, transnationalization takes place within the micro-spaces and small 
practices of universities and is hence both institutional and locally embedded. 
This resonates with Sassen’s (2005) argument according to which de-nationali-
zation takes place within supposedly national contexts and thus does not entail 
the demise of the territorial state. Universities can therefore be understood as 
both drivers and outcomes of the processes of the knowledge-based economy 
and the capitalist globalization more broadly (see, e.g. Olds 2007).
The relationship between universities – as nodes or sites of globalization 
– and the territorial state (and also the city) has changed over the course of 
time. The empirical part of the chapter at hand highlights the fact that the 
Finnish state has been active in setting up new frameworks for higher educa-
tion in order to further globalization and enhance territorial competitiveness 
(cf. Wahlström 2014). Universities have become pivotal sites of negotiation 
between the state government and various transnational actors and organiza-
tions, including global business firms. This has manifested itself in a gradual 
re-working of universities regarding existing national regulations and associ-
ated constraints. As part of such re-working, the various constituents of uni-
versities have been positioned within extensive webs of interdependencies 
through which the university is expanded beyond its immediate environment 
(cf. Addie et al. 2015).
Although the process varies from university to university, and from country 
to country, universities in the OECD sphere are today expected to contribute to 
national success and prosperity in the purportedly borderless knowledge-based 
economy. Richard Florida (2007, 251) argues revealingly how universities are 
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today perceived as “undeniably powerful talent magnets, attracting … the best 
and brightest to our shores. They are the Ellis Islands of the Creative Age”. In 
other words, academic knowledge production and associated educational prac-
tices of universities have gradually become integral parts of the internationali-
zation strategies of the state itself (cf. Harland 2009). As a result, universities 
have been spatially re-constituted in policy discourses and practices related 
to teaching and research in such a manner that has implications for student, 
teacher and researcher alike.
Universities as geopolitical objects of competition
I have earlier discussed the role and importance of objectifying calculative 
practices and related systems of comparison in the process of knowledge-based 
economization. I argued that cities, states and regions are produced as geopo-
litical objects of competition in such calculative practices. Nonetheless, the 
formation of cities, regions or states as geopolitical objects is effected through 
measurements, analyses and comparisons of other objects as well. Indeed, a 
university can be comprehended as one of the geopolitical objects through 
which the performance of states, cities and regions can be measured.
For decades, the OECD has produced detailed country comparisons of 
national systems of higher education. Similarly, governments have produced 
their own national university comparisons throughout the twentieth century. 
However, since the 1990s, university ranking has emerged as a potential mar-
ket for private consultancies, which have been active in tailoring different 
kinds of university rankings, league tables and indices. These rankings, which 
often aim to identify the world’s leading (and also poorly performing) univer-
sities through different types of ranking criteria, typically measure scientific 
output and excellence but also reputation, level of internationalization and 
other elements of the learning environments and governance of universities. 
These rating organizations have thus become peculiar geopolitical actors of the 
knowledge-based economy, and are arguably closely related to the commodi-
fication of knowledge and even the commodification of universities.
Rankings such as World University Rankings (The Times Higher Education 
Ranking), the Academic Ranking of World Universities (the so-called Shanghai 
list) and the THE-QS Ranking are today widely followed in the higher educa-
tion sectors and their indices are widely circulated in the media. These rankings 
contribute to the emerging “international standards” of higher education and 
direct the focus toward individual universities and therefore divert attention 
away from national comparisons of entire “national systems of higher edu-
cation”. Importantly, these rankings produce universities as objects of global 
 geopolitical competition, and thus connect these institutions to “national 
interest” in a new manner.
Today, university rankings play a notable role in the internal management 
processes of universities in terms of their efforts to develop and secure reputa-
tion in the global higher education market. The role of university rankings in 
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building particular “reputational geographies” ( Jöns and Hoyler 2013, 45) is 
thus a significant geopolitical phenomenon of the knowledge-based economy. 
Reputation is important not only from the perspective of the attractiveness of 
a university in the markets of higher education but also from the perspective 
of public funding and accountability. It is similarly striking to notice the ways 
in which universities use or misuse these rankings in their various efforts to 
represent themselves as exceptional learning environments. International rank-
ing schemes thus have a direct impact on the institutional decision-making of 
universities – irrespective of the methodological limitations of these schemes, 
and regardless of the difficulty of climbing up the ranks of the various rankings, 
which use disparate criteria.
As many of the rankings and league tables include discipline-based compari-
sons, these rankings are also increasingly used by university managers to dis-
tinguish between valuable and less valuable fields of research and tuition. The 
role of ranking schemes in the practices of running universities has thus become 
increasingly visible. It is exactly through these practices that the contemporary 
geopolitical condition is directly experienced by university teachers and research-
ers, who are supposed to be increasingly aware of their role as contributors to 
the international excellence – often dubbed “world class” science and education 
– and reputation of the university within which they happen to work. The more 
international excellence is defined and understood as a capacity to participate in 
global economic processes, the more individual researchers and research groups 
become hedged in by the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based econ-
omy, and the related imaginaries of nation’s competitive advantages.
Important for the treatise at hand is to realize that the ranking schemes 
and associated bibliometrics are objectifying social practices that consti-
tute universities as geopolitical objects of competition. Universities are 
objectified as units of the knowledge-intensive global economy that can 
be compared, disciplined and thus placed under the eye of governmental 
power. Rather than providing useful information for universities them-
selves, university ranking schemes and related metrics represent governance 
by comparison that becomes a constitutive element of the transnational 
state apparatus. Within such an apparatus, universities appear as objects 
of competition and are entangled with other objects through which the 
international competiveness of political communities is measured, analyzed 
and acted upon.
Some further contours of the geopolitics of higher education
The previous arguments already hint at some of the ways higher education 
and geopolitics come together. In the geopolitical perspective, higher educa-
tion is much more than a purely pragmatic and technocratic enterprise. It 
is a site of strategic action for different political forces and actors, including 
state and non-state institutions alike, to pursue their strategies and to realize 
their goals. Second, geopolitics of higher education concerns the processes of 
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re-territorialization and de-territorialization, and takes into account the various 
micro- and macro-spaces where ideas, rationalities and technologies of govern-
ment intersect. A geopolitical perspective on higher education thus highlights 
an “investigation of the intertwining of the economic space of capitalism with 
political and legal spaces, which are no longer fully conjoined in the territorial 
form of the state” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, 66). The geopolitical perspec-
tive on higher education also highlights the relevance of these spaces with 
respect to forms of political subjectivity. Finally, on theorizations of the world 
as becoming, the geopolitical perspective on higher education highlights that 
institutions of higher education are productive of ideas that shape future geo-
political action (also Dittmer 2014).
In this perspective, the geopolitics of higher education does not refer to 
“geopolitical education” or associated geopolitical knowledge which circu-
lates in select institutional environments, diplomacy schools, military acad-
emies, universities or the like, or which is embodied in various educational 
materials. It rather designates the envisioned and materialized higher education 
learning environments which function as apparatuses of governance, that is, 
those which constitute, normalize and naturalize certain representations of the 
knowledge-based economy (see also Koch 2014).
As mentioned above, a key aspect in the geopolitics of higher education 
is subject formation. An inquiry into subjectification within universities must 
therefore be situated within the epistemic and material structures of the knowl-
edge-based economy, and within the relationship between the state and capi-
talist economy (Mitchell 2003). This also implies that efforts to instill loyalty to 
the state and a particular type of patriotic thinking (e.g. Müller 2011) are only 
one geopolitical aspect of higher education. Rather, the geopolitics of higher 
education takes note of a wider attempt to enhance such qualities in human 
subjects that conform to the prevailing and, importantly, also envisioned future 
systems of capital accumulation (also Thrift and Olds 2004).
Universities are not passive agents of knowledge-intensive capitalism but 
rather contribute to the creation of a social and political reality that the key 
actors of such economy suggest already exists. Given this, it would be possible 
to approach and analyze the geopolitics of higher education from two partly 















Figure 6.1  The two paths of analyzing the geopolitics of learning environments of 
universities.
Subject formation in higher education 95
inquiry would investigate the assemblage – its discourses, governing techniques 
and subjectivities – through various everyday practices or experienced spaces 
of subjectivity, for example, students, professors, administrators and planners. It 
would also inquire into whether this project being orchestrated by the knowl-
edge-intensive capitalism is succeeding and whether (and how) it is being 
resisted. The second line of research would examine higher education as a stra-
tegic space linked to the desire to generate new types of professional subjects. 
This latter form of analysis is the focus of the rest of the present chapter. It is 
primarily text and policy based, and does not seek to address the ways in which 
individuals work with particular discourses of the knowledge-based economy.
As I have already suggested, knowledge-based economization proceeds 
though spatial-institutional experimentations that territorialize the knowledge-
intensive “global” economy as distinct political units. These experiments of 
the knowledge-based economy are often predicated on an understanding that 
the world of the (global) knowledge-based economy actually already exists 
and that there is no other alternative than to come to terms with its internal 
dynamics through behavior change.
Not least because of the temporal quality of the geopolitical discourses of 
the knowledge-based economy to orient toward the future, the state in knowl-
edge economization becomes ever more experimental and entrepreneurial in 
its delivery of policy. This does not of course indicate that entrepreneurship 
somehow replaces production in state strategies but rather that entrepreneur-
ship and production become entangled in new ways with regard to skills and 
subjectivities. The state which operates within the discourse of the knowl-
edge-based economy is motivated to generate productive subjectivities within 
particular sites. As production is increasingly seen to take place in social rela-
tionships, subjectivity itself becomes productive, not just skills (Read 2009, 33).
The coming together of the modern state and (state) university marks the 
complex relations between particular segments of population and the territori-
ally institutionalized state apparatus. In short, this coming together illuminates 
how the state seeks to control bodies, souls and associated skills, capacities and 
orientations (Lemke 2007, 44; also Elden 2013; Hannah 2001; Jones 2012) 
in the constant re-production of the state as a territory of wealth and power. 
The central question of the rest of the chapter is how the capacities and spatial 
orientations of individuals and populations are being reshaped in knowledge-
based economization. This chapter argues that one of the characterizing aspects 
of the knowledge-based economization is a determination to responsibilize 
universities in order to forge innovative, devoted, resilient and entrepreneurial 
state citizens who are capable of generating national success in a purportedly 
competitive and urbanized “spiky world” (Florida 2008).
In the process of knowledge-based economization portions of citizen- 
subjects are produced as “globally capable” through spatially and institutionally 
selective arrangements. These subjects are envisioned to become capable of 
connecting themselves with all sorts of networks characterized by the highest 
surplus value. Knowledge-based economization requires engendering a certain 
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type of entrepreneurial life, a life which is oriented toward individualization of 
both success and responsibility. It is only the current emphasis on individuali-
zation and liberalism that distinguishes this type of entrepreneurial geopolitical 
subject from the German ordoliberal (the so-called social market economy) 
ideal subject: the innovative, energetic, enterprising, competitive, risk-taking, 
self-reliant and self-responsible state citizen (see Bonefeld 2012).
In terms of subjectivity crafting, knowledge-based economization is unique 
in that it unfolds in a peculiar duality. The subjects of the knowledge-based 
economy should be equipped so that they understand the nature of business 
in the global market “beyond the state”. But at the same time these subjects 
should also remain loyal (territorialized) in their spatial orientation and political 
belonging; they should be globally oriented but simultaneously committed to 
generating success in a given state or polity.
The changing figure of an engineer from the 
1950s to the present: the case of Finland
In this section, I suggest that an investigation of the ways in which the state has 
sought to bring into existence an engineer as a geopolitical subject in different 
conjunctures may shed light on the operation of state power in the context of 
knowledge-based economization. The rest of this chapter is based on empiri-
cal material on engineer education in Finland as well as documentary material 
dealing with how the Finnish state apparatus has sought to regulate the capac-
ities, mentalities and orientations of engineers since the 1950s. My analysis 
thus calls for a close inquiry into particular segments of “strategic populations” 
within the state and how the changing state strategies and attempts to govern 
their skills, “talent” and indeed their very being disclose the changing geopo-
litical strategies within a given state.
In order to undertake such analysis, I first provide some contextual notes 
on the political economic context in which the university reforms in Finland 
took shape. This contextualization is crucial given that the constitution of 
geopolitical subjects of the knowledge-based economy – and the whole 
process of knowledge-based economization – must be firmly grounded in 
real-world events and related experiences. These experiences are circulated 
through infrastructures of affect (Dittmer 2014, 389) such as the media. It can 
be argued that ideas regarding the need for the new geopolitical subject have 
emerged concomitantly with a particular experiencing of knowledge-intensive 
capitalism both at the scale of everyday life and among experts, politicians 
and policymakers.
I am tempted to argue that the political need for the production of new 
geopolitical subjects is grounded in the geographically specific circumstances 
regarding the changing dynamics of labor markets. Most OECD states have 
witnessed a shift from goods to services, the rise of information and commu-
nications technology (ICT)-related jobs and the relatively rapid disappearance 
of manufacturing and agricultural jobs. This change in economic structure, 
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together with the more general volatility of labor markets as well as the actions 
of large and even smaller companies in outsourcing manual jobs, has been the 
source of the conviction that the contemporary global condition is turbulent 
and that nobody is entirely secure. This experience has thus been grounded 
upon the demise and outsourcing of industrial jobs, a more general vanishing 
of middle-class work and the changing structure of employment within some 
OECD states.
The Finnish case is illustrative of such development and not exceptional 
(Figures 6.2. and 6.3.). During the past 40 years, the share of industrial manual 
jobs has declined from 25.5 percent to 14.9 percent. In absolute terms this 
means a loss of nearly 300,000 industrial jobs in a country of slightly more than 
five million inhabitants. During the same period, the total number of jobs in 
the ICT sector (electrical and electronics industry, telecommunication, infor-
mation technology services) has increased from 56,000 in 1975 to 113,000 in 
2015. The decline of industrial jobs has been particularly striking in the field of 
forest industry – historically a major contributor to livelihoods in Finland, and 
still accounting for approximately 20 percent of the country’s revenue – which 
has lost more than two-thirds of its workforce in four decades. Since 2007, the 
decline of industrial jobs has hastened. In some regions in Finland, industrial 
jobs have vanished with striking rapidity: Central Finland, for instance, lost 30 
percent of its industrial jobs between 2007 and 2014.
During the past ten years or so, reactions to the decline of traditional man-
ufacturing employment in some corners of Western Europe and elsewhere has 
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Figure 6.2  The development of industrial and ICT jobs in Finland 1975–2015 (Statistics 
Finland 2016). Note that “industry” includes manual labor in ICT.
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jobs that were established in the 1990s. Since 2005 in particular, multina-
tional corporations have not only outsourced their production and services, 
thus causing predicaments for local subcontractors, but also cut and relocated 
engineering jobs. This development has prompted severe economic and 
social problems as well as related epiphenomena in many localities. From 
2007 onwards, the decline of ICT-related manual jobs has also included jobs 
in research, development and design. Nokia, the multinational corporation 
which came to symbolize the ICT boom and related information society dis-
course in the 1990s in Finland, alone has downsized its workforce in this 
geographical context from 24,000 (in 2007) to around 5,600 (in 2016); this 
significant drop has also been marked by a notable loss of jobs which require 
highly skilled labor.
The “double destruction” of jobs, covering both traditional industrial jobs 
and the advanced science-based work, has effected a widely articulated sense of 
political powerlessness which is generally argued by governmental agencies and 
trade unions alike as being brought about by the inevitable nature of “globaliza-
tion” (sometimes dubbed globalization 2.0). The picture is now very different 
compared with the era of spatial Keynesianism. During those days, centralized 
systems of wage negotiations and devaluations of the “national” currency (the 
Finnish markka) functioned as a political mechanism to address business cycles 
that jeopardized the competitiveness of national industries (see, e.g. Vartiainen 
2011). The government was also able to use unemployment and, thus, surplus 
labor power as a means to discipline workers about the negative implications of 
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Figure 6.3  The development of jobs in the two basic industrial sectors in Finland 1975–
2015 (Statistics Finland 2016).
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Today, the widely reported political weakness in the face of “global forces” 
has been, interestingly enough, accompanied by a series of demands to com-
pletely end the public subvention of the “mature sectors” of industry (such 
as wood-processing industry, see Laukkanen 2016) and to fundamentally re-
develop the skills and orientations of the national population to better cope 
with the purportedly unavoidable events that mark the contemporary global 
condition. For instance, the recent emphasis on the importance of start-ups 
for national economic success, and the related plans to include more entre-
preneurial content in primary school tuition, must be understood against this 
backdrop. Familiarity with the processes of knowledge-based economization 
has thus convinced Finnish political circles to highlight the importance of small- 
and medium-size knowledge-intensive firms and the associated entrepreneurial 
“strive for growth” attitude (which is understood to characterize a particular 
start-up culture/citizenship) as the new source of economic and political success.
The rest of the chapter is based on research into the higher education reforms 
in Finland, which culminated in 2010 with the founding of Aalto University 
(also called an “innovation university”, hereafter AU) and the passing of a new 
law on universities (see also Kangas and Moisio 2012). The idea is to focus 
on the ways in which the reform has targeted professional citizens, engineer 
education in particular. This is in part because the engineer is a figure that has 
occupied a central position in the state strategies of Finland since the country’s 
independence (1917). S/he has been an integral part of state-led and nation-
ally scaled modernization, industrialization, military and national defense sys-
tems, as well as processes of urbanization, planning and economic growth. The 
engineer has therefore occupied a central position in all sorts of state strategies 
within this state since the 1950s; it can thus be understood to mark the rise of 
the technology oriented, modernizing and indeed nationalizing state strate-
gies which were played out in the Western capitalist states after the Second 
World War. The engineer with particular orientations, capacities and skills was 
arguably located at the core of state strategies which sought to construct the 
“national” since the 1950s. This figure thus came to epitomize an interesting 
geopolitical being during the Cold War. Arguably, this is now changing.
The following analysis of AU epitomizes the knowledge-based economiza-
tion of the university. It highlights changes that critical human geographers 
often discuss in terms of neoliberal corporatization of the university (e.g. 
Castree and Spark 2000; Belina et al. 2013). Three aspects in particular are 
highlighted below. First, AU is located right at the heart of transnational policy 
flows that revolve around the ideas and practices of an entrepreneurial uni-
versity (e.g. OECD 2012) and it provides a mechanism through which such 
ideas are re-spatialized in a locale. Second, the genesis of AU demonstrates that 
higher education, as a mostly publicly funded enterprise, plays a central role in 
the strategies of private actors to extend their power toward the state. Third, 
AU is an outcome of the ways in which public and private educational inter-
ests entangle in efforts to qualitatively re-equip and transnationalize “profes-
sional citizens” for a new system of knowledge-intensive accumulation. It thus 
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belongs among the historically specific ways of negotiating the instability and 
persistent crises of capitalism by way of producing new forms of the subject.
In addition to a body of various kinds of publicly available documents, 
semi-structured extended interviews were recorded in 2014 with six key polit-
ical actors, civil servants and university rectors, including the former prime 
minister of Finland (2003–2010), the permanent secretary of the Ministry of 
Education and Culture and key representatives of the Confederation of Finnish 
Industries. In addition, two more interviews were conducted in 2016 with 
the presidents of two Finnish universities. The interviewees have been closely 
involved in the recent university reforms in Finland and in the founding of 
AU. The interviewees were posed questions that mainly had to do with the 
rationale behind the contemporary university reforms and the founding of AU. 
I also attended the main start-up event in Finland in 2014, known as Slush, 
which is considered to form part of the learning environment of AU. In addi-
tion, notes were gathered at an international higher education seminar that was 
organized by AU as an informal part of the Slush event.
The geopolitical discourse of the 
university reform in Finland
In this section, I inquire into the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-
based economy upon which university reform in Finland is predicated. These 
discourses position the state in a particular way within knowledge-intensive 
capitalism and prompt it to adopt particular types of strategies – higher educa-
tion reform being one of them.
As noted in Chapter 4, the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based 
economy foreground the link between the state and the world in a distinctive 
way, enabling different actors to act upon the state. These discourses posit that 
there is a major transformation taking place in world politics and redefines the 
place of nation states in a specific way. In Finland, these discourses have sig-
nificantly contributed to the re-orientation of the strategies of the state across 
policy fields, particularly since the early 2000s.
My conversations with the interviewees normally started with a set of 
questions that sought to discern how the interviewees viewed the conditions 
prevailing in Finland and beyond and how the present, in their assessment, 
differs from the epoch of the welfare state. There was a tendency on the part 
of the interviewees to narrate a fundamental historical break or a rupture, 
a transition from an epoch characterized by states as “unified wholes” or 
“closed societies” to an increasingly complex and challenging contemporary 
condition. They touched upon the de-territorialization of the state by making 
references to the fluidity of the social world and argued that ubiquitous risks 
and challenges are inherent in the rise of the global competition. This transi-
tion was also argued to mean that the main source of wealth had switched 
from natural resources and tangible assets to such intangible assets as knowl-
edge and information.
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A related aspect of the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based 
 economy is their emphasis on spatial relationality and mobility. This is often 
articulated as a move away from the territorialized economy and immobile assets 
of the past to the present economic arrangement where assets are increasable and 
mobile, and unfold in relational space. My interviewees indirectly referred to the 
instability and persistent crises of capitalism by painting a picture of the present 
global economic turmoil as a situation in which the notions of relative political 
fixity, division of labor, stability and predictability have become unraveled. The 
present was described as hard to govern precisely for the reason that instead of 
simple national conflicts and oppositions, it is characterized by a fluidity of all 
social relations. The idea of the increasingly difficult world played an outsized 
role in their efforts to characterize the context for higher education reforms.
The interviewees articulated the relationship between the state/nation, the 
present and the world in terms of economic vulnerability and risk. As one of 
my interviewees stated in our discussion: “we adopted a very positive attitude 
toward globalization and we knew that the selected knowledge-based strategy 
was very risky, but we thought it was the only strategy that was available” 
(Author’s interview 2014). Basically, all interviewees relied on a very similar 
logic of reasoning. The prevailing conditions were argued to warrant new sur-
vival strategies. This was said to be the case in particular for Finland, a small 
state fragile as a result of the way it is exposed to the world economy. The 
interviewees also identified certain critical failures in dealing with the situ-
ation. They made reference to a gradual loss of industrial jobs, the difficul-
ties of attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) and the unique structure of 
the Finnish economy, which relies on “large economic players”. There has, 
indeed, been a decline of 19 percent in the number of industrial jobs in Finland 
over the period 2007–2012, a considerable drop in FDI after the 2008–2009 
economic crisis, and over 60 percent of the country’s exports are produced 
by the 20 largest enterprises (Statistics Finland 2015). Due to the conceived 
“smallness” of the state, its exposed posture and the landscape of large corpora-
tions, Finland was portrayed as particularly vulnerable to the volatile nature of 
the world market, and fostering specific capacities and qualities in its population 
was portrayed as the way out of this dilemma. The demands of the de-territori-
alizing global economy were thus re-spatialized with reference to the discourse 
of necessity. The same logic is repeated in countless official documents:
Large multinational companies have been the cornerstone of Finland’s 
economy, but are now undergoing continuous operational regeneration, 
in reaction to changes in the global market situation. These companies 
will find it easiest to fragment and transfer their operations anywhere, 
while managing their value networks. In Finland, determined efforts must 
be made to grasp opportunities for retaining production operations that 
increase added value and generate new development …. Large multina-
tional companies capable of seizing control of global value networks will 
be the success stories of the future. The prerequisites for this must be 
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monitored and strengthened. An obvious prerequisite is a high level of 
competence [of population] that meets the needs of enterprises, as well as 
a sufficient labor supply.
(Prime Minister’s Office 2013, 39)
Re-spatialization of the global economy here occurs through the idea that the 
state can and must strategically re-situate itself vis-à-vis multinational busi-
nesses that have organized their production in global value chains. As it can 
do little to strengthen the ostensibly national firms which are constantly under 
assault from their OECD-country based rivals and the so-called emerging-
world upstarts, the state is faced with the task of coming up with strategies 
through which it can relocate its territorial economy vis-à-vis global value 
chains. While value chains were discussed by the interviewees as being gov-
erned by economic imperatives and/or the multinationals, there was seen to 
be some room for state agency, though this was an adaptive form of agency. 
While the world was described as the playing field of multinationals, it was 
seen as the task of the state to create such spaces that would attract the mul-
tinationals to place some of their operations within the state’s territory. This 
logic of thinking is re-produced in the following excerpt which discusses state 
strategies in an increasingly digitalized economy.
In a digital economy, it is increasingly easy for a growing number of busi-
nesses to transfer their operations anywhere in the world. Competition 
between providers of the best locations is stepping up … . The state could 
contribute to the creation of marketplaces within the digital economy, 
attracting knowledge-intensive industries to invest in Finland.
(Prime Minister’s Office 2013, 26, 35, 37)
The portrayal of the world as a playing field of globally oriented businesses 
develops logically into a doomsday scenario. It suggests that the nations and 
“regions” that harness ideas, upgrade skills and generate knowledge-intensive 
jobs will simply be the most successful polities in avoiding unemployment, the 
development of bad jobs and thus, national disaster. Accordingly, any nation 
which loses its ability to compete in the range of high-productivity/high-wage 
knowledge-based industries characterized by innovation, high technology and 
talent is said to be in danger of losing its standard of living and will be doomed 
to a future in the periphery (Porter 2008, 177). All the interviewees were very 
responsive to the logic of this scenario, thus echoing what the Economist reported 
a few years ago: Finland has been “updating” its version of capitalism by way of 
moving on to “brainwork in global networks” (The Economist 2013, 8).
The new learning environment
One of the ways in which the state has responded to the demands of the knowl-
edge-based economy is by way of producing new learning environments of 
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higher education. In the ensuing pages, I turn my attention from the geopolitical 
discourses of the knowledge-based economy to the components of a particular 
learning environment as specific condensation of material, symbolic, intellectual 
and political elements constitutive of knowledge-based economization. I sug-
gest that the new learning environment is being built with the expectation that 
it will nurture such competencies and characteristics in the population that meet 
the requirements of the global economy (multinationals, venture capitalists etc.) 
and thus connect the state space of Finland to the global value chains. I analyze 
what kinds of physical and immaterial settings of learning and education are 
being designed to advance a shift from the iconic national worker-citizen of the 
post-Second World War period to the globally attuned citizen-subject.
The creative entrepreneur and the culture of start-ups
AU was originally and very tellingly developed under the rubric of University 
of Innovations and constitutes one of the core substances of the Finnish higher 
education reform that culminated in 2010. The founding of AU, with the help 
of supplemental funding of 700 million Euros (of which 500 million was public 
money), was instigated by a handful of export-based business representatives – 
key industrialists with the support of the highest political elite and central state 
officials. The promise of the leading industrial sectors to contribute at least 
200 million Euros to the foundation of AU not only fundamentally enticed 
the willingness of the state government to launch general university reform 
but also committed the government to the substantial public financing of AU.
The founding of AU illustrates a particular heterogenization of space; it 
evidences how the state became a key agent in the establishing of a “globally 
competitive university” which, in terms of re-spatialization, meant turning 
the Helsinki capital city-region into an educational node, a hub for domestic 
and global talent, or a high-tech city-region (Ministry of Education 2007). In 
addition, the initiative for AU discloses a bid to transform work subjectivity, 
to broaden the capacities and skills of individuals toward new transnational 
substances and spaces. Such an expectation is also expressed by the professor 
of entrepreneurship education at AU, who argues that the institution’s tuition 
aims to further the birth of an entrepreneurial identity and that entrepreneurial 
identity is not limited to the mundane matter of running of a business: “rather 
it is a world-view according to which your own attitude is key and that there 
are no safe havens in this world” (Kalska 2013). In the first Aalto Academic 
Summit this view was also shared by a notable Finnish science policymaker 
who argued that entrepreneurialism is a mindscape, a kind of novel culture that 
can be partly engendered by public intervention.
My interviewees also argued that AU had to be founded because a new 
kind of learning environment was needed, for engineers in particular. This was 
in response to the fact that the fundaments of higher education in engineer-
ing – the hard core of natural sciences that can be utilized in industrial pro-
cesses – had remained relatively untouched by the previous reforms of higher 
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education. Interestingly, this attempt is not so much visible in the formal cur-
ricula as it is manifested in the ways in which AU has sought to function as a 
novel type of an environment for learning. The genesis of AU was based on 
the issues of technology and innovations; it was to bring together knowledge 
on business, technology and design innovations in a way which would create a 
breeding ground for new kinds of globally oriented economic players.
My discussions with the interviewees about AU invariably revolved around 
the idea that the contemporary world requires not so much new science skills 
but new forms of professional attitude, which were articulated in terms of indi-
viduality and creativity. Fostering such entrepreneurial culture among a new 
generation of Finns was referred to as a key justification for the founding of 
AU. The fact that emphasis was put on these kinds of attitudes rather than con-
crete skills resonates with the way in which the knowledge-based economiza-
tion involves constituting individuals as human capital and how this transforms 
notions of labor and workers. As Read (2009, 33) observes, “capital no longer 
simply exploits labor, understood as the physical capacity to transform objects, 
but puts to work the capacities to create and communicate that traverse social 
relations”. As production is seen to take place in social relationships, subjectivity 
itself becomes productive, not just skills (ibid.) This is the context within which 
the interviewees’ call for new knowledgeable and enterprising subjects (cf. Thrift 
and Olds 2004) capable of modifying their relationship to business and work in a 
purportedly rapidly changing world makes sense and must be understood.
The stakeholders of AU thus envisaged the new university as an effective 
strategy of subjectification which, by way of fostering a start-up culture not 
only among its students and staff but also wider society, encourages individuals 
to see themselves as “companies of one” (Read 2009, 30). This has a notable 
social political relevance, as it resonates with the contemporary trend away 
from careers built on long-term labor contracts toward temporality of jobs. 
Key elements and the logic of this way of thinking are re-produced in an article 
published in the Aalto Magazine:
The startup movement is like the rock scene,” say business students Miki 
Kuusi and Antti Ylimutka. People want to be like successful rockstars, so 
more and more start playing the guitar, but only a few can become world 
famous. This is why it is important that there’s a lot of beginners. The 
phenomenon spawns new bands – and, analogously, new enterprises …. 
Kuusi and Ylimutka say that startup entrepreneurs share common traits 
like ambition and a drive for accomplishment. These people won’t start a 
hardware store or a hair salon to provide them with a steady income for 
the rest of their lives. Instead, they employ venture capital to build prod-
ucts or services for the international market at a dizzying pace.
(Kalska 2013)
Perceiving themselves as rockstars or companies of one, individuals are less 
inclined to think that they would have something to gain from collective 
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organization and solidarity. Rather, they are encouraged to make investments 
in human capital which transforms desire for independence into a business 
spirit. There is a striking distance between this way of thinking of professional 
life and the previous state-centered professional life (of engineers).
This transformation also entails a shift in the way in which individuals are 
made subjects. The interviewees envisioned the learning environment of AU 
as a specific kind of governmental apparatus expected to foster such qualities in 
individuals that suit the new landscape of charismatic entrepreneurialism. It is 
interesting to note that this new culture of learning was expected to be engen-
dered if, in addition to physical settings of education (e.g. buildings and class-
rooms), the bodies and affective energies of students and scholars representing 
different disciplinary backgrounds were brought together. Moreover, the AU 
case illuminates how the current form knowledge-based economization is 
marked by a particularly intense affective rhetoric of neoliberal governmental-
ity (cf. Read 2009, 29). Indeed, AU and special projects clustered around it 
are almost invariably characterized with notions such as “enthusiasm”, “full 
steam”, “hustle”, “drive”, “ambition” and so on.
The interviewees as well as the analyzed documents referred to the new 
combination of material objects, bodies and the invisible infrastructure of learn-
ing with the notions of “start-up culture” or “ecosystem”. Various kinds of 
events, institutional structures, principles, professorships and student activism 
– Entrepreneurship Society being today the largest form of student activity at AU 
– were cited as its constituent elements. What purposes are they expected to 
serve? In its promotional materials, AU often refers to these ostensibly creative 
spaces as platforms that enable students, professors, researchers and developers 
to meet, interact and collaborate. Moreover, interdisciplinary “factories” have 
been designed to “facilitate new forms of collaboration in an environment 
where academic teams, researchers and students work together with companies 
and communities” (Aalto University 2014). In addition, the stated task of the 
Aalto Center for Entrepreneurship is to create successful business out of the 
interactions and innovations taking place within this culture and its spaces, that 
is, to make the participants part of the processes of innovation.
From the point of view of the dynamics of re-spatialization it is also inter-
esting to note that the key principles of the new learning environment of 
AU echo what Saxenian (1994) originally associated with Silicon Valley and 
Boston’s Route 128 region. This spatial connection – which effectively dis-
closes some of the ways in which the transnational citizenship is built in the 
functioning of AU – is not at all insignificant as there are also attempts to build 
actual connections between AU and Silicon Valley. The company incuba-
tor Startup Sauna, for instance, regularly takes students to Silicon Valley in 
order to embed and familiarize them with what the chairman of this organiza-
tion markets as a local culture that promotes entrepreneurship through “moral 
support”, encourages risk-taking and experimentation and provides suitable 
role models. The practice of making study trips to the US and its expected 
impact on the societal atmosphere has also been recognized by The Economist 
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(2013, 10). In 2010, it published a story about a group of students from Aalto 
University on a study trip to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Upon 
their return to Finland, they embarked on what the publication calls “the most 
constructive piece of student activism in the history of the genre”. During their 
visit, the students had been
converted to the power of entrepreneurialism” and “organized a ‘sum-
mer of start-ups’ to spread the word that Finland’s future lay with new 
companies, not old giants. The summer of start-ups turned into a season 
of innovation. The student revolution was part of a wider reconsideration 
of the proper relationship between government and business.
(The Economist 2013, 10)
This provides yet another innocent but at the same time revealing example of 
the kind of back-and-forth re-working of spatial arrangements and associated 
subjectivities that characterize contemporary geopolitics of knowledge-based 
economization in the context of higher education.
Linking entrepreneurial culture with internationalization
Within the learning environment of AU both student and staff are surrounded 
by the ideals of excellence, economic productivity, profitability and risk-taking 
(on these ideas more generally, see Brown 2006, 694). This learning environ-
ment, which brings together such material elements as lecture halls, buildings, 
innovation labs and their interiors and also spaces of business incubation, to 
name but a few, is structured around the dogma of internationalization. This 
re-spatializes the idea of entrepreneurialism in a very specific way, suggesting 
that a nationally scaled learning environment is unlikely to be entrepreneurial:
It is not possible for a university to be entrepreneurial without being inter-
national but the university can be international without being entrepre-
neurial. Internationalization is the process of integrating an international, 
intercultural or global dimension into the purposes, functions or delivery 
of education.
(OECD 2012, 14)
The internationalization of the learning environment of AU has taken both 
conventional and novel forms. The conventional forms of student and staff 
mobility schemes and the associated international science collaborations have 
been accompanied by new types of practices of internationalization that take 
place both within and beyond the campuses of AU.
The OECD also urges universities to integrate education activities “with 
enterprise-related activities to ensure entrepreneurs are adequately prepared 
for creating start-ups through their education and that they have the support to 
put what they have learned into practice” (OECD 2012, 10). This evidences a 
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desire to turn state-orchestrated and state-sponsored public spaces into a mech-
anism that re-spatializes the dictates of knowledge-intensive capitalism. AU, 
as a whole, forms part of the state’s attempt to respond to this challenge. Its 
learning environment also comprises components that have been even more 
clearly designed for this purpose. For example, the Aalto Ventures Program 
seeks to teach entrepreneurship by way of providing students with the “skills, 
tools and global networks” (Aalto University 2015) needed in the creation of 
new business, and, for this purpose, extends beyond the actual physical facili-
ties of AU into new spaces of action. AU has also founded the Aalto Center 
for Entrepreneurship, which is tasked to commercialize research originating 
at AU and thus to connect the university with the de-territorializing flows of 
global capital.
The above-mentioned developments represent efforts to interlink and cre-
ate a productive match between the formal educational programs and research 
conducted at AU and the global flows of capital. The constitution of individu-
als as specific types of internationalized entrepreneurial subjects, transnational 
citizens, lies at the crux of these efforts; it is a process which is assumed to 
take place within such learning environments where “the students understand 
the benefits of developing an entrepreneurial mindset” (OECD 2012, 10). 
It would be possible to cite a number of examples of how the AU learning 
environment is geared toward these goals but a particularly salient example is 
the start-up mentoring in which a nascent start-up company is mentored by a 
“person with an entrepreneurial mindset … familiar with the key players and 
market mechanisms” (Aalto University 2015).
Another component of the geopolitical co-constitution and co-functioning 
of AU is the Slush event, the single largest start-up event in northern Europe, 
supported and eagerly promoted by AU in its marketing efforts. In 2014, Slush 
brought together almost 14,000 students, professionals, investors and high-
tech executives from almost 3,500 companies from all over the world. The 
event is particularly interesting from the point of view of knowledge-based 
economization as it epitomizes not only how things are “made to happen” by 
concentrating bodies – that is, young professionals, students and representatives 
of footloose capital (the so-called angel investors in particular) – in a particular 
location, but also how the affective experience of participation contributes to 
the formation of transnational citizenship (cf. Dittmer 2014). Commentators 
frequently made use of notions such as excitement, enthusiasm, ambition and 
energy to characterize the atmosphere of the event. Taking part in it, I also 
sensed such affective energy – to an almost exhausting degree.
Curiously, although the very logic of the event bypasses official structures 
and systems as well as territorial borders, states played a central role in Slush. 
The prime minister of Finland, accompanied by the vice-premier of China and 
the Estonian prime minister, officially declared the event opened. Through the 
bodies and performances of these political figures, the entrepreneurial enthu-
siasm of the event was re-spatialized within an international framework of the 
state system. In their talks, these political leaders spoke the language of country 
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promotion, inter-state competition, national competitiveness and state invest-
ment landscapes. This illustrates how re-spatialization – understood as back-
and-forth re-working of spatial arrangements – informs the conceptualization 
of the world as constantly becoming (cf. Mitchell 2003, 8; Dittmer 2014, 495).
Even if the learning environment of AU is expected to be a globally con-
nected node, the project as a whole remains firmly attached to a state-centric 
framework. For the state, AU forms part of an attempt to “activate Finns to 
participate widely in various competence and knowledge networks” (Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy 2008, 4). In essence, this represents a nation-
ally scaled, state-centric topography which is articulated in terms of the learn-
ing environment of AU being one element in the re-working of the entire 
fabric of Finnish society. It is expected to transform the purportedly intro-
verted national culture and narrow-minded mentalities of the Finns – some-
times discussed in terms of the “culture of envy” and the “culture of shame” 
– and replace the purportedly old values of the agrarian past or the “industrial” 
welfare statehood with such attitudes and orientations that are not in conflict 
with new forms of “connectedness”.
The global engineer
The developments in AU, a key institution for the education of engineers, 
are particularly interesting given that the figure of the engineer has occupied 
a central position in the state strategies of Finland since independence (1917). 
Particularly since the 1950s, the engineer was an integral part of state-mod-
ernization, industrialization, military and national defense systems, urbaniza-
tion, planning and economic growth. What is referred to as the construction 
of the national Keynesian welfare state would not have been possible without 
a pool of engineers with skills in mathematics, physics, chemistry and data 
processing. These skills were pivotal in constructing national industries in the 
export-oriented sectors of machinery and forestry, but they were also central 
in state planning more generally. Engineer education in technical universities 
and faculties was developed and maintained during high Fordism not only for 
purposes of sustaining capitalist systems of accumulation tied to national sys-
tems of production (Liesto 1988) but also for the purposes of securing national 
strength in a security and foreign policy environment which was perceived as 
challenging. Higher education in engineering has thus played a critical role in 
the genesis of such modernizing state strategies that constructed the national as 
a meaningful and pivotal geopolitical category. In Finland, purportedly “tal-
ented”, “cheap” and “politically loyal” engineers became part of the national 
narrative of constructing the welfare state, and their subjectivity was tied to the 
national polity.
Systematic training in engineering has been offered in Finland for over 
100 years. For much of this time, it has been tied to the project of national 
development and has thus assumed a broad homology of territory and econ-
omy. Recently, however, the coupling of the national territory of wealth 
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and engineer has become less stable, as illustrated by the reform rhetoric 
according to which engineer education should be increasingly geared toward 
the production of “global engineers”. This de-coupling forms part of efforts 
to reform engineer education to better meet the demands of the purportedly 
new international division of labor and the dictates of global commodity and 
value chains. As argued by a professor of engineering at Aalto University: 
“The highly analytical, technically-focused engineering ‘geek’ is a person of 
the past” … “engineering education worldwide is not providing an adequate 
supply of globally prepared engineers” (Pellinen 2013). The subjectivity 
of the new generation of engineers as transnational citizens thus becomes 
produced at the intersection of the discourses of globalism and entrepre-
neurialism, and partially detaches itself from the discourses of the nation 
and patriotism.
The new learning environment of AU is expected to foster the subjectivity 
of global engineer among its students and staff. The genealogy of the term global 
engineer can be traced back to the debate on higher education and public pol-
icy that started over a decade ago, mostly in the OECD sphere. Originally, the 
expression was coined to highlight social responsibility in the face of various 
“global (i.e. shared) problems” ranging from poverty and underdevelopment 
to global warming. But the concept has since been “coopted” for alternative 
uses and is increasingly employed within an exclusively economistic perspec-
tive, that is, geared toward the production of economic growth in knowledge-
intensive capitalism. The globalization discourse plays an important role in 
naturalizing and depoliticizing economic subjectivities in the discussions over 
engineer education. The production of globally attuned engineers is argued to 
be a purely pragmatic and technocratic enterprise, a response to the demands 
that the changing economy sets:
Globalization is linking national economies in new ways. Nations are 
transitioning from distinct economic entities to essential segments of one 
global economy. Likewise, business competition comes from everywhere, 
requiring engineers to develop a global perspective. The international 
competition for talent is intense. In today’s world, no country can remain 
isolated or impose barriers to international talent and trade. To be success-
ful in this global environment, you must develop personal, social, business 
and cultural global literacies.
(Malkinson 2003)
The global engineer thus illustrates the way in which knowledge-based 
economization re-positions the engineer with regard to the state-society nexus 
through the idea of entrepreneurialism; re-equips him or her with interdisci-
plinary skills that cross the border between technological, business and design 
innovations; re-calibrates the engineer from a technical “geek” to someone who 
has internalized creativity as a way of life; and re-locates him or her within “the 
global”, understood as a culturally differentiated marketplace in which states 
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seek to locate themselves with regard to transnational corporations and their 
value chains.
The global engineer provides an archetype of the kind of globally attuned 
subject that the learning environment of AU is expected to produce. Both 
the interviewees and the written documents make explicit reference to such 
a character. This shows that in geopolitics of higher education an engineer is 
not just a human being with technical capacities. She or he is rather a geopo-
litical figure, a subject who is constantly being re-made by the “discipline” of 
engineering and its learning environments. This is highlighted by the fact that 
engineers have historically been located at the intersection of transformations 
in the relationship between the state and market as well as the national and 
global, as the following quotation illustrates.
If things are allowed to develop as they have to this point, and our land 
educates only administrators, soldiers and civilian servants, you don’t need 
a crystal ball to see that such a country is destined to be forsaken.
– Agathon Meurman (1826–1909) 
cited in On the Education of Engineers
The global engineer that the AU learning environment seeks to produce is a 
character that shares much of what Mitchell (2003, 387–388) refers to as the 
“outward-looking cosmopolitanism” of “globally oriented state subjects”, that 
is, actors who are able to adapt to rapidly shifting personal and national con-
texts and whose characteristics are thus in tune with the demands of capitalist 
globalization. The global engineer is similarly envisaged as an ideal type of a 
managerial self (Orta 2013) that can be produced through high-quality teach-
ing, research training and extra-curricular activities. A global engineer thus 
embodies transformations of higher education policies, spatial transformations 
and the larger accumulation strategies of contemporary capitalism.
Similarly to how Fordism involved a reshaping of the entire fabric of soci-
ety, including a determination “to elaborate a new type of man”, the produc-
tion of global engineers must be seen as part and parcel of contemporary efforts 
to produce forms of the subject through which the instability and persistent 
crises of capitalism can be negotiated. Arguably, the figure of the global engi-
neer forms part of a post-Fordist strategy whereby the state seeks to relocate 
itself vis-à-vis production increasingly organized in global value chains as well 
as to engender new business to compensate the potential failures in attract-
ing and retaining foreign direct investments. Paradoxically, it is a statist figure 
which “reduces citizenship to a notion of market entrepreneurship” (Giroux 
2012, 253).
It is clear that since the early 2000s such a vision has gradually come to steer 
Finnish engineering education. Already in the late 1970s there were calls to 
increase entrepreneur training in the Technical University of Helsinki (Liesto 
1988). The idea, however, remained firmly anchored in a national setting. 
Nowadays, however, engineers are being prepared for a world which is at once 
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“borderless” (as implied by the proverbial world market) and uncertain but at 
the same time lucrative, that is, characterized by limitless opportunities that can 
be harnessed through skills and creative agency.
However, although the global engineer is characterized as a competi-
tive, creative and globally oriented character – a de-territorialized figure of 
the knowledge-based economy to a great degree – his or her existence and 
purpose nonetheless continues to be promoted or legitimated within national 
parameters. Paradoxically, the geopolitical discourses of the knowledge-based 
economy continue to actualize the almost mythical idea of a nation’s citizenry 
sharing a common economic fate (Kangas 2013, 574). These suggest that the 
“skill problem” targeted by reforms of higher education is a “nation-wide ‘we’ 
concern” (Jones 2008, 391). This is an example of the way in which the geo-
political assemblage re-territorializes the knowledge-based economy by way of 
nationalizing it. It also serves as a reminder of the fact that a straightforwardly 
de-territorialized reading of the figure of the global engineer as a form of trans-
national citizenship would easily overlook how narratives that remain bound 
to national territorial frameworks also work to sure up the de-territorialized 
post-Keynesian regime of accumulation (see also Koch 2014).
Coping with knowledge-intensive form of capitalism: 
reforming higher education in Finland
The previous sections have shown how the geopolitical assemblage of higher 
education functions as a mechanism through which the developments of 
global capitalism are realized and acquire place-specific manifestations. I have 
hoped to demonstrate that it is through re-imagining universities that the state 
responds to calls suggesting that its key task is to create societal conditions that 
facilitate innovations (e.g. Aalto University). “An essential task for govern-
ment”, as the Confederation of Finnish Industries sees it, “is to create a cli-
mate and an infrastructure where innovations are possible” (Confederation of 
Finnish Industries 2007: 7).
Although a largely publicly funded institution within the fabric of the state, 
AU is imagined as a novel learning environment where subjectivities of capital-
ist laborers are re-forged and the entrepreneurial strategies of private industries 
extended to the social spaces of professionals and young adults in particular. 
My inquiry into AU has also demonstrated the willingness of the higher edu-
cation elite to respond to the strategies of the state by pushing universities 
to the center of knowledge-intensive capitalism. University managers have 
therefore acted as docile bodies when confronted with political leaders who 
constantly underscore the contemporary “competitive environment” within 
which the Finnish nation and the Finnish state need to cope. This willingness 
to act geopolitically occurs in particular through a strategic exploitation of the 
discursive structures of the knowledge-based economy on the part of the top 
management of universities. From this angle, the institutions of higher educa-
tion are not passive victims of corporatization or marketization of universities 
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but active agents in generating particular Schumpeterian political economies 
of the state.
This represents a significant change. Since the 1960s, higher education in 
Finland was elementarily bound to what is commonly referred to as social 
government. It operated within the nation state format and was premised on 
investing in state-owned industries, maintaining private enterprise as well as 
transforming the subjects of government into useful social citizens with par-
ticular rights and responsibilities. Since the early 2000s, this system has been 
increasingly questioned, mainly due to a perceived danger of declining indus-
trial competitiveness.
The general role of higher education in the spread of the discourses and 
practices of the knowledge-based economy has been insightfully documented 
in numerous contexts. Thrift and Olds (2004, 286), for example, suggest that 
these “cultural circuits of capital” have “been aligned with the state” and have 
thereby become involved in global geopolitical interventions. Attempts to re-
make Finland and re-code its citizens also fall within state strategies to bring the 
state and the cultural circuit of capital together through higher education. Yet 
there are certain peculiarities as to how this has unfolded in Finland.
In certain contexts, globally well-known elite institutions of higher educa-
tion have been assigned an important role in re-structuring and re-orient-
ing national economies and molding the subjectivities of national citizenries. 
These elite universities have not opened branch campuses or pursued part-
nerships with local institutions in Finland. One of the interviewees argued 
that “the Finnish political circles considered that the Finnish education market 
would be too small and too unattractive for global elite universities” (Author’s 
interview 2014). The Finnish context rather, is characterized by an attempt to 
qualitatively re-engineer the existing “national” university system, as well as 
by the establishment of one state university (AU) as a particularly “innovative” 
learning environment. The cultural circuits of capitalism have thus penetrated 
Finnish society primarily by engendering the adoption of transnational models 
of higher education within ostensibly national institutions.
Business circles and individuals representing technology industries in par-
ticular were central forces in mobilizing the state to undertake the higher edu-
cation reforms and to establish Aalto University. In the context of AU, the 
activism evidenced in the actions of the leading business institutions demon-
strates the ways in which different non-state institutions act vis-à-vis the state 
through the discourse of the knowledge-based economy. As a consequence, 
one of the trends in Finnish higher education policies since the “little reces-
sion” in 2002 has been an increasingly transparent attempt to make university 
education more connected and “relevant” to business through commerciali-
zation of ideas as well as skills. The state has therefore actively sought to find 
the means to act at the interface of the public and private. The Government 
Program in 2011 explicitly states as its core message that “common forms of 
research cooperation will be created for higher education institutions for the 
purpose of collaboration with companies” (Prime Minister’s Office 2011, 57). 
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The most common way of legitimizing such collaboration is to refer to the 
need to “strengthen the role of universities within the system of innovation” 
(Ministry of Education and Culture 2014).
The founding of AU was also motivated by a particular kind of spatio-
temporal reasoning in which the national appears interestingly as a problem. 
Echoing the statement of the ex-minister of education and culture (Virkkunen 
2010), the interviewees invariably argued that the Finnish system of higher 
education was outdated, ineffective and too “national”. The existing system 
was cast as overly geared toward domestic competition rather than oriented 
toward “global competition”.
One of the goals of the university reforms was not only to increase competi-
tive behavior within academia but also, and perhaps even more importantly, to 
qualitatively modify the logic of competition by extending the spaces of com-
petition beyond the national borders. In this context, global university ranking 
charts were often referenced by the interviewees as a testament of the need to 
qualitatively re-engineer the idea of competition. The Ministry of Education 
and Culture has justified the reforms as a “reaction to the changes in the opera-
tional environment”. Accordingly, the Finnish universities have been facili-
tated to operate in an “international environment” through affording these 
institutions the capacity to compete and cooperate in the international arena 
(Ministry of Education and Culture 2014).
The premise of global competition was the guiding principle with respect to 
how the central actors comprehended and legitimized the need to undertake 
the Finnish university reforms and to found AU. They shared an understanding 
that the present condition was characterized by a phenomenon which one of 
the interviewees labeled as the “global market” of higher education. It was the 
lack of global orientation which was argued to be the cause of the mediocre 
performance of the Finnish university system in the global education market.
The Finnish state appears here as a facilitator whose primary task is to estab-
lish an intellectual connection between the citizenry and global spaces of action:
The prerequisite for sustainable growth is intellectual closeness to the rest 
of the world. Intellectual closeness manifests itself as common international 
conduct, whose international aspect no longer seems to require separate 
emphasis. We are already closely involved with members of global value 
networks.
(Prime Minister’s Office 2013, 35)
The reasoning of the representatives of the interviewed business and state agents 
clearly did not epitomize any form of laissez-fare political culture according to 
which government should limit its power to intervene in the (higher education) 
market. Rather, the state was seen to be forced to undertake the reforms in order 
to intervene in and tinker with the spaces of competition. The Finnish state thus 
appears as the agency required to inject and re-spatialize the “global” market 
principles into the Finnish university sector and, through it, into society at large.
114 Subject formation in higher education
The recent Government Report on the Future – together with a whole gamut 
of other reports – is similarly premised on the idea that the state is faced with 
a critical situation whereby the growth that “financially underpins its citizens’ 
and inhabitants’ wellbeing” must be created by “special measures” (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2013, 7). The report portrays an image of a state whose 
future is determined essentially by the entrepreneurial spirit of its population. 
It laments that the Finns “should create a bold culture of entrepreneurship in 
Finland, encouraging entrepreneurial activity of all kinds” (Prime Minister’s 
Office 2013, 43). The founding of AU represents precisely the need to quali-
tatively re-engineer spaces of higher education because of the conceived sub-
stances of the global market.
Interim conclusions
In this chapter, I have focused in particular on the construction of new kinds of 
learning environments within which new kinds of geopolitical subjects would 
be constituted. I have suggested that Aalto University as a co-functioning 
element within knowledge-based economization re-spatializes the “global” 
knowledge-based economy and its boundary-effacing pretensions. This mainly 
publicly funded and state-instigated but private-interest-driven institution 
thus illustrates the way in which transnational circuits of particular ideas – 
 exemplified here by the discourse of knowledge-based economy – become 
entrenched in particular locales.
This chapter highlights that in the examined Finnish context these entrepre-
neurializing and internationalizing environments are generated to a significant 
extent through and by the state but at the same time enmesh intellectual, social 
and business interests. The re-casting of publicly funded institutions as learning 
environments where the constitution of entrepreneurial subjects takes place thus 
highlights one among the multiple ways that the state, by seeking to foster accu-
mulation through new institutional arrangements, negotiates the instability and 
the persistent crises of capitalism. But in this case, agency is not reduced to the 
state as a homogeneous, stable actor; agency is rather distributed and emergent 
by nature.
Knowledge-based economization is a process that re-works political space. 
New kinds of borders and boundaries acquire salience in this process. That 
is, the examined case discloses selective investing in certain micro-spaces; it 
creates spatial exceptions presumed to be functional from the perspective of 
the present-day capital accumulation. This is also shown in the way in which 
processes of subjectification in knowledge-based economization place certain 
segments of population at the center of new system of capital accumulation and 
push others to its margins.
It is notable how little resistance and political tension these developments 
have generated in Finland, a country where the welfare state culture, and 
the related “social government”, has been quite thoroughly institutionalized. 
Finland has been, however, demonstrated to be a fertile ground for the transfer 
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of ideas on entrepreneurial university and on the importance of generating 
new geopolitical subjects that were discussed in Chapter 5. Something that 
has been touched upon briefly in this chapter, but that would also be crucial 
to focus on, are the resistances and contingencies which shape the meanings 
and impacts of higher education when these ideas arrive and are translated in 
a particular locale.
Cities and knowledge-based economization
It is beyond the scope of this book to evaluate whether the notion of the 
knowledge-based economy offers the most scientifically appropriate descrip-
tion of the nature of the contemporary political–economic condition. Rather, 
I draw from a body of research which suggests that since the 1990s the knowl-
edge-based economy – both as an economic–political imaginary and as a set of 
practices – has emerged as a powerful discursive-cum-material phenomenon 
which provides a meaningful frame for political, economic and even cultural 
contestation across different geographical sites and within the different fields of 
social life. This phenomenon is arguably related to the rise of the competition 
state (Cerny 1990; Moisio 2008), neoliberal geopolitics of state space (Brenner 
2004; Moisio 2011a) and the ostensibly geoeconomic visions and means in 
world politics (Moisio 2017; Sparke 2007). Whatever the best conceptualiza-
tion may be, my perspective highlights both the fundamental role of sense 
making and meaning making in politics as well as related social relations and 
regulative structures in the context of the most recent iteration of capitalism 
(Jessop and Sum 2017; Jessop 2005). I have hence argued that knowledge-
based economization is a process which brings together geopolitical subjects, 
objectifying calculative practices and, notably, geopolitical discourses.
The basic discursive tenets constitutive of the knowledge-based economiza-
tion have been widely articulated and circulated in firms, business associations, 
international organizations, trade unions, cities, states and regions, as well as 
in a number of policy sectors from culture to science and health. These dis-
cursive tenets have a notable self-actualizing quality. Even if they represent 
the social world only partially and highly selectively with regard to territorial 
competition or the valuation of human capital, for instance, the discourses of 
the knowledge-based economy constantly contribute to the making of the 
knowledge-based economy in its own image. Moreover, the discourses of the 
knowledge-based economy carry with them a deep geopolitics, one which is 
predicated in particular on various discourses of global inter-spatial competi-
tion and territorial competitiveness. As suggested in Chapter 4, within such 
geopolitical discourses on “advanced nations” (e.g. Porter 2000, 15), global 
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value chains emerge as a crucial political site which guides the strategic action 
and policymaking of states, cities and regions with regard to producing spaces 
and human capital.
It may be only a slight overstatement to say that since the 1990s the pro-
cesses of financialization and knowledge-based economization have together 
established the urban as the unquestionable site of capital maximization (cf. 
Foglesong 2012). Knowledge-based economization can therefore be examined 
through the ways in which producers of urban space and experience – rang-
ing from international organizations, firms and business associations to political 
leaders, state officials, urban planners, real estate developers and so on – define 
and articulate the strategic meaning of urban formations, infrastructures and 
environments vis-à-vis broader political–economic goals, in particular when 
these actors legitimize collective consumption in the production of these infra-
structures and formations.
As a geopolitical process, knowledge-based economization has manifested 
itself in urban visions, branding and urban strategies in particular. Urban spaces, 
therefore, should not be treated as static sites of knowledge-intensive capi-
talism, but rather understood as spaces that are constitutive of knowledge-
based economization.
The knowledge-based economy has become a significant meta-object of 
urban governance and planning. This kind of governance and planning rests on 
the assumption that urban infrastructures and built environments are important 
for engendering a culture of creativity, entrepreneurship and innovation, and, 
consequently, developing and maintaining territorial competitiveness of the 
nation state. Moreover, this kind of governance of competitiveness through 
cities has clearly become entangled with the mushrooming academic concep-
tualizations of urban attractiveness, urban amenities, smart urbanism, agglom-
eration economies, competitive cities and the like over the past two decades.
Importantly, knowledge-based economization has proceeded through a 
range of attempts to produce a novel spatial organization of the state through 
cities, city-regions and urban spaces more generally. These urban spaces are 
thus hoped to facilitate the circulation of knowledge-intensive capital and the 
production of surplus value. It seems clear, indeed, that the strategic role of cit-
ies and certain micro-spaces of cities has grown rapidly after the 2008 financial 
crisis, and that the mobilization of creative city, smart city, start-up city and 
eco-city imaginaries in crisis-ridden Europe and beyond stems from the efforts 
of political and economic actors to revitalize local as well as national economies 
through particular urban discourses of hope (also Rossi 2016). The phenom-
enon of knowledge-based economization thus refers to the increasingly salient 
and pervasive ways in which various actors think about cities and especially 
some locales of cities as well as city networks as pivotal spaces of value creation.
Particular urban singularities, such as business parks, signature build-
ings and so on, together form urban infrastructures or “spatial products” as 
Keller Easterling (2014, 12) would have it. These infrastructures are associ-
ated with economic growth not only locally but also nationally and even in 
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the supranational context. Producing a competitive state spatially is therefore 
less about the territorial management of state space in its entirety, that is, con-
necting citizens to the land and state institutions in itself; it is more about 
maximizing the potential of places, micro-spaces and populace in the endless 
production of value in a transnational context. In such a context, cities and 
urban infrastructures within cities become crucial sites within which political–
economic success or failure in the contemporary condition is being produced. 
Facilitating the circulation of capital in the upper tiers of global value chains 
and building urban infrastructures become two sides of the same coin.
The remainder of this chapter scrutinizes “city geopolitics”, which is at 
the heart of the phenomenon of knowledge-based economization. The basic 
argument of the chapter is that the knowledge-based economy is not only 
predicated on particular urban imaginaries and the associated discourses on 
the inevitability of urbanization, but also practiced through cities and their 
micro-spaces. I begin with conceptualizing city geopolitics, before entering 
into a selected set of theories on the ways in which the knowledge-based 
economy, urban space and territorial competition come together. I scrutinize 
certain geopolitical narratives, such as the creative class and the creative city, 
which have been widely circulated and translated into policies in different 
geographical contexts as planning ideas within the past 15 years. Again, an 
analysis of these narratives and related ideas uncover the geopolitical in the 
context of knowledge-based economization. The analysis of the geopolitical 
narrative of the creative class and cities is followed by an examination of the 
recent Guggenheim Museum project in Helsinki, Finland. Finally, the role of 
urban projects vis-à-vis the imagined knowledge-based economy at the scale 
of the EU is briefly discussed.
On the concept of city geopolitics
Urban geopolitics is often used to denote the intertwining of cities, politics and 
conflicts, as they have manifested for instance in ethnically divided cities (see 
Fregonese 2009). It thus extends the concept of geopolitics from the realm of 
inter-state relations toward what could be called urban battlefields. The objec-
tive of urban geopolitics has therefore been to produce new insights on the 
fascinating yet potentially treacherous relationship between violent geopolitical 
processes and urban space (see, e.g. Rokem et al. 2017).
In their discussion of urban geopolitics, Rossi and Vanolo (2012) refer to the 
ways in which cities are commonly theaters of war across the globe, and how 
cities as geostrategic targets (including human capital and built environment) 
are destructed in the practices of warfare. They also associate urban geopolitics 
with the intensive governmentalization of urban experience, the neoliberal 
re-shuffling of the relationship between political authorities and citizens or 
urban communities, the rise of the so-called gated communities, the increasing 
demands for safety and security which have followed the terror attacks in the 
US in 2001 and the associated militarization of urban spaces as well as with 
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the practices of criminalization in the context of neoliberal urban governance. 
Today, the concept of urban geopolitics is often used to denote militarization 
of urban space (see Graham 2010) and experience, and it therefore refers to the 
ways in which the security policies of the state, often articulated in terms of 
national security, have been urbanized and localized through new regulations, 
policies and related technologies of surveillance and control which have the 
potential to annihilate basic democratic rights.
In order to develop a geopolitical reading of urban space in the context of 
knowledge-based economization, I introduce the concept of city geopolitics, 
which resonates with the concept of urban geopolitics but also extends its 
meaning without falling into the trap of “methodological cityism” (for the 
concept, see Angelo and Wachsmuth 2015). The concept of city geopolitics 
covers at least four issue areas:
1 City geopolitics refers to the political processes of engineering cities 
through technologies of surveillance and discipline, and related systems of 
power. The increasingly pervasive surveillance and policing of urban spaces 
is connected to the “politics of fear” in the “age of insecurity” and “the 
war on terrorism”, but it also reflects the various efforts to tackle crime and 
social deviance in urban space (Graham 2010; Rossi and Vanolo 2012).
2 City geopolitics stands for the political dimensions of urban infrastruc-
ture and built environments and the ways in which international politics 
penetrates or saturates urban space and experience. This alludes to how 
urban space not only mirrors but also becomes world politics. These urban 
infrastructures range from hard and soft infrastructures of “smart cities”, 
“creative cities” and “start-up cities” to the more traditional geopolitical 
symbols which are situated in urban infrastructures. Urban infrastructure 
may thus signal both the conceivably fluid world politics of the knowl-
edge-intensive mode of capital accumulation as well as the more tradi-
tional markers of geopolitics such as the West and East, “homeland” or 
“nation”, among others. Urban infrastructure and built environments can 
thus be mobilized for various purposes, and the production and manage-
ment of the urban built environment and related urban experience is inex-
tricably connected to the issues of producing territories of wealth, power 
and competition.
3 City geopolitics refers to the historically contingent role of cities in the 
changing political strategies of the state more generally. City geopoli-
tics signifies the positioning of cities in the geopolitical narratives and 
political–economic processes of the state. These narratives and processes 
can be nationalizing or globalizing, or both simultaneously. Cities and 
urban spaces, therefore, can be understood as having a historically con-
tingent strategic position within the broader dynamics of state de- and 
re- territorialization. This dimension of city geopolitics can be interrogated 
through popular expert accounts, ideas and academic theories, as well as 
through urban projects (orchestrated by cities or the state) which seek to 
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establish correspondence between the conceived world political condition 
and the produced urban formations and experience.
4 City geopolitics denotes processes within which the urban built environ-
ment is produced as a resource system for the further production of value 
in a national as well as in an increasingly transnational context.
Points two, three and four are particularly relevant in an examination of the 
phenomenon of knowledge-based economization, for they disclose the geo-
political dimension of spaces such as innovative milieux, learning regions, 
national or regional innovation systems, triple helixes, clusters, ecosystems of 
innovations, smart cities, creative cities, compact cities and intercultural cities, 
to mention but a few. These are thus not “mere” urban ideas but carry a sig-
nificant amount of geopolitics with them.
City geopolitics of spatial Keynesianism
During the peak of national welfare state construction in post-Second World 
War Europe, state development was characterized by territorialized and uni-
fied city spaces and urban networks in a predominantly national setting. This 
process is often dubbed spatial Keynesianism (see Brenner 2004) whereby ter-
ritorial unification was accomplished through homogenizing and equalizing 
economic policies and hierarchic spatial planning practices (Table 7.1). Welfare 
statehood was thus produced and maintained through extending and generat-
ing state power through networks of interconnected cities and their “func-
tional regions”, thus connecting cities and the so-called hinterlands to form a 
nationalized spatial setting for national production, national consumption and 
national identity. By controlling the links between cities within its jurisdiction, 
and by protecting the commercial functions of inter-city relations, the state 
became a peculiar national mediator of socio-spatial relations. In this capac-
ity, the state was both symbolically and in terms of institutional power located 
“above” cities (cf. Lefebvre 2003). This is one of the key constitutive ele-
ments of the so-called spatial Keynesianism that emerged in post-war Western 
Europe in particular: a historical epoch in which urban spaces and city govern-
ance were nationalized and statized through various techniques of “sovereign” 
government ranging from extensive spatial planning practices to systems of 
controlling the spatial distribution of public and, to a degree, private money. 
The state provided not only the necessary political and symbolic order but 
also, at least ideally, a uniform infrastructural basis and predictable operational 
environment for wide-ranging policymaking and market exchanges within the 
geographical boundaries of the state.
Toward a re-worked city geopolitics of state space
In some contexts, the key practices and geopolitical reasoning of spa-
tial Keynesianism began to unravel already in the early 1980s. The uneasy 
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Table 7.1  From spatial Keynesianism to knowledge-based economization (modified from 
Brenner and Theodore 2002 and Moisio 2011b)
Spatial Keynesianism Knowledge-based economization
Regional structure Even regional development, 
national integrity, 
decentralization in 
settlement and industrial 
policy
Economic development through 
major cities and metropolitan 
areas, regional concentration of 
economic and innovation activity, 
rise of metropolitan politics and 
city-regionalism
Forms of governance Emphasis on “national”, 
state-centered government, 
nationalization of the 
political 
Internationalization of the national, 
de-nationalization, de-statization, 
diffusing system of economic 
governance, economization of the 
political
Purpose of the state Economic growth, 
production and 
distribution of welfare, 
state ownership, provider 
of military security, 
transfers of income
Provider of conditions for effective 
competition, economic facilitator 
and supporter, creator of favorable 
conditions
Regulation The Bretton Woods system, 
regulation by national 
central banks, public 
investments 
Deregulation, freeing the financial 
market, enabling the (relatively) 
free movement of capital
Nodal scale National Overlapping of several scales, 
devaluation of the national, the 




Regional planning, transfers 
of income, dominance of 
homogenizing policies
Competitiveness and growth policy, 
innovation policies, region-led 
development through state income 
transfers, internationalization of 
places, specialization 
Territory Nationalization of territory, 
natural resources, 
economic growth, defense 
policies, societal order, 
sovereignty
Internationalization of territory, 
emphasis on attractive territorial 
qualities, economic growth through 
spatial centralization, partial 
suppression of territorial dimension 
of defense policies, movement from 
homogenization toward territorial 
specialization and spatial selectivity
City/state relations Governing cities through 
nationalizing processes, 
managing and preventing 
competition between 
cities within a national 
city-hierarchy
Governing through cities, fostering 
inter-spatial competition, 
responsibilizing cities and city 
governments
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relationship between the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism and 
 Fordist-Keynesian regional policies increasingly became a topic of debate 
(Jessop 1990). Spatial Keynesianism was gradually replaced by a reasoning 
according to which the new economy and related inter-state competition were 
equated with competition between cities.
In their work on the rise of technopoles, Castells and Hall (1994, 7) argued 
over 20 years ago that the role of cities in global politics is growing because – 
when compared to the state – cities “have a greater response capacity to gener-
ate targeted development projects, negotiate with multinational firms, foster 
the growth of small and medium endogenous firms, and create conditions 
that will attract the new sources of wealth, power, and prestige”. In important 
ways, their formulation discloses the ways in which the economized geopoliti-
cal condition has embedded itself in policymaking in the context of both cities 
and states: the discourses of territorial competition and competitiveness instru-
mentalize the city as the pivotal site of inter-spatial competition in the age 
of knowledge-intensive capitalism. Castells and Hall perceive this inter-city 
competition as a productive one: it generates new growth because “such com-
petition becomes a source of innovation, of efficiency, of a collective effort to 
create a better place to live and a more effective place to do business” (ibid., 7).
Many scholars, politicians, business people and lobbyists have from the 
1990s onwards suggested that key cities and city-networks are somehow sup-
planting or at least challenging the territorial state both in terms of governance 
and market functions. They have postulated a declining role for the territorial 
state in the governance of both political and economic affairs, thus juxtapos-
ing the state and the urban as competing scales of politics and governance 
(Brenner 1998).





major cities as national 
social and economic 
machines, industrial 
districts, technopoles
Mixture of nationalizing and globalizing 
symbolism and infrastructures, 
technopoles, the heightening 
role of spectacular architectural 
formations, “soft infrastructures” and 
learning environments (both higher 
education and start-up spaces), city as 
a multicultural and transnational hub
Characteristics of 
policymaking
The ideal of democracy and 
political representation 
and responsibility, the 
development of slow and 
long-term policies through 
inter-party and inter-
ministerial consensus and 
collaboration
The growing role of consultants and 
economic agents in policymaking, 
fast policy formation, transnational 
policy mobilities and their 
translations
Table 7.1  (Continued)
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Rather than embracing the above-mentioned hollowing out of the state 
argument, researchers in urban and regional studies have pointed out how con-
temporary state-orchestrated policies can be understood as spatially selective 
( Jones 1997), and thus significantly contribute to the increasingly city-centered 
image of the world. These policies challenge the decentralized and equalizing 
spatial formations of the state as sensible national expressions of public territo-
rial sovereignty ( Jonas and Moisio 2016). And, in consequence, the territorial 
logic of policies has been at least partially inverted. Brenner (2004, 16) argues 
exhaustively how “it is no longer capital that is to be molded into the (territo-
rially integrated) geography of state space, but state space that is to be molded 
into the (territorially differentiated) geography of capital”.
This new molding of state space into the geography of capital is practiced 
through policymaking which seeks to differentiate and segment state space in 
order to correspond to the conceived locational preferences of transnational 
capital within each national territory. This, in turn, can be understood as an 
effort to strategically position the state through its cities within the global cir-
cuits of knowledge-intensive capital. When we asked one of the leading offi-
cials of spatial development in the Finnish state about the strategic role of cities 
in the contemporary world, she responded revealingly how
cities have agglomeration benefits in terms of economic activity and avail-
ability of skilled labor force. They are well connected with each other and 
internationally, and they attract students and working-age people with 
education and job opportunities. Cities are places for research, companies, 
and funding organizations working together to create value in the form 
of new products and services and well-being. Here, the role of the city is 
changing from service organizer and infrastructure builder to active and 
open platform developer.
(Interview in 2016, Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment, Finland)
The role cities play within the contemporary transnationalizing state appara-
tus is an intriguing geopolitical phenomenon. It seems evident that a perva-
sive reasoning of the colossal strategic role of major cities and their internal 
fabric in the production of vital, productive, prosperous, happy and innova-
tive territorial polities is one of the constitutive elements of the process of 
knowledge-based economization. This kind of reasoning is premised on a 
particular geopolitical logic that discusses the role of cities in economic and 
state-centered terms, and it is not hard to find this pervasive logic in the 
mainstream academic discourse. Consider, for instance, some of the arguments 
presented by a well-known urbanist, influential neo-classical Harvard econo-
mist and widely read columnist Edward Glaeser (2012, 1, 6) in his bestselling 
Triumph of the City. The book is predicated on four central propositions which 
aptly disclose some of the geopolitical tenets of knowledge-based economiza-
tion. Indeed, his work explicates how the territories of wealth and economic 
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processes come together. First, cities, Glaeser argues, have for a long time 
been “engines of innovation”; second, “urban density provides the clearest 
path from poverty to [national] prosperity”; third, “proximity has become ever 
more valuable as the cost of connecting across long distances has fallen”; finally, 
industrial cities need to reconfigure themselves by “reinventing themselves” to 
meet the requirements of the new economy. Glaeser thus argues that
A more connected world has brought huge returns to the idea-producing 
entrepreneurs who can now scour the earth in search of profits … Cities 
are the absence of physical space between people and companies. They are 
proximity, density, closeness. They enable us to work and play together, 
and their success depends on the demand for physical connection. During 
the middle years of the twentieth century, many cities, like New York, 
declined as improvements in transportation reduced the advantages of 
locating factories in dense urban areas. And during the last thirty years, 
some of these cities have come back, while other, newer cities have grown 
because technological change has increased the returns to the knowledge 
that is best produced by people in close proximity to other people … In 
America and Europe, cities speed innovation by connecting their smart 
inhabitants to each other.
(Glaeser 2012, 5–7)
I would argue that this form of geopolitical reasoning, centered on the idea of 
the competitive city and echoing the nowadays popular “people go first, jobs 
follow” argument (Peck 2016, 6), has strengthened in the aftermath of the 
2008 economic crisis. As a critical actor in this process, the state increasingly 
orchestrates territorial policies which are spatially selective – both within state 
territory and cities. Moreover, public investments in the structures of the puta-
tive new economy have concentrated spatially during the past 20 years or so, 
and this pattern seems to be prevailing in the post-crisis setting and in fact may 
be invigorated by it. Today, a significant share of the private investments in 
innovation-driven development flow to and are being absorbed in major cities 
in different state contexts. This has prompted a kind of investment hunting as 
a key preoccupation of cities. This hunting results in a variety of attempts by 
cities to reinvent themselves by highlighting qualitative features of their urban 
spaces of production and consumption. Without such reinvention, cities are 
doomed to fail. As Glaeser (2012, 9) pronounces tellingly, “the age of the 
industrial city is over, at least in the West”.
The creative class as a geopolitical theory
An attempt to produce value in places – be it a city, a region or a state – is at 
the heart of the process of knowledge-based economization. One of the driv-
ing forces of such economization is an understanding that the world is divided 
between places in terms of their capacity to bring together particular types of 
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economic agents and to aid them to produce economic value in the upper 
echelons of the production chain. Successful places are winners who produce 
a lot of economic value whereas other places are losers who are locked in the 
structures of the past and produce only a relatively limited amount of eco-
nomic value (Florida 2004).
It is little surprise indeed that both the scholarly and more popular litera-
ture which discusses and explains the fragmentation and differentiation of the 
contemporary political–economic map with regard to economic value creation 
has emerged during the past two decades – thus in tandem with the process 
of knowledge-based economization. Literature on the spatial distribution and 
concentration of “creativity” in particular seeks to explain how some places 
are more successful than others in the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism.
I argue in the ensuing pages that this literature uncovers the ways in which 
the nature of territorial competitiveness is increasingly understood as if it were 
constituted through bringing together urban spaces and a particular type of 
geopolitical subjects. More specifically, I discuss one highly policy-relevant 
theory of economic and spatial development: the theory of the creative class 
which has been developed by the US-based Richard Florida in a series of writ-
ings from the early 2000s up to the present.
As Peck (2005, 740) argues, Florida’s ideas have proven enormously 
seductive among civil leaders in different geographical contexts. These ideas 
have become the bread and butter of urban managers, planners, state offi-
cials and politicians who promote a kind of consumption city (Pratt 2008) 
and simultaneously seek to attract science, research and development and 
high-tech activities to locate in their city. Since the early 2000s, many cities 
which have or have not experienced large-scale loss of manufacturing jobs 
have jumped onto the creative city bandwagon and sought to create urban 
spaces and infrastructures to attract people with economically valuable ideas 
which can be utilized in the fields of nanotech, media, design, high-tech, 
bio-tech and other sectors. Creative city policies have also come to charac-
terize knowledge-based economization because Floridean and related notions 
of creativity have seemed to offer quick solutions to complicated economic 
problems, solutions that can be fairly easily implemented by public authorities 
(Borén and Young 2013).
By way of simplifying the complex political–economic condition, the 
concept of the creative class and related concepts such as the creative city 
have shaped the ways in which a wide spectrum of actors view the world. 
Simultaneously, these concepts disclose the fundamentally place and urban-
centered nature of knowledge-based economization. The theory of the crea-
tive class thus belongs to a wider genre of literature on the coming together of 
human capital and urban space in the generation of competitive advantage and 
territorial competitiveness (Moisio 2015).
Rather than treating the theory of the creative class as a mere elitist regional 
development theory of post-Fordism, I argue below that Florida’s theory of 
the creative class is essentially geopolitical. The intellectual framing of creativity 
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as a geopolitical phenomenon is in itself a striking phenomenon. Indeed, an 
analysis of the theory of the creative class nicely discloses some of the ways 
that geopolitical objects, subjects and discourses come together in the context 
of knowledge-based economization. Inter-spatial competition is the discourse 
and the “creative” segment of the population the subject. Furthermore, by way 
of tailoring indices, the literature on the creative class and the creative city 
(together with the related work of consultants) alters the city into a geopoliti-
cal object of competition that can be measured, analyzed and compared with 
other cities.
The theory of the creative class provides not only a subtext on the con-
temporary geopolitical condition but also an intellectual framework which 
identifies, privileges and normalizes certain issues which are then argued to 
explain how economic and political success can be engendered in the context 
of knowledge-intensive capitalism. Against this quality, it does not come as 
a surprise that the basics of this framework have been re-produced countless 
times in policy debates in different geographical contexts. In short, the theory 
of the creative class provides a particular ideational toolkit with which different 
kinds of actors in politics and administrations can circumnavigate the purport-
edly messy global capitalism.
When analyzed from a geopolitical perspective, the theory of the creative 
class is composed of five ideational elements (Figure 7.1). It is to these elements 
that I now turn.


















Figure 7.1 Constitutive elements of the theory of the creative class by Richard Florida.
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The great epochal shift: creative class, value creation and 
territorial competition in the knowledge-based economy
Similarly to almost all theories of the knowledge-intensive capitalist economy, 
the creative class theory is premised on the view that there is presently an 
ongoing transition away from the manufacturing era toward an economy of 
innovations, especially in the most advanced parts of the world. Indeed, the 
theory of the creative class is premised on the assumption of an almost epochal 
shift in capitalism, and it is this piercing emphasis that connects Florida’s theory 
to another set of influential theses that have emerged since the 1990s. One may 
argue that Florida’s book The Rise of the Creative Class represents an influential 
body of “rise literature” which embodies knowledge-based economization. In 
particular, Florida’s work resembles some of the ideas Castells (1996) devel-
oped in his The Rise of the Network Society, and in so doing highlights the role 
of high-paid professionals, innovative work and what Florida calls the creative 
sector of the economy.
The theory of the creative class does not seek only to analyze but also 
discursively construct a world in which creativity and knowledge replace the 
more traditional forces of production. The great epochal shift Florida portrays 
touches upon the ways in which economic growth “happens” and can be 
cultivated in different historical contexts. Whereas for most of human history 
economic growth derived “from a place’s endowments of natural resources, 
like fertile soil or raw materials”, today the key resource is a highly mobile 
creative populace and the resources they carry with themselves: creativity and 
“creative ethos” (Florida 2004, xix–xx, 21–43). In contemporary knowledge-
intensive capitalism creativity plays a similar role to what coal and iron ore 
played in the era of steelmaking (ibid., 6). Creativity, in short, is not a tangible 
asset “like mineral deposits”, but rather it is “something essential that belongs 
to all of us, and that must always be nourished, renewed, and maintained – or 
else it will slip away” (Florida 2007, 269). Accordingly, unlike the eras domi-
nated by agriculture and manufacturing, today the key dimension of economic 
competitiveness is the ability to attract, cultivate and mobilize creativity as a 
resource (Florida 2004, xx).
Like many other theories of the knowledge-based economy, the creative 
class thesis is a theory of economic growth. The theory takes its inspiration 
from the issue of human creativity, which it treats as a resource, potential and 
economic force. Human creativity thus appears as a force of production that 
is crucial in the generation of value in the upper ladders of the value chain. 
Injecting what Florida calls “creative value” into the economic process thus 
makes local, regional and national economies grow. Human capital is some-
thing that is necessary for both wealth generation and inter-territorial com-
petition. The theory of the creative class is thus premised on the ultimately 
instrumental nature of the concept of creativity. Florida narrows down, neu-
tralizes, normalizes, economizes and, eventually, geopoliticizes creativity as a 
pivotal thing, ethos and process of post-Fordist capitalism.
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This value creation is conceived of as happening primarily through the 
 productive capacities of the creative class, which is composed of talented 
individuals. Florida (2004) associates the concept of the creative class with a 
relatively large group of people working in ostensibly creative jobs in science 
and engineering, design, education, architecture, the arts, music and entertain-
ment. People working in these sectors hence form “a new social class” (obvi-
ously without class consciousness in its traditional sense). Accordingly, if “you 
are a scientist or engineer, an architect or designer, a writer, artist or musician, 
or if you use your creativity as a key factor in your work in business, educa-
tion, health care, law or some other profession, you are a member” (Florida 
2004, xxvii).
The creative class engages in work that seeks to create “meaningful new 
forms”, and comprises two different groupings: the super-creative core (prob-
lem finding and problem solving) and creative professionals who work in 
various knowledge-intensive jobs – particularly in the high-tech sector. The 
creative class therefore produces value in a relatively limited spectrum of the 
economy. Florida (2004) defines certain occupations as essential agencies of 
economic growth, and locates a creative class with certain capacities and tastes 
at the heart of value generation. According to the theory of the creative class, 
it is the value that the work is producing which defines the success and failure 
of political communities at the contemporary conjuncture.
Resonating with the idea of Castells (1996) on the crucial role of a particular 
type of professionals in what he calls “informationalism”, the creative class is 
itself a geopolitical subject that is needed to provide the framework conditions 
for engendering economic value. Florida’s theory discloses how the process 
of knowledge-based economization is “peopled”. The figure of the talented 
individual and the collective body of the creative class become the single most 
important geopolitical subject in determining the contemporary political econ-
omy of the purportedly advanced nations. Accordingly, creativity, more than 
any other force of production, positions cities, regions and nations vis-à-vis the 
knowledge-based economy, and in so doing determines their future in terms 
of wealth, prestige and resilience.
In sum, Florida’s “value theory” is twofold. First, the creative class, through 
its fabulous capacity to create economic value, is both politically and eco-
nomically indispensable. Second, the purported personal values of the creative 
class – tolerance, liberalism, celebration of cultural diversity and readiness to 
“take tremendous levels of risk” (Florida 2007, 244) – and the actual capacity 
to produce economic value through their creative ethos are two sides of the 
same coin. Creativity hence does not refer to such forms of “radical creativity” 
which would destabilize the existing political system. Rather, the liberal values 
of the creative class are understood as important components of establishing a 
firm economic and cultural base which attracts talented individuals to gather 
and produce even more economic value. Simultaneously, the central desires 
and values of the creative class – such as individualism, entrepreneurialism, 
meritocracy and willingness to engage in teamwork – may potentially spread 
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to the rest of society (including some of the workers in the service sector and 
manufacturing), and in so doing eventually extend the economic base.
Geopolitical subtext: peaks, hills and valleys
Superstar cities’ expanding economies spur demand for more and better 
restaurants, theaters, nightclubs, galleries, and other amenities. Successful 
businesspeople and entrepreneurs endow their museums, concert halls, 
private schools, and universities … [Superstar cities] have unique kinds of 
economies that are based around the most innovative and highest value-
added industries, particularly finance, media, entertainment and tech; busi-
nesses in superstar cities are formed and scaled up more quickly. All of 
this attracts still more industries and more talent. It’s a powerful, ongoing 
feedback loop that compounds the advantages of these cities over time.
(Florida 2017b)
According to the theory of the creative class, successful firms locate where 
the talent is. These are not the cheapest locations, but firms want to locate in 
them because of the availability of highly talented employees. Successful firms 
in the creative economy need highly specialized employees, who, according to 
Florida, tend to settle in cities or city-regions that offer the best quality of life.
As Castells (1996) reminded in his “rise book”, creative knowledge workers 
are urbanized and mobile and value individuality, difference and merit. The 
theory of the creative class repeats the same message: because of their urban 
tastes, economically valuable individuals gather in cities. Following some of 
the Glaeserian tenets of urban economics, Florida argues that the productivity 
of people increases when they locate close to one another in cities and regions 
(Florida 2008, 6). The creative class is thus composed of a distinctive group of 
urban dwellers who are productive, passionate and embrace a particular mod-
ern urban lifestyle and associated active pastimes. They cherish urban amenities 
and value urban hustle and buzz. They thus express a proclivity for a “livable” 
urban environment which is loaded with cafes, boutiques and galleries, among 
other things.
The preferences of the creative class differ from those of the “old” middle 
class, characterized by suburban lifestyles. But the challenging thing with the 
creative class is that its representatives are hypersensitive and hence mobile, and 
they easily vote with their feet. The creative class do not therefore select their 
place of residence on the basis of the availability of jobs and thus on the basis of 
national and international labor markets (cf. Scott and Storper 2009). Rather, 
this class is not bound to any “nations” and is not restricted by state borders. It 
moves to cities in which they prefer to reside, and these preferences are based 
on quality-of-life perceptions (Houston et al. 2008).
In the theory of the creative class, place is the key economic and social 
organizing unit of the contemporary capitalist condition. Places are not only 
concentrations of creativity but also sites that nurture, manage and cultivate 
130 City geopolitics
that creativity and the related “experiential life”. Florida (2004, 166) argues 
that “the creative class lifestyle comes down to a passionate quest for experi-
ence. The ideal … is to ‘live the life’ – a creative life packed full of intense, 
high-quality, multidimensional experiences”. The power of place is therefore 
associated with its capacity to provide an environment for creative or experi-
mental lifestyles through ecosystems (one of the catchwords which epitomize 
knowledge-based economization) which harness human creativity and turn it 
into economic value. Florida thus argues that building a particular “world class 
people climate” is absolutely essential in any attempt to attract or retain crea-
tive people (Florida 2004, 293).
By way of highlighting the connection between the generation of eco-
nomic value and the urban lifestyles of the creative class, the theory of the 
creative class discloses how “metropolis” is seamlessly connected to biopolitics 
as a form of governmentality (see also Kivelä and Moisio 2017). As proposed 
by Agamben (2011), the concept of metropolis should not be understood as a 
mere “city” but rather linked to the emergence of a thoroughly economized 
urban fabric. The creative class theory indeed uncovers an urban-based view of 
the valorization of knowledge-intensive capital, and the associated governance 
to accommodate its lifestyles and things.
Because the concept of the creative class is predicated on a preference-
centered economic model of human behavior, it highlights “underlying con-
ditions”, or what Florida (2004) eventually calls “ecosystem characteristics”, 
which enable certain cities and city-regions to attract and mobilize creative 
people more effectively than their competitors. In so doing, a critical read-
ing of the creative class theory exposes one of the central discursive tenets of 
knowledge-based economization: the emphasis on the “struggle” of major cit-
ies to compete for the highly mobile and de-nationalized creative class, inter-
national attention as well as a particular type of desirable investments. In such a 
view, urban space becomes not only a critical infrastructure in the production 
of economic value but also a crucial factor in inter-spatial competition.
All the above-mentioned issues of the theory of the creative class eventually 
boil down to the question of the nature of contemporary world politics. In the 
theory of the creative class, cities and city-regions are creative epicenters of 
national territorial economies, a kind of basic unit of competition. It is there-
fore unsurprising that the creative class theory has proceeded in tandem with 
the growing scholarly and practical interest toward what is customarily called 
the “creative city”. This concept has its origins in the work of Jane Jacobs in 
the 1960s, but has been fundamentally re-animated as part of the process of 
knowledge-based economization since the 1990s (for an overview, see Borén 
and Young 2013; Scott 2014).
By way of highlighting the role and importance of urban experience in 
engendering value, wealth and prestige, the theory of the creative class de-
stabilizes the cartographic image of the territorial state. Accordingly, whereas 
in the past the cities of one country or region competed for investment and 
talent with other cities in that same country or region, now locations all across 
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the globe are competing with one another (Florida 2008, 28–29). The theory 
of the creative class thus reifies the geopolitical discourses of “global” territorial 
competition that were discussed in Chapter 4.
Florida (2008, 32) highlights that the emerging global politics is not a matter 
of competing states but rather competing metropolises. He divides the world 
into three groups of cities with regard to their economic performance: peaks, 
hills and valleys. Florida argues that talent, innovation and creativity are not 
distributed evenly across the world but tend to concentrate in specific loca-
tions. This makes global competition a harsh spatial game:
When looked at through the lens of economic production, many cities 
with large populations are diminished and some nearly vanish. Three sorts 
of places make up the modern economic landscape. First are the cities that 
generate innovations. These are the tallest peaks; they have the capacity 
to attract global talent and create new products and industries. They are 
few in number, and difficult to topple. Second are the economic “hills” 
– places that manufacture the world’s established goods, take its calls, and 
support its innovation engines. These hills can rise and fall quickly; they 
are prosperous but insecure. Some, like Dublin or Seoul, are growing 
into innovative, wealthy peaks; others are declining, eroded by high labor 
costs and a lack of enduring competitive advantage. Finally there are the 
vast valleys – places with little connection to the global economy and few 
immediate prospects.
(Florida 2008, 48)
In such a view, the significant locations in the world economy remain l imited 
in number. Florida presents provocative maps which show that there are 
roughly 25 places and regions worldwide that generate significant innovation. 
These are “mega-regions” which have ecosystems of leading-edge universities, 
high-powered companies, flexible labor markets and venture capital that are 
attuned to the demand of commercial innovation, and they produce the lion’s 
share of the patents (Florida 2008, 25).
It is for this reason that global politics will, according to the theory of the 
creative class, hinge on the tensions brewing among different locations that are 
all seeking to navigate successfully in the global economic game. The main 
dividing line in global politics is now between the innovative talent-attracting 
“have” regions and the talent-exporting “have-not” regions. This is a world of 
both concentration of value, growth and success and potential marginalization 
of many places.
In the original treatment of the creative class concept Florida argues that 
“the real threat to American security is not terrorism, it’s that creative and 
talented people may stop wanting to come here” (Florida 2004, xxiv). A few 
years later, he adds that “what we face is not a clash of civilizations but a deep-
ening economic divide among the world’s spikes and valleys” (Florida 2008, 
32). This conception of territorial competition and national security is at the 
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heart of knowledge-based economization, and it derives from an understand-
ing of the restless mobility of investments, companies and talent, which has the 
potential to turn places and entire “nations” upside down.
The city and the state
According to the theory of the creative class, world-class cities benefit and 
prosper. Firms in the creative industry form weak and strong ties in urban envi-
ronments and thereby support a process that attracts talented people to move 
to certain cities and city-regions. In such reasoning, cities must actively scan 
the horizon for investment, monitor competitors and emulate “best practices” 
(see Peck and Tickell 2002, 47), as well as re-structure themselves to respond to 
the creative class’s needs just as companies have already done (Peck 2005, 742).
At first sight, the theory of the creative class does not appear to touch 
upon the state. The theory is premised on the view that the knowledge-based 
economy is characterized by a movement away from prosperity and wealth as 
understood in terms of homogenized state territories. Indeed, the second edi-
tion of the Rise of the Creative Class (Florida 2012) articulates the dysfunctional 
nature of the nation state when compared to local governments.
But upon closer inspection, “cities and regions” and city centers stand 
out in the theory of the creative class regarded as “a country’s crucibles of 
competitiveness in the creative age” (Florida 2007, 258). Therefore it is only 
logical to propose that state-orchestrated urban policy must be “resurrected 
from the backwaters of social policy” to become “a cornerstone of national 
competitiveness planning” and a “strong innovation policy” (ibid., 259). The 
implicit emphasis on the state is not surprising given that “figuring out how 
to make national and regional economies grow and compete is the practical 
aspect” of Florida’s work (2004, xxi). The Flight of the Creative Class (Florida 
2007) includes explicit recipes for how nation states could renew their wel-
fare, investment and education policies in order to strengthen their innovation 
capacities in global inter-territorial competition.
Rather than rejecting the role of the state in knowledge-intensive capital-
ism, the theory of the creative class can be understood as qualitatively refor-
mulating state–city relations. And in this capacity it nicely articulates one of 
the basic elements of knowledge-based economization. By way of arguing that 
any country that does not constantly keep building its creative strengths will be 
left behind (Florida 2004, xxvi), the theory of the creative class articulates the 
city and city-region as crucial elements of state success as a territory of wealth. 
Ultimately, then, the theory of the creative class is concerned with inter-state 
rivalry. This same dimension has been similarly articulated by some of the most 
notable boosters of the creative city. To illustrate, Charles Landry suggests in 
his book The Creative City that
When I first began talking about the Creative City idea around 20 years 
ago I did not think that it would take off as a concept. My original impulse 
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was to respond to the dramatic economic, social and cultural transforma-
tions happening in Europe at that time as our cities needed to restructure 
and rethink what their role and purpose were. Subsequently, these trans-
formations have affected cities worldwide as cities everywhere have been 
drawn into the maelstrom of a reinvigorated globalization. In this process, 
cities have become the hubs of wealth creation and so increasingly more 
important than nation states; as a result, it is often cities that are competing 
as proxies for states.
(Landry 2009, xvii)
The theory of the creative class discloses the geopolitical reasoning inherent in 
knowledge-based economization whereby states appear as geopolitical agents 
of competition which compete through their cities. The theory of the creative 
class thus re-locates a territorial state in the framework of the conceived global 
competition, and represents the national state as being highly dependent on 
metropolises in particular as havens of jobs, talent and investment. These cities, 
rather than entire nation states, are styled as potential magnets for ambitious 
and highly skilled people (Florida 2008).
The most recent emphasis in the theory of the creative class articulates the 
growing interest in the so-called start-up cities and the related focus on city 
centers as micro-spaces in the valorization of capital. As such, it arguably points 
to some of the more recent developments of knowledge-based economization. 
Whereas the early ICT-driven entrepreneurial formation was still partly con-
centrated in outer areas in some of the major US cities – which was connected 
to what Florida (2007, 253) labels an “industrial-age materialist mind-set” – the 
recent development further highlights the role of dense urban space and urban 
lifestyle as well as the increasing role of “global start-up cities” (Florida 2013). 
This development stems from the putative creative ethos of ambitious start-up 
neo-entrepreneurs who concentrate in “superstar cities”. These are “not just 
the places where the most ambitious and talented people want to be – they 
are where such people feel they need to be” (Florida 2017b, italics in origi-
nal). Accordingly,
the most important and innovative industries and the most talented, most 
ambitious, and wealthiest people are converging as never before in a rela-
tive handful of leading superstar cities that are knowledge and tech hubs. 
This small group of elite places forge ever forward, while most others 
struggle, stagnate, or fall behind. This process is one I like to call winner-
take-all urbanism.
(Florida 2017b)
This winner-take-all urbanism further highlights the role of major urban areas 
in the production of national success. Accordingly, super-star cities generate 
the greatest levels of innovation, and they also become proxies for the state 
to enter the sphere of global governance. These cities “control and attract 
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the largest shares of global capital and investment, have huge concentrations 
of leading-edge finance, media, entertainment, and tech industries, and are 
home to a disproportionate share of the world’s talent” (Florida 2017a). In 
such a view, the major metropolitan city-region is the most characteristic form 
of social organization of the current knowledge-intensive capitalism and a 
particular symbol of national economic growth. This ultimately geopolitical 
aspect of the theory of the creative class can be best summarized by referring to 
Florida’s own phrasing, which comes in the context of comparison of nation 
states and major metropolises in terms of their role in world economy:
Cities really are the new power centers of the global economy – the 
 platforms for innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. But 
when it comes to fiscal and political power, they remain beholden to 
increasingly anachronistic and backward-looking nation-states, which has 
become distressingly obvious with the rise of Trumpism in the United 
States and populism around the world. The greatest challenge facing us 
today is how to ensure that global cities have the economic, fiscal, and 
political power to govern themselves and to continue to be a force for 
innovation and human progress.
(Florida 2017a)
Many local and state governments have taken their inspiration from the writ-
ings of Richard Florida and his fellow travelers, and a range of consultant com-
panies have put these ideas into motion in different geographical contexts. But 
I have suggested in this section that an analysis of the theory of the creative class 
exposes the geopolitical that is built into knowledge-based economization. 
The relationship between major cities and their urban spaces and states has in 
fact become one of the key facets of the process of knowledge-based economi-
zation, and it is clearly a topic which merits further scholarly attention. It may 
be oversimple to argue that the enhanced political authority of “global city-
regions” inescapably indicates a weakened sovereign political autonomy of the 
territorial state (cf. Soja 2011).
Finally, policy formation on the basis of ideas such as the creative class or the 
creative city can be understood as connected to one of the key geopolitical virtues 
of the state in the age of knowledge-intensive capitalism: its role not only as a 
facilitator and enabler of the production of economic value but also as a kind of 
“manager of mobility” which seeks to fix global movement to a national territory.
Guggenheim Helsinki and the limits of 
knowledge-based economization
Every city of real ambition wants to move up the value chain and cap-
ture centrality for themselves and become a central hub of wealth crea-
tion by exporting, yet controlling from a distance, low-cost activities and 
attracting high-value ones to itself. These include research and knowledge 
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creation centres, headquarters, advanced manufacturing, or cultural and 
artistic creativity.
(Landry 2008, xvii–xviii)
The contemporary urban policy debates are littered with buzzwords like crea-
tivity, culture and livability and value-chain talk more generally. The same 
applies to the Helsinki city-region where imaginaries how the city-region is 
developing toward a world-class business and innovation hub whose success 
is based on the power of science, art, creativity and learning capacity have 
become increasingly visible in recent years. These debates highlight the poten-
tial role of culture in achieving non-cultural goals, and in so doing uncover one 
dimension of knowledge-based economization: the economization of culture. 
But these debates also disclose a somewhat narrow urban-policy repertoire 
based on central-city makeovers, place promotion, science and technology 
center construction and local boosterism.
Today, creative city developers constantly ask cities to do new things, to 
constantly revise themselves spatially, culturally and socially. This requires cit-
ies to constantly re-think their resources, weaknesses and assets vis-à-vis the 
knowledge-intensive form of capitalism. As Landry (2008, xvii) puts it, “cities 
have had to ask themselves: who am I; where do I go next; what is my identity; 
what is distinctive about me and what are my assets?”
The creative city is reinvented in many places at the same time, and it is 
above all fixated on enhancing the competitiveness of a given city in inter-
spatial competition through value creation (cf. Peck and Tickell 2002). 
Arguments concerning how “super-star museums” are a sort of cathedral of 
the post-industrial age (for the logic, see e.g. Frey 2003) aptly disclose how 
spaces of culture and the valorization of capital are inextricably connected 
in knowledge-based economization. Those who highlight the link between 
urban density, urban amenities and productivity argue that successful cities are 
capable of attracting “smart entrepreneurial people” by “being urban theme 
parks” (Glaeser 2012, 11).
The term urban theme park is in reference to cultural infrastructures which 
occupy a specific function within knowledge-intensive capitalism, thus encap-
sulating the presence and availability of “urban culture” as a crucial dimension 
of knowledge-based economization. In this context, urban culture refers both 
to the qualitative aspects of urban space that are conceived to satisfy the needs 
of talented professionals as well as to the means through which cities try to 
develop their uniqueness. It is no surprise that since the 1990s in particular cit-
ies have sought to construct and develop facilities of culture in order to stand 
out favorably from other cities. Cultural infrastructures have thus taken on an 
integral role in developing knowledge-intensive economies in the so-called 
“ambitious cities”. Landry (2008, xviii) argues revealingly that “the overall 
aim of ambitious cities is to increase their ‘drawing power’ and to get on 
the radar screen”. In such process, local policymakers and leaders increasingly 
respond to an economic imperative that is instigated by global institutions, 
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consultant companies, international organizations, state government or federal 
 administration, for instance.
This section analyzes one particular dispute over cultural space in the 
City of Helsinki. More specifically, I elaborate upon the joint project 
by the city and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation to construct a 
Guggenheim Museum in Helsinki. The project was initiated in 2011 by 
the City of Helsinki with the intention to raise the international profile of 
the city. The first official report (Drury et al. 2012) was commissioned by 
the City of Helsinki and was produced by the foundation with the help of 
consultant companies such as LaPlata Cohen, Boston Consulting Group, 
and Cooper, Robertson & Partners (with a price tag of two million Euros). 
The report included an idea to build a new building in the harbor area of 
downtown Helsinki.
The original plan did not gain majority backing in the city council, which 
put the project on hold. It is often suggested that the city council of Helsinki 
rejected the museum project because of financial concerns, particularly out-
side criticism of the proposed c. $30 million licensing fee for use of the 
Guggenheim name for two decades. This rejection was, however, followed 
by a revised proposal instigated by the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation 
in 2013. The new proposal included a reduced licensing fee, and a promise to 
assist local supporters in soliciting private donations through a newly formed 
local foundation. Even though the revised plan again sparked much political 
controversy, the City of Helsinki and the Guggenheim Foundation launched 
a competition over the architectural plan of the museum. In 2015, the results 
Figure 7.2  The winning architecture of the Guggenheim Helsinki used with permission by 
Moreau Kusunoki Architects.
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of the competition for the design of the Guggenheim Museum building were 
announced (Figure 7.2).
In the ensuing public debate, the price of the planned museum occupied 
a central role. The New York Times observed the situation from a distance 
and reported on how the City of Helsinki “has been bitterly divided over 
the project, largely because of concerns over its price of about $147 million” 
(Bogrebin and Carvajal 2015).
In 2016, the museum project was permanently shelved by the City Assembly. 
Throughout, the Guggenheim Helsinki project was characterized by twists and 
Figure 7.2  (Continued)
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turns with respect to the actual implementation, division of labor, as well as 
funding and overall economic sensibility of the project. The confusion sur-
rounding the funding of the museum is often mentioned as the primary reason 
why the project ultimately failed (e.g. Linko 2013). There are, however, a 
number of issues that connect the project with knowledge-based economiza-
tion, issues that may help one to understand why the Guggenheim Helsinki did 
not materialize. The Guggenheim Helsinki in particular uncovers the uneasy 
entanglement of knowledge-based economization through mega-projects at 
the present political–economic conjuncture.
The following analysis of the project is not concerned with the economic 
difficulties and even oddities of the Guggenheim Helsinki, or the resistance 
to the project from different actors in the local art and political scene. I rather 
elaborate various ways through which the museum project and knowledge-
based economization were entangled.
The following analysis of the Guggenheim Helsinki project is in two parts. 
I first dissect the different ways in which the museum project was connected 
to the production of urban experience by various stakeholders. In the second 
part, I interrogate the political coalitions and political dynamics which played a 
notable role in the debate surrounding the project, and discuss the role of the 
state in the Guggenheim Helsinki case.
Guggenheim Helsinki and the question of urban experience
In the art and design world, the fate of the prospective museum has become 
a matter of global import: with everyone from the Louvre to the Hermitage 
looking to set up outposts abroad, Helsinki has become the latest battle-
ground in an ongoing conflict over how—and whether—small cities and 
emerging countries should accommodate expansionist mega-museums.
(Volner 2015)
The Guggenheim Helsinki mega-museum project did not take its inspira-
tion from the so-called Bilbao model, which included a set of urban struc-
tural reforms and related experimentation – including the construction of a 
Guggenheim museum. The Guggenheim Helsinki was not about revitalizing 
declining industrial urban spaces. In contrast to the Bilbao case, the original 
and the revised plans located the museum in a historical neo-classical urban 
environment in Helsinki, which can be regarded as a peculiar spatial condensa-
tion of geopolitical symbolism of the Finnish state.
It may sound paradoxical – but not entirely surprising – that the public 
debate over the Guggenheim Helsinki was less about experiencing art and 
more focused on economic development through the production of urban 
experience. Accordingly, many stakeholders articulated the meaning of the 
museum vis-à-vis broader societal goals.
Observed from the perspective of the public debate and political debates in 
the City Assembly and Council, the proponents of the museum particularly 
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articulated the meaning of the museum in terms of re-positioning the City of 
Helsinki (and Finland to a lesser extent) on European and global economic 
and political maps. In a similar vein, the transnational actors involved in the 
project portrayed the museum as if it were about re-situating Helsinki. It is 
notable how the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation linked the museum 
with the geopolitical location of Finland. In 2013, the CEO of the foun-
dation, Richard Armstrong, explained that Helsinki was the only city with 
whom the foundation was negotiating because the “geographical location of 
Helsinki is unusual, between the East and West” (Helsingin Sanomat 16 May 
2013), and the first official report of the museum included a detailed section 
on the geopolitical history of Finland and its recent identity as an “advanced 
nation” (Drury et al. 2012). The New Yorker, in turn, went so far as to connect 
the Guggenheim Helsinki to the issue of clarifying the geopolitical identity of 
the entire country:
Finland is different: its language is like no other on earth, with only faint 
echoes in Estonian and Hungarian; its relationship with the rest of the 
West is exceptional, since it maintained cordial relations with Soviet Russia 
throughout the Cold War. In its nearly century-long history, Finland has 
managed to erect a social state as tolerant and egalitarian as any of its 
Nordic neighbors, but it has never attracted a substantial immigrant popu-
lation, never become a major tourist destination—never, in short, figured 
out quite what its relationship with the rest of the world is meant to be.
(Volner 2015)
In the early stages of this urban struggle in particular, articulations about the 
need to re-position Helsinki were high on the agenda. The proponents per-
ceived the museum as a means to “internationalize” the City of Helsinki, 
and this form of reasoning was one of the key rhetorical devices of the local 
Guggenheim Helsinki foundation.
When examined through the public presentations and other articulations 
of the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation and the local proponents, the 
Guggenheim Helsinki case discloses a particular narrative of “cultural homog-
enization” with potential colonizing effects on the contemporary urban expe-
rience (see Rossi 2017). The potential colonizing repercussions of the museum 
were indeed vigorously taken up by the opponents of the project. Both in the 
public debate and in the political discussions, the museum was debated in terms 
of Americanization and harmful forms of globalization which would extend 
business logics to all sectors of cultural life. Local artists in particular resisted 
the museum as a space which would primarily serve the strategies of local and 
international urban elites. Accordingly, these elites are more concerned with 
urban attractiveness, place marketing and economic value, rather than local 
cultural institutions and inclusive artistic networks. They thus politicized the 
nature of the Guggenheim Museum as an elitist means to internationalize a 
place through mainstream cultural landscape branding.
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From 2012 onwards, the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation together 
with local proponents articulated the meaning of the museum increasingly 
in terms of fierce global inter-spatial competition (Drury et al. 2012). The 
museum was represented as a magnet that would attract different forms of capi-
tal to an otherwise relatively peripheral city. In this context, the museum was 
explicitly articulated as a contributor to the knowledge-based economy. One 
of the supporters of the Guggenheim Helsinki wrote how in the new post-
industrial era urban culture is a source of intangible capital that pulls in “real 
capital” from all over the world (Wilenius 2012). An expert report similarly 
argues explicitly how
Helsinki is currently in the process of realizing its vision to be a dynamic 
world-class center for business and innovation. Its high-quality services, 
arts and science capabilities, creativity, and adaptability promote the pros-
perity of its citizens and bring benefits to all of Finland. Finland, the City 
of Helsinki, and the Guggenheim Foundation can certainly find a way for 
their respective missions to complement one another … This project will 
allow Helsinki to grow strategically, creating room for continued expan-
sion according to advanced principles of urban development.
(Drury et al. 2012, 14–15)
This view of “advanced principles of urban development” has been repeated 
countless times since the 1990s in different geographical contexts as cities 
have sought to estrange themselves from their industrial past and move into 
the conceived new economy characterized by what Scott (2014) calls the 
cultural-cognitive form of capitalism. According to the nowadays main-
stream urban development routines, ambitious cities and metropolitan areas 
need monuments, attractions, interesting creative spaces, signature architec-
ture and other elements that would stimulate economic activity and dis-
tinguish the city from the identified competitor cities. The early phases of 
the Guggenheim Helsinki project aptly disclose this kind of urban develop-
ment mantra.
The above comes not as a revelation given that the culture-reputation-
economy nexus had been increasingly discussed in Helsinki since the 1990s 
and resulted in a growing interest toward what Zukin (1995) famously calls 
the symbolic economy of a city. One author wrote already in 1999 that “one 
major question facing Helsinki is how to maintain the relative advantage over 
competing cities and, in the long term, create a symbiosis between Helsinki 
(place), culture and economy” (Cantell 1999, xx). In 2000, the City of Helsinki 
officially declared that it is a “real” cultural city.
Closely resonating with these earlier debates, the Guggenheim Helsinki was 
increasingly represented as a reputational urban policy project for the City of 
Helsinki in 2013–2016. It was on numerous occasions connected to issues 
such as international recognition, attractiveness, and articulated as a means to 
prevent geographical marginalization.
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It is, however, equally significant to notice that in the latter half of the cam-
paign the Guggenheim Helsinki was tied to economic issues primarily through 
tourism and the accompanying local service economy. There remained only 
little evidence of articulations on how the museum would produce an emo-
tionally stimulating city or how it would contribute to enhancing innovative 
capacities amongst the residents of Helsinki. In the local and national politi-
cal campaigning, the Guggenheim Helsinki museum therefore became sur-
prisingly thinly connected to concepts such as creative cities, urban amenities, 
innovative milieux or local buzz. It was no longer articulated as a crucial project 
of creativity that would stimulate innovative behavior on a grassroots level or 
beyond the somewhat narrow art and design circles.
The museum was thus not highlighted as a cultural space that would reach 
beyond “mere consumption”; it was not essential in the endeavor to create a 
more attractive urban space for the talented people working in various crea-
tive jobs beyond art and design. It did not therefore appear in political debates 
as a pivotal contributor to the local or national economic recovery that was 
sought after the economic hardships which ICT companies like Nokia faced 
in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. Moreover, the museum was no 
longer explicitly represented as a piece of infrastructure that would help to 
re- territorialize global mobility and redirect flows of money, ideas and people 
related to the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism.
These silences are important, I believe, for they disclose the fact that the 
Guggenheim Helsinki was not strongly linked to the ICT sector (the repre-
sentatives of the high technology industry remained largely silent throughout 
the process), to the emerging high-tech start-up scene, creative economy, cul-
tural industry or any other main dimensions of new urbanism in the first place. 
Indeed, in the decisive phases of the struggle over the Guggenheim Helsinki, 
the economic articulation which sought to justify the construction of the 
museum remained utterly tourism and service centered and highlighted the 
direct revenue that the museum would generate locally.
If analyzed through the local and national political debates between the years 
2013 and 2016 in particular, the Guggenheim Helsinki can of course be seen as 
an attempt instigated by the local elites to fill the void left by Nokia in a con-
text of economic decline (Rossi 2017, 139). But more than that, these debates 
disclose the “contextual” limits of mega-projects, which are in the scholarly lit-
erature often associated with creative economy, creative cities and competitive 
urbanism. The case thus embodies how mega-projects such as the Guggenheim 
Helsinki are inescapably negotiated politically in local contexts and in particu-
lar historical conjunctures.
Transnational coalition, the decline of the “innovation right”
The Guggenheim Helsinki case exemplifies the interdependencies between 
local and transnational actors in attempts at constructing what is customarily 
known as new urbanism and related cultural mega-projects. These projects 
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are often structured around an alliance of local government actors, local elites, 
business organizations, developers, transnational consultancies and others who 
join forces in an effort to expand the local economy and to generate sur-
plus value.
A transnational coalition emerged in the context of the Guggenheim 
Helsinki. It played a decisive role in launching, maintaining and keeping the 
somewhat tumultuous museum project alive. It exerted significant pressure 
on local politicians and city officials over the developmental approval for the 
museum. This coalition was backed by notable auxiliary players such as the 
main local and national newspaper Helsingin Sanomat and the local chamber 
of commerce. Irrespective of the coalition’s relatively strong line-up, the 
Guggenheim Helsinki Foundation was not able to convince the majority of 
the local and national political elites to channel public money into the project. 
As such, the Guggenheim Helsinki discloses the ways in which the effective-
ness of transnational urban growth coalitions is in part dependent on their local 
and national ties and connections with political forces. As a related matter, the 
case also epitomizes how post-2008 austerity politics has influenced mega-
projects such as the Guggenheim Helsinki.
From the beginning of the project, the local political sphere was divided on 
the issue. The Left Alliance was straightforwardly against the museum, which 
it perceived to be a symbol of harmful “American” globalization. The Social 
Democrats and the Greens were internally divided, and the right wing National 
Coalition Party was largely but not entirely supportive of the Guggenheim 
Helsinki. Focusing on mere party politics either on the local or national scale 
does not, however, produce a satisfactory picture of the difficulties that the 
Guggenheim Helsinki faced in tapping into the coffers of public money.
The ensuing paragraphs suggest that the progression of knowledge-based 
economization in the Finnish context since the 1990s has been based on the 
consolidation of what Teppo Eskelinen (2015) has called the “innovation 
right”. This term refers to a political faction which embraces issues such as 
economic and political liberalism, internationalization and international com-
petitiveness and knowledge-based and technical solutions to economic and 
social problems. This faction also stresses the role of innovation, the inevitable 
nature of urbanization, the strategic role of major cities as fundamental con-
stituents of “national” success, a particular type of human capital, high-quality 
research and development, experimentation and charismatic “Steve Jobsian” 
leadership in the production of surplus value and political success. Moreover, 
the innovation right sees the role of the state and local government primarily as 
facilitators of the processes of innovation, and thus as essential providers of the 
related supporting infrastructures of learning and capacity building.
The innovation right emerged in Finland gradually in the 1990s. Its emer-
gence was seamlessly connected to the rise of the Nokia Corporation as a 
national champion firm. The development of the innovation right in the 
late 1990s and in the early 2000s was not confined to the right wing politi-
cal parties alone but gradually came to encompass nearly the entire political 
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spectrum. In other words, the innovation right had its core in right wing 
 economic liberalism, but enjoyed notable support among the center left polit-
ical parties at a time when the annual national GDP growth of more than four 
percent was widely accepted as the result of the thriving innovation sector of 
the economy.
The innovation right had its peak momentum in the early 2000s when polit-
ical elites across the political field, business firms in the ICT sector and beyond, 
as well as various Finnish and foreign experts of innovation formed strong 
coalitions. To illustrate the workings of this faction, a peculiar policy-network 
developed in the late 1990s based on the chance encounter between Pekka 
Himanen, a young Finnish philosopher interested in knowledge- intensive cap-
italism, and Manuel Castells. The pair went on to ingratiate themselves with 
key factions of the Finnish political elite and established a network of promi-
nent individuals dealing with the knowledge-based economy. They thus began 
manufacturing what is today customarily known as the Finnish information 
society model, and successfully exploited the structures of the Finnish National 
Innovation System as well as publicly and privately funded think tanks clus-
tered around the booming ICT sector.
In the early 2000s, the condensation of the power of the innovation right 
was based on its capability to bring into regular contact the government, its 
key ministries, various state-sponsored innovation funds, think tanks, private 
and public research institutes, multinational corporations and consultant com-
panies. Contacts between these bodies were established through multiple offi-
cial and unofficial learning events, such as seminars and major conferences 
in Finland and abroad, business site visits for politicians, officials and scholars 
to the various “model places” of the knowledge-based economy and various 
practices of evaluation, auditing and advocacy.
The innovation right demonstrates a particular fetish of expertise that has 
its roots in technological rationality, and introduces this rationality across pol-
icy fields. This faction frames the national interest as well as national identity 
against the purported needs of the global knowledge-based economy and por-
trays “national success” in biopolitical terms as if it were dependent on the 
attitudes and capacities of the populace. In its attempt to harness the intellec-
tual, communicative and emotional capacities of individuals for the purposes 
of knowledge-intensive capitalism, the innovation right extends the sphere of 
the economy to all corners of social and cultural life. By encouraging indi-
vidualism, creativity, a “global” entrepreneurial attitude, risk taking and inter-
nationalization, the innovation right thus expresses a will to develop a new 
innovative populace both for the needs of the nation and global capital. To 
illustrate, Castells and Himanen (2013) argue how the “renewed spiritual cul-
ture” of society would be the single most important factor in engendering eco-
nomic success in Finland. The innovation right has therefore sought to further 
a transition from the purportedly passivating “welfare state of the industrial 
era” to the “welfare society of the information age” (Castells and Himanen 
2013; Himanen 2007).
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In the Finnish context, the innovation right figuratively uprooted and made 
Silicon Valley a referential component of the knowledge-based economy. In 
a number of reports, books, assessments, talks and informal events, the repre-
sentatives of this faction have argued since the late 1990s that by selectively 
copying some economic, cultural and societal elements from Silicon Valley, 
Finland could be transformed into one of the “internationally most attractive 
concentrations of enriching interaction”, a kind of “spiritual capital of the 
whole world” (Himanen 2010).
One peculiar outcome of the 2008 crisis was the internal unraveling of the 
innovation right, which has resulted in a decline of its relative importance as 
a political force in Finland. The center-left political forces have become less 
eager to circulate the faith of the innovation right in technological innovations 
and “global” entrepreneurial attitudes. Simultaneously, the relative power of 
the “conservative right” (Eskelinen 2015) has gradually grown stronger within 
right-wing politics – both at local and national scales.
The political reasoning of the conservative right resonates with what is 
customarily called austerity politics. This is a form of disciplinary governance 
which is based on entrepreneurship, an ethos of self-survival, positive under-
standing of hierarchic forms of economic and political organizations, valuing 
“hard work” and morality and resisting collective forms of political economy. 
The conservative right thus seeks to transform ostensibly “proletarianized” 
social structures into entrepreneurial ones (Bonefeld 2012). Moreover, the con-
servative right highlights “voluntary deflation” in which the economy adjusts 
through the reduction of wages, prices and public spending to restore com-
petitiveness, which is supposedly best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, 
debts and deficits. Doing so, the advocates of the conservative right believe, 
will inspire “business confidence” (see Blyth 2013).
The innovation right enjoyed much success in pushing through publicly 
funded projects in the early 2000s. However, the rise of the conservative right 
and the relative decline of the innovation right has from 2010 onwards meant 
that it is increasingly difficult to push through projects in the field of culture 
that are based on heavy public funding. Similarly, the gradual decline of the 
innovation right signals a weakening enthusiasm on the part of the key busi-
nesses in the technology industry to fund projects that are not explicitly associ-
ated with their global business interests.
The fact that the corporate fundraising of the museum project was tardy and 
lukewarm from the beginning clearly discloses the above-mentioned devel-
opment. The key firms of the high-tech industry and related business asso-
ciations did not make any direct commitments to the Guggenheim Helsinki. 
Only a handful of companies, operating primarily in the service sector (hotel 
chains, etc.), notably participated in the fundraising organized by the local 
Guggenheim Helsinki Foundation.
The rise of the conservative right was similarly visible in local politics. At 
decisive moments of the project, the conservative right highlighted the fund-
ing issues of the museum in particular, and in so doing made it practically 
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impossible to treat public investments in the museum as if they were contribut-
ing to long-term “intangible capital”.
Finally, the Guggenheim Helsinki case brings us back to the issue of the 
state and the role of government and public spending. The role of the Finnish 
government was singular throughout the Guggenheim Helsinki process. It 
was marked by notable strategic selectivities within the state apparatus. In the 
beginning, the museum was articulated as an economic and growth-oriented 
project to the extent that the Ministry of Culture and Education refused to 
get involved in the project because it considered it to be solely about eco-
nomic affairs and local economic development (Linko 2013). The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment – a peculiar bastion of the innovation 
right – maintained a positive image of the museum throughout, whereas the 
Ministry of Finance (a stronghold of austerity politics) was more reserved about 
the public funding of the project.
Ultimately, the government refused to fund the project, which, in turn, 
made it impossible for the transnational coalition supporting the museum to rely 
on the state to push the museum through against local resistance. Even though 
the museum was articulated by its local supporters as a chance to demonstrate 
the skills, qualities and ambitions of the Finnish nation (Savolainen 2016), the 
government of Finland refused to channel public money into the museum pro-
ject. The transnational coalition thus failed to scale the Guggenheim Helsinki 
as a national project. This together with the gradual consolidation of the poli-
tics of austerity after 2008, instigated in particular by the conservative right 
both nationally and locally, made the Finnish government reluctant to invest 
public money in the project.
With regard to state involvement, the Guggenheim Helsinki highlights the 
differences that exist among infrastructural projects central to knowledge-based 
economization. Some of these are more explicitly connected to reproducing 
human capital and the related crafting of geopolitical subjects, whereas others 
are more closely connected to the issue of exhibiting creativity. With regard 
to the former (see Chapter 6), the founding of Aalto University as the “MIT 
of Finland” in 2010 was heavily sponsored by local industry and foundations. 
It was a pet project of the innovation right. The local and national economic 
elites raised more than 200 million Euros of private money in less than a year, 
and the Finnish government invested another 500 million Euros to comple-
ment the generous private fundraising. The founding of Aalto University thus 
discloses the ways in which the growth strategies of the state and the local 
growth coalitions were seamlessly interlinked in a biopolitical attempt to pro-
duce human capital for “national” purposes but with a global focus.
The EU and knowledge-based economization: from 
regional to urban form of knowledge-based economization?
Since the 1990s, the process of European integration has been fundamentally 
predicated on an idea of economic competition between Europe, Asia and the 
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US. The formulation of such a space of competition was later accompanied 
by concrete policies which were structured around the issue of competitive-
ness. The debate on European economic competitiveness vis-à-vis its rivals 
brought together three powerful political ideas, two of which were geopoliti-
cal. First, the European single market policy was premised on the view that 
the European states were too small to compete on the global sphere in the age 
of globalization. Second, the diminutive size of European states was coupled 
with another political idea related to the need to qualitatively re-construct the 
entire economic structure at the scale of the EU. Since the 1990s the com-
petitiveness problem of the EU has been articulated as a need to move toward 
a “knowledge economy” or even an “information society”. Third, from the 
1990s onwards, the European debate on competitiveness was predicated on the 
view that European competitiveness problems had to do with the territorial 
structures of the EU (Moisio, 2011b). The articulation of such a “European 
competitiveness problem” and the associated exercise of political power in the 
political–economic field since the 1990s has thus brought about the production 
of understandings of the EU as a territory of wealth with discernible suprana-
tional interests.
The EU as a regional knowlegdge-based economy
The decision in the 1990s to turn the EU into a world-class knowledge econ-
omy was a geopolitical one. As such it did not represent a predestined develop-
ment path dictated by the conceived forces of globalization. Rather, the idea 
of the European knowledge-based economy was a selected and institutionally 
retained political choice, which was in the beginning in particular accompa-
nied with the idea of a European social model. The EU-driven knowledge-
based economization was wholeheartedly first instigated and later supported by 
notable political powers within the EU, by its member states, by the OECD 
and by large high-tech companies. Ever since, the European knowledge-based 
economization has been premised on an imagination of the EU as a terri-
tory of wealth, and rationalized by the fear of Europe losing its position in 
global competition.
The idea that the EU could be turned into an ideal type of knowledge-based 
economy culminated primarily in the launching of the so-called Lisbon Agenda 
at the EU Council Meeting in Lisbon in 2000. This summit on the Atlantic 
shore was a significant milestone in a process which had started already in 1993 
with the publication of the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Jobs 
issued by Jacques Delors as a response to the deepening employment crisis in 
Western Europe. The Lisbon meeting published a bold strategy which set for 
the EU the goal of becoming “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council 2000, 
5). Since the Lisbon meeting, this overall economic goal has been among the 
leading political priorities of the EU. It has effectively subsumed other EU 
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policies under its priorities and strategic aims. Indeed, the Lisbon Agenda and 
its follow-ups are predicated on the idea that a particular “European society” 
could be developed through the “European knowledge-based economy” (e.g. 
European Communities 2006).
Explicit instructions for organizing the European knowledge economy spa-
tially were enshrined already in the European Spatial Development Perspective 
document (ESDP) published by the Commission of European Communities 
in 1999 (CSD 1999). The document identified the European competitiveness 
problem as partially a consequence of Europe’s spatial disorder (Moisio 2011b, 
21) and presented a set of guidelines which resonate explicitly with the later 
outlines of the Lisbon Agenda. These concerned issues such as how to organize 
European space to make better use of the economic potential of all of the EU’s 
regions and how to guarantee parity of access to infrastructure and knowledge 
in different parts of Europe (CSD 1999, 20–30).
The alliance between the development of the EU as a regional knowledge-
based economy and the spatial ordering of the EU has been further confirmed 
in the Territorial Agenda of the European Union, which was prepared in 
2005–2006 and launched in 2007. The connections between the Territorial 
Agenda, the Lisbon Strategy and the ESDP are obvious since they all involved 
“regionalizing” policy priorities such as strengthening polycentric develop-
ment through networking of cities around European mega-regions, and 
promoting regional clusters of competition and innovation in Europe (EU 
Ministers Responsible for Urban and Spatial Development 2007). The Lisbon 
Strategy was later replaced by the Europe 2020 strategy, published in 2010 
(CEC 2010). This strategy further underscores the priorities of smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive regional growth, which have been notable catchwords 
in the process of knowledge-based economization. In so doing, the strategy 
discloses the efforts to make the EU the world’s leading knowledge-based 
economy. The same goal has been repeated numerous times in the follow-up 
documents (e.g. EU Ministers Responsible for Spatial Planning and Territorial 
Development 2011, 3).
All the above-mentioned political documents are premised on the geopo-
litical discourses of the knowledge-based economy. They articulate what kind 
of global position Europe and its populations are in, how they ought to be, 
where they ought to end up and what will happen if the chosen goal remains 
unattained (e.g. European Communities 2006, 19). In so doing, they expose 
one of the subtexts that the European policymakers ideally take into account 
when tailoring policies from the EU’s point of view.
The above broadens the conventional analysis of the territorial features of 
the EU typically undertaken by border scholars (for a debate, see Moisio et al. 
2013; Moisio and Luukkonen 2017). From the perspective of knowledge-
based economization, the EU territory can be understood as a processual entity 
which brings together geopolitical discourses of global competition, segments 
of the population of the EU as geopolitical subjects and practices which pro-
duce the EU and its regions in particular as geopolitical objects of competition. 
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I have examined with Juho Luukkonen the ways in which the idea and ideal 
of transforming the EU into a “world class knowledge economy” has since the 
1990s been envisioned and put into practice as a distinct territorializing strategy 
(see Luukkonen and Moisio 2016) which is geographically structured around 
regions in particular. In so doing, we have sought to demonstrate that the ter-
ritory of the EU should not be comprehended as a distinctive set of policies 
but rather as a constituent and effect of the contemporary economic strate-
gies which are implemented, analyzed and put in motion in professional net-
works within and beyond EU institutions. This perspective highlights the role 
of “expertize” (Kuus 2014) in imagining and implementing the connection 
between the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism and the EU’s territorial 
structure. This expertize is in operation in different EU projects and discloses 
the complex agency of “EU power” (Moisio 2011b).
For instance, the so-called European Spatial Planning Observation Network 
(ESPON) framework has launched a number of scientific projects that have 
tasked European academics with measuring and quantifying the strength of the 
EU’s knowledge-based economy in different corners of Europe. It can thus be 
understood as a concerted effort to produce European regions, networks, flows 
and spatial structures as calculable and comparable, and as if they represented 
the EU as a unitary space (Moisio and Luukkonen 2015). Another apt example 
is the European Regional Competitiveness Index (RCI) which was launched 
in 2010 by the European Commission to allow the European regions to moni-
tor their development and make comparisons with other regions. Thus, the 
users of the RCI “can see easily where their region stands in innovation, gov-
ernance, transport and digital infrastructure, and measures of health and human 
capital” (CEC 2017). The ESPON and the RCI thus disclose some of the 
ways in which the EU as a geopolitical unit of competition is constituted in 
calculative and objectifying social practices which render the EU thinkable in 
a particular spatial way.
The territorial construction of the EU-driven knowledge-
based economization: from regions to urban spaces?
The territorial constitution of the EU has been intense in numerous other 
EU-funded projects since the 1990s, and most of these operate within the 
discursive and material structures of knowledge-intensive capitalism. These 
projects almost invariably locate spatial question at the core of the envi-
sioned European knowledge-based economy. In this capacity, the projects 
on European regions and cities that have been initiated since the 1990s aptly 
uncover the coming together of the city, regions and the knowledge-based 
economy in the context of the EU’s notable efforts to put together an ostensi-
bly European system of economic value creation and related territory of wealth 
and power.
One may argue that since the 1990s the territorial construction of the 
EU has been based on privileging the regional scale over the urban scale, 
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in particular when it comes to political–economic development strategies. 
Harding (1997) pointed out in mid-1990s how the political processes of the 
EU revolved around “Europe of regions” while “a Europe of the cities” 
was almost entirely confined to academic debates. Perhaps one of the long-
term implications of such governing cities through regions is that the EU 
has launched only a limited number of projects that focus on the production 
of urban space and experience. Similarly, the EU-orchestrated discourses of 
the European knowledge-based economy have been predominantly region-
centered since the 1990s.
However, one may also argue that the regional strategies of the EU as a 
knowledge-intensive economic territory have highlighted the role of cities as 
the fundamental backbone of regions and their competitiveness. From this per-
spective, the urban-centered nature of the EU’s regional development policies 
is not new. Since the 1990s, the EU has launched a series of “regionalizing” 
urban programs and town-twinning initiatives in order to enhance political 
integration and the valorization of capital at the same time. These initiatives 
have sought to make the EU more visible in localities and in local, national 
and regional expert networks. But I would argue that these “region-projects” 
also disclose the ways in which knowledge-based economization has been con-
nected to cities in the context of the EU.
Indeed, most of the “city projects” of the EU operate through the discursive 
framings of the knowledge-based economy. One such example is the Urban 
Audit project, which was launched in 1997 by the European Commission 
and has continued up until recently under the auspices of Eurostat. From the 
beginning, the Urban Audit has been premised upon a need to compare cities 
and their spatial attributes at the European level. The earlier efforts to compare 
urban locations, and thus to bring these locations into the singular European 
spatial matrix, was, as one of the representatives of the European Commission 
stated in 2004, “fraught with problems due to differences in data collection 
methods and definitions” (Dijkstra 2004, 16). The Urban Audit was thus an 
attempt to solve these problems by generating a set of indicators that was based 
on primary data, aspects of urban life and urban space, from a number of large 
and medium-size cities primarily within the EU.
From the beginning, the Urban Audit was entangled with knowledge-based 
economization. It was a by-product of the policies of competitiveness that 
were officially articulated in the Lisbon Agenda in 2000. More precisely, the 
Urban Audit was predicated on conceiving urban space as a substance that can 
be fundamentally exploited for the needs of the EU-wide knowledge-intensive 
system of capital accumulation. Comparisons and related city statistics were 
generated at the level of the EU because an EU-wide urban network was 
comprehended as a resource, or indeed a prerequisite for the emergence of a 
new European economy:
The “Urban Audit” data collection provides information and comparable meas-
urements on the different aspects of the quality of urban life in European cities. 
150 City geopolitics
Improving the attractiveness of regions and cities is one of the priorities 
targeted by the renewed Lisbon Strategy and the EU’s strategic guidelines 
for cohesion policy for 2007–13. Quality of life is crucial in attracting 
and retaining a skilled labour force, businesses, students, tourists and, most 
of all, residents in a city. Assessing the current situation is a prerequisite 
for any improvement, development and future monitoring. The “Urban 
Audit” is a response to this demand for assessment.
(CEC 2014, emphasis in original)
The Urban Audit discloses the breakout of the discourse of the knowledge-
based economy in the 1990s as the primary growth and competitiveness strat-
egy at the level of the EU. But it also reveals the endurance of this discourse as 
a crucial political substance in the wider European project. As such, the Urban 
Audit represents a wider re-territorializing discourse which couples particular 
urban qualities, urban problems and segments of population (particularly the 
highly educated) as strategic nodes in the genesis of the EU as the world’s 
most competitive knowledge-based economy. A representative of the EU 
Commission states this revealingly:
The role of cities in reaching this goal is critical. Innovative knowledge-
based firms tend to settle in cities and urban areas. Cities are major centres 
of employment, providing jobs for its residents as well as many commuters 
from the surrounding areas. However, cities often have important pockets 
of deprivation. These deprived urban neighbourhoods can be improved 
by reducing and preventing problems related to social exclusion, drugs and 
crime. Tackling these issues is necessary not only to create a more cohesive 
Europe, but also to make cities a better place to live and more attractive 
to investors.
(Dijkstra 2004, 16)
Another example of the EU-funded urban projects has been structured around 
the fashionable planning idea of the smart city. A considerable amount of 
the recent EU territory work has been clustered around the European Smart 
Cities Initiative which covers a broad range of issues ranging from transport 
infrastructures and soft infrastructures of innovation to digitalization and smart 
buildings. This initiative nicely uncovers the ways in which the attempt to 
produce the EU as a knowledge-based economy includes notable efforts to 
engender “smartmentality” (Vanolo 2014) at the scale of Europe and through 
European cities.
The imaginary of the knowledge-based economy almost invariably articu-
lates certain substances of urban space as prerequisites for creative and thus 
putatively innovative human behavior. One of the key characteristics of this 
discourse has been the linking of cultural diversity with spaces of innovation 
potential and urban creativity, and translating this coupling into knowledge 
production. To illustrate, the Intercultural Cities project, jointly initiated by 
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the European Commission and the Council of Europe, operates inherently on 
the basis of such understanding:
Cities can gain enormously from the entrepreneurship, variety of skills 
and creativity associated with cultural diversity, provided they adopt poli-
cies and practices that facilitate intercultural interaction and inclusion. The 
Intercultural Cities programme supports cities in reviewing their policies 
through an intercultural lens and developing comprehensive intercultural 
strategies to help them manage diversity positively and realize the diversity 
advantage. The programme proposes a set of analytical and practical tools 
to help local stakeholders through the various stages of the process.
(Council of Europe, 2014)
The Intercultural Cities project is structured around a discursive formation 
which brings together growth, characteristics of urban space, innovation and a 
particular breed of human capacity. The key aspects of the project boil down 
to the purportedly central role of “diversity” in the so-called creative city 
discourse whereby urban cultural diversity is perceived as an economic asset 
which fosters dynamism, innovation capacity, creativity and economic growth.
The Intercultural Cities project involves developing indices through which 
interculturality in a given European city can be measured and acted on in evi-
dence-based policies. The Intercultural Cities Index is produced as a tool to rank 
cities within the EU and beyond according to their measured “intercultural 
performance”. The Intercultural Cities Index reduces the mosaic of “cultures” to 
a governable sphere which is then articulated as a key domain of a concerted 
political project of the EU as a knowledge-based economy. The formation 
of scoreboards and charts conducted within the Intercultural Cities project is 
therefore not only a technical exercise. It rather presents difference and diver-
sity management as pivotal political aspects of European territorial construc-
tion and the knowledge-intensive mode of accumulation. In this capacity, the 
Intercultural Cities project, together with many other similar projects, epito-
mizes that EU-funded projects have a proclivity to generate systems of com-
parison through which “knowledge-intensive” territorial developments within 
the EU can be represented and talked upon.
The urban focus has gradually strengthened in EU development policy-
making since the economic crisis in 2008. The political elites of the EU have 
increasingly highlighted the role of cities as crucial sites in terms of innovation-
led production and entrepreneurial development, and not just in terms of con-
sumption. It would be tempting to argue that the change in perspective stems 
from the pervasive geopolitical discourses of knowledge-based economization 
in which cities appear as the key places of capital accumulation and geopoliti-
cal construction of competitive advantages. The gradual change toward more 
urban agenda in EU policy may also indicate the relative strengthening of the 
“European innovation right” which is primarily concerned with the city and 
the urban as a place of surplus value creation.
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The most explicit manifestation of the gradually developing explicit urban 
rather than regionalizing focus of the EU-centered knowledge-based econo-
mization is the Urban Agenda (2014). It was launched only relatively recently 
after a CITIES forum organized by the EU Commission, the Commission’s 
own Cities of Tomorrow project, and debates within the member states and 
beyond. This document highlights the need for a common EU urban policy, 
and denotes the increasing aspirations of the Commission’s Directorate General 
for Regional and Urban Policy (until 2012 only regional policy was mentioned 
in its name) to produce an ideal European city model. The Commission indeed 
argues in the Urban Strategy that “in terms of aims, objectives and values, there 
already is an explicit agreement at the European level on the character of the 
European city of the future and the principles on which an ideal European city 
should be based” (CEC 2014, 6). It is illuminating to see that the list of policies 
which the Commission argues “explicitly target urban areas” is inextricably 
related to the process of knowledge-based economization that has been the 
topic of this chapter. The Commission lists the following EU policies:
Energy, Information Society, Environment, Climate Action, Education 
and Culture, Transport, etc. support initiatives such as European Capital of 
Culture, Smart Cities and Communities European Innovation Partnership, 
Green Capital Award, Covenant of Mayors and Mayors Adapt.
(CEC 2014, 7)
In this book, I have elaborated the geopolitics of what is customarily called 
the knowledge-based economy, the knowledge economy, the information 
economy or even the new economy. This is a vast phenomenon, and I have 
chosen to focus on a specific aspect of it. A number of other connected issues 
could have been explored. Among these are, for example, the re-spatialization 
of the state in the discursive practices of “cyber security”, the strategic use of 
“smart technologies” by national (Rodríguez-Bolívar 2018) and local govern-
ments (see e.g. Carrillo et al. 2014), and the gendered aspects of knowledge-
based economization.
My analysis in the previous chapters has been premised on a view that the 
concept of the geopolitical is eventually about the production of territories of 
wealth and power. This production may take the form of territorial expan-
sion, territorial contest, and war over geographical space. The twentieth cen-
tury witnessed the centrality of such geopolitical contestation, and the more 
recent history indicates that this kind of Hobbesian geopolitics has not ceased 
to be important. I have however stressed that the geopolitical world of knowl-
edge-based economization is also about producing territories of wealth and 
power, albeit with different spatial strategies (for these, see e.g. Thurow 1999). 
Chapter 2 thus elaborated the knowledge-based economy both as a capitalist 
social formation and an inescapably discursive political process which structures 
socio-spatial practices, related political decision-making and different kinds of 
strategy work across multiple scales and sites.
A major goal of the book has been to challenge the view that geopoli-
tics belongs to the old twentieth-century world of territorial enmities, natural 
resources and the spatial consolidation of the nation state, as well as the view 
that it is not present or relevant in the contemporary knowledge-intensive 
capitalist development and its spaces of flows. This book is thus an effort to 
conceptualize the strategic and political nature of mastering space in the con-
text of the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism. The point of departure has 
been the idea that the contemporary capitalism too encloses geopolitics which 
differs from the one we customarily associate with the concept.
In my perspective, the concept of the geopolitical refers to the production 
of territories of wealth, power, security and belonging, as well as to related 
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social practices which are premised on ideas about how to best facilitate such 
production through mastering of space and population. I have developed 
the concept of knowledge-based economization as a process productive of a 
specific kind of spatial organization and related geopolitical subjects, that is, 
a historically contingent economic territory. Specific political forces seek to 
build a “new economy” which is based on innovations, high value, selec-
tive urban spaces and highly skilled “global entrepreneurs”. This process is 
strategic in a dual sense. First, it is strategic in the sense of facilitating the 
circulation of capital in the contemporary historical conjuncture. Second, it 
is strategic in the sense of producing political territories of competition. In 
such a process, new geopolitical spaces and subjectivities are imagined and 
constructed, and new objectifying social practices are also tailored. In con-
trast to suggestions that globalization renders space and territory irrelevant, 
the concept of knowledge-based economization highlights the profoundly 
geopolitical nature of capitalist developments that have taken shape since the 
1990s in particular.
Knowledge-based economization cannot be understood without its geopo-
litical element, its strategic spatial production which brings together political 
space, human subjects and capitalist valorization. Knowledge-based economi-
zation also transforms how politics and the political are understood. It entails 
what Michael Callon (1998) has called the technicalization of politics which 
emphasizes the growing importance of scientific and economic rationality, and 
the associated importance of expert knowledge in policymaking. I have sug-
gested in the previous chapters that the 1990s and early 2000s mark the birth of 
a new body of academic work which is a constitutive element of knowledge-
based economization. I have analyzed the ways in which the ideational frame-
works generated by well-known academic figures such as Manuel Castells, 
Richard Florida and Michael Porter can be considered as disclosing some of 
the geopolitical elements of knowledge-based economization.
My point has not been to ask whether the academic theories of Castells, 
Florida and Porter hold water in terms of their capacity to explain patterns of 
migration, economic development, inter-spatial competition, the success of 
political communities or something else. It would, of course, not be difficult 
to argue that theories like the creative class are analytically flawed because they 
treat cities as unitary entities and homogenous actors who compete against 
each other, win or lose, succeed or fail as a result of policymaking (see Marcuse 
2005). It would also be legitimate to claim that the policies that derive from 
ideas such as the creative class represent hegemonic projects which are “mobi-
lized by politico-economic elites who are appropriating the socio-affective 
externalities of urban environments” (Rossi 2017, 74). These critiques are 
undoubtedly relevant. This notwithstanding, I have desired to highlight the 
ways in which the theory of the creative class, for example, frames the contem-
porary capitalist condition geopolitically, as a matter of territorial attractiveness 
and survival of political communities as territories of wealth in a world of flows 
and heightening inter-spatial competition in general. From my perspective, 
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the theory of the creative class is a member of a wider family of ideas playing a 
constitutive role in the process of knowledge-based economization.
Table 8.1 summarizes the key features of the geopolitics of the knowl-
edge-based economy vis-à-vis the geopolitics of territorial consolidation and 
control that characterized most of the twentieth century. I will discuss these 
Table 8.1 Some features of the geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy
Geopolitics of territorial 
condensation and control
Geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy
Ideologies Nationalism, conservatism Economic nationalism, liberalism
State strategies Social and spatial 
homogenization




Strategies of territorial 
management and 
sovereignty
Strategies of leadership, management, 
economic growth and 
competitiveness




Managing the topological space 




state success and 
strength




Competitiveness indices, creativity 
indices, innovativeness indices, 











Nation state Mega-regions, city-regionalism, hubs 





the potentiality of 
territorial enmities
Porterian-Floridean, the constitutive 






Tangible resources Intangible assets
Targeted 
citizenship
Loyal national figure Global entrepreneur
Nodal spatial 
strategies







Globally competitive universities and 
related innovation centers 
Nature of the state 
apparatus
Condensation of forces 
around national 
spatial fix
Diversification and transnationalization 
of state apparatuses; growing role of 
economizing Ministries, the ECB 
and related bodies; increasing power 
of business associations and firms to 
operate through the state 
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features through four and partly overlapping themes that merit further schol-
arly attention: the spatiality of knowledge-based economization; knowledge-
based economization and the state; the relationship between neoliberalism and 
knowledge-based economization; and the emergence of socio-spatial divisions 
and hierarchies in the context of knowledge-based economization.
Spatiality of the process of knowledge-based economization
The processes that I have designated here as knowledge-based economization 
were underway prior to the early 1990s. In the 1980s, they took the form of 
national technology initiatives and programs in the OECD states. Yet, I have 
endeavored to highlight that knowledge-based economization took an increas-
ingly geopolitical form in the early 1990s, an epoch characterized by the deep-
ening crisis of Atlantic Fordism and the associated gradual dismantling of late 
Keynesian political structures. This involved re-imagining the nation state as a 
new kind of economic territory engaged in competition with other economic 
territories. With the notion of economic territory I have striven to highlight 
that knowledge-based economization has entailed new kinds of “national” 
economic imaginaries as well as urban visions and projects. It has proceeded as 
a spatial-strategic process manifest in locally orchestrated and spatially selective 
development visions and urban and regional projects. Again, this process has 
been most visible within the OECD sphere, but has not been confined to this 
context only.
If the Keynesian issue of social and spatial homogenization was still vis-
ible in the 1990s in some states which sought to generate innovation-driven 
growth, the contemporary knowledge-based economization is increasingly 
premised on a selective “opening” of the state in the name of both globali-
zation and innovation (Moisio and Belina 2017). This raises the issue of the 
nature of knowledge-based economization with regard to what geographers 
customarily conceptualize as the distinction between relational and territorial 
spaces. If territorial geopolitics denotes topographical control and management 
of state space, knowledge-based economization is often taken to refer to spa-
tial processes that seek to build strategic connections between the state and 
the “topological” space of “global” value chains. The Porterian and Floridean 
geopolitical rationalities are geared at producing this kind of an economic 
territory. In these texts, inter-state competition is not only represented in a 
new manner but is calculated through different kinds of indices measuring 
competitiveness, creativity, openness, innovativeness and so on. These indices 
“objectify” states, cities and regions as if they were units of global competition 
(for the disciplinary function of indices, see Kangas 2017). Such objectifying 
calculative practices produce the global as a meaningful political–economic 
territory or scale of competition (cf. Elden 2005; Larner and Le Heron 2002).
Knowledge-based economization is a process which transcends the 
 territorial-relational dualism. It proceeds through the dynamics of re- and de-
territorialization. In so doing, it highlights the overlapping spatial logics and 
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processes of the contemporary capitalist condition and the related transnation-
alization of the state apparatus. In Chapter 6, I have interrogated the coming 
together of de- and re-territorialization in the context of institutions of higher 
education. These institutions can be regarded as being assembled geopolitically 
as units of competition in the process of knowledge-based economization. 
Furthermore, I sought to demonstrate that the construction of new kinds of 
state-orchestrated learning spaces is expected to produce novel transnational 
geopolitical subjects – a new generation of capitalist laborers with conducive 
minds and competences that meet the demands of the time. The geopolitics of 
the knowledge-based economy thus entails a state-orchestrated production of 
new professional citizen-subjects for the purposes of global knowledge-inten-
sive capitalism.
Moreover, in the geopolitical imaginaries of urban economics the role of 
large cities and city-regions in the production of nation states as territories 
of wealth is highlighted (see, e.g. Glaeser 2012). Knowledge-based economi-
zation, as it unfolds today, is partly constituted through an emphasis on the 
role of metropolitan areas as epicenters of “national” productivity, innova-
tion, prosperity, wealth and competitiveness. As a consequence, rural areas 
and smaller urban centers have been difficult to incorporate in policymaking, 
which takes its inspiration from the idea of innovation-led growth.
The transformation of urban politics in the age of knowledge-based econo-
mization is a notable scholarly issue that merits further scholarly attention. 
Knowledge-based economization, in its neoliberal form in particular, marks 
the generation of urban infrastructures as framework conditions for successfully 
defending national and local interests in the conceived global innovation game. 
One of the consequences is that the model of an innovative city becomes a 
powerful template that can be applied for regulating the entire state space. 
Exemplifying this process, most of the OECD states have launched urban strat-
egies to retain or effect a link between creative economies, human capital and 
the state as a territory of wealth. Knowledge-based economization thus frames 
both the city and the urban in terms of their innovation capacities which in 
turn can be nurtured through urban amenities and more general cultural quali-
ties of urban spaces.
Some reflections on the role of the state in 
knowledge-based economization
According to twentieth-century classical geopolitics, the territory of the state is 
understood as providing both “physical advantages” and setting possible limita-
tions or material constraints on inter-state competition. Geopolitical struggle 
at the world scale revolves around attempts to control the distribution of natu-
ral and other material resources for the benefit of a territorially consolidating 
nation state. In territorial geopolitics, therefore, the government of the state 
is a crucial actor whose deeds are shaped by the state’s geographical features 
and associated position in the capitalist world economy. By way of contrast, in 
158 Coda
knowledge-based economization the generation and utilization of technologi-
cal, business and design innovations are pivotal constituents of the state as a 
territory of wealth, and determinants of its particular “location” in the global 
hierarchy of states.
Knowledge-based economization re-articulates the nature of inter-state 
competition and downplays the importance of the state as a bounded piece 
of land or physical territory. With respect to achieving success as a nation 
state, political virtues rather revolve around the capacity to re-work the state 
as an economic territory which is connected to the flows and streams of tal-
ent, money and ideas. In consequence, knowledge-based economization is 
premised on spatial selectivity rather than territorial maintenance, which aims 
at unifying state spaces through public investments.
The geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy is predicated on flow and 
network-articulations which highlight major cities not only as crucial circula-
tory infrastructures of contemporary capitalism but also as geographical sites 
within which the competitive advantages of nations are produced. Indeed, 
states play a key role in re-constructing urban spaces so as to meet the require-
ments for attracting and developing activities that belong to the upper tiers of 
value creation. Rather than “‘freeing’ of cities from containerization imposed 
by states” (Taylor 2004, 200), knowledge-based economization re-positions 
the city and even micro-scale urban fabrics vis-à-vis the conceived world polit-
ical condition and the state’s role therein. These attempts of re-positioning 
have been associated with twin developments. On the one hand, the spatial 
and symbolic structures of the state have been re-worked through cities. On 
the other hand, the symbolic, moral and ethical dimensions of national identi-
ties of given states have been reformulated, thus targeting nation-state citizens 
in the realm of their “being and subjectivity” (Ong 2006) by virtue of the 
constant attempts to enhance the national competitive advantage.
It must be highlighted that knowledge-based economization does not refer 
only to economic leverage but also to an active construction of institutional 
capacity. It is not least because of this issue that excavating the role of the 
state in the process of knowledge-based economization merits further study. 
Knowledge-based economization proceeds through what James Scott (1998) 
famously called state-led social engineering, and through related and increas-
ingly transnational policy circuits. These circuits are mobilized by different 
kinds of actors ranging from international consultant companies to state and 
local authorities. These actors operate through different institutional capacities 
but are bound together in their efforts to produce innovation-led growth and 
economic value.
Neoliberalism and knowledge-based economization
Since the early 1990s, the process of knowledge-based economization has qual-
itatively changed. A gradual shift from the late Keynesian policies of technopo-
litization toward increasing neoliberalization has taken place. State apparatuses 
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have been increasingly transnationalized and coupled with a normative artic-
ulation according to which economic “strength” – understood as the main 
issue behind the success of political communities today as well as in the future 
– is dependent on the capacity of business firms to attract and produce win-
ners and innovate. Talented individuals, business firms and private investors 
are subjectified primarily as risk-takers and creative forces. Representatives of 
the public, in turn, are responsibilized to align themselves with the former. 
Accordingly, the role of the public sector in promoting innovation-led devel-
opment has been actively dismissed since the early 2000s. The contemporary 
knowledge-based economization, thus, highlights the role of the private sector 
in determining the level of development among political communities. This 
has unfolded irrespective of continuous public investments in the very basis of 
the economy of innovations (cf. Mazzucato 2013).
In this book, I have also shown that one geopolitical outcome of knowl-
edge-based economization is a heightened emphasis on new economic spaces, 
start-up ecosystems and super-talented individuals in the overall social and 
political developments of states. This resonates with the key characteristics 
of the neoliberal project. Obviously, neoliberalization and knowledge-based 
economization are intertwined and strongly co-constituted, both in terms of 
their geopolitical and biopolitical features. Indeed, some scholars have explic-
itly linked the “language of innovation” with neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 
2002). Even though this link is not straightforward, the contemporary form 
of knowledge-based economization is clearly premised on a neoliberal view 
of the world, one which increasingly dominates the overall societal discourse. 
Similarly to neoliberalization, the processes of knowledge-based economiza-
tion are often re-cast as non-ideological and non-political economic problems 
that necessitate meticulous “innovative” and “technical” solutions. This results 
in policymaking which revolves around scientific and economic rationality 
and unwavering belief in the potential of technological development, as exem-
plified by the mantra of digitalization, for example. Indeed, what lies at the 
heart of the geopolitics of the knowledge-based economy is a strong belief in 
economic and societal progress, which is taken to occur through the coming 
together of science, rationality, markets, large-scale urbanization, “global men-
tality” and technology. As to the state, it is expected to exert its power in order 
to foster and cultivate this meeting, and to act as a facilitator of knowledge-
intensive economic development – both socially and spatially – but otherwise 
is expected to accept limited public authority and leave the field of knowledge-
intensive development to private actors (cf. Raco 2013). In the contemporary 
form of knowledge-based economization, the state is thus charged with step-
ping aside and setting the field for market functions and private actors. But at 
the same time, the state is activated to create a globally relevant business atmos-
phere that includes a political culture of competition and creativity within its 
territorial jurisdictions (see Ahlqvist and Moisio 2014, 31).
Moreover, the contemporary neoliberal form of knowledge-based econo-
mization presumes that the state can facilitate private-sector-led innovations 
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primarily through subsidies, tax reductions and other means that increase 
the attractiveness of the economic territory of the state. For example, the 
Netherlands offers significant tax cuts to foreign “innovators”. The French 
government, in turn, has launched a start-up visa program in order to kick-
start its start-up economy with the help of a foreign talent pool. Indeed, the 
incorporation of foreign skilled labor recruitment into state territorial strategies 
is one important geopolitical dimension of knowledge-based economization.
Both knowledge-based economization and neoliberalization thus highlight 
the issue of the entrepreneurialization of society and the self. Similarly to neo-
liberalization, in knowledge-based economization individuals and populations 
are taken up as economic resources with potentials that can be cultivated, 
mobilized and harnessed for profit making. Knowledge-based economization 
in its current form thus seeks to produce neoliberal subjects who apprehend 
themselves in an entrepreneurial, market-oriented and “post-national” manner, 
and who responsibilize themselves as creative and innovative economic agents. 
But what the literature on neoliberalism often leaves largely unaddressed is 
the fact that knowledge-based economization also highlights the co-consti-
tution of the de-territorializing and globalizing of political geopolitical spaces 
(such as urban infrastructures and learning environments of higher education) 
and entrepreneurial social development as a territorial survival strategy of the 
nation state. Whether such an emphasis has implications with respect to the 
ways in which inter-state relations are organized is another matter entirely. But 
it seems obvious that because knowledge-based economization plays down the 
link between the state’s physical territory and its political survival as a territory 
of wealth, it adds a new component to the ways in which inter-state com-
petition and conflict are traditionally conceived in a geopolitical perspective. 
Be it as it may, the centrality of the discourses of territorial competition and 
competitiveness in knowledge-based economization signal a close relationship 
to neoliberalism. Neoliberalism and knowledge-based economization thus are 
in a productive interaction with each other (for a useful discussion on neolib-
eralization, see Brenner et al. 2010); both designate a specific way of securing, 
enhancing and accelerating capital accumulation.
However, the relationship between the knowledge-based economization 
and neoliberalism is not straightforward. Peters (2009) stresses that not all of 
the key ideas of the knowledge-based economy are based on the tenets of 
neoliberalism. Jessop (2002) has made a distinction between the neoliberal, 
neo-statist, neo-communitarian and neo-corporatist ways of promoting the 
knowledge-intensive form of capitalism. Mazzucato’s (2013) recent examina-
tion of the role of the state in knowledge-intensive capitalism for instance 
exemplifies the evolving dispute on the appropriate ways of promoting the 
economy of innovations. Mazzucato (2013) seeks to promote innovation-led 
growth in a more inclusive manner than is currently the case. She provides 
an analysis of the undermined role of the state in the economy of innovations 
and points out that, contrary to the suggestions of neoliberal proponents of 
innovation-led growth, it has often been the state that has made the initial, 
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absolutely crucial high-risk investments, the fruit of which business firms have 
later exploited. She underscores the collective character of innovations, pro-
poses a Keynesian model of innovation-driven growth and calls for the need to 
end the large-scale privatization of profits which are generated partly through 
public investments. As such, her work demonstrates one of the ways in which 
the contemporary neoliberal mode of knowledge-based economization might 
become politically contested. The ways in which the Keynesian form of 
knowledge-based economization might challenge and alter the geopolitical 
features of contemporary knowledge-based economization nonetheless remain 
unclear in such otherwise notable academic interventions.
Toward a socio-spatial polarization?
The contemporary attempts to produce the state as a territory of wealth under-
score the important role of a particular faction of population as well as the qual-
ities of urban spaces in determining success in the global innovation game. The 
ways in which human capabilities and orientations are today valued in knowl-
edge-based economization disclose clear connections with neoliberal dogma. 
Knowledge-based economization is about governing “living resources”, and it 
gives and denies value to particular human conducts and human mentalities. 
In so doing, it involves defining valuable geopolitical subjects. As I have dem-
onstrated through a reading of Manuel Castells’ (1996) theory of the network 
society and Richard Florida’s (2004) theory of the creative class, knowledge-
based economization places a relatively narrow faction of population in the 
driver’s seat of societal development. In other words, knowledge-based econo-
mization is not only characterized by the financial and political success of its 
“happy subjects” but also by its capacity to abandon certain populations and 
to situate them outside political normativity. Simultaneously, it is clear that as 
living resources the pivotal population factions, whether they are called crea-
tives or something else, do not form a unitary group of people with a shared 
political identity or a similar economic status. It is not least for this reason that 
it would also be worthwhile to examine how knowledge-based economization 
is linked to democracy and socio-spatial-economic inequality – both crucial 
factors from the perspective of state transformation.
The potentiality of the knowledge-intensive form of capitalism to increase 
socio-spatial differentiation and uneven development has been recognized by 
some of the key geopolitical writers of the knowledge-intensive form of capi-
talism. Richard Florida (cited in Schell 2014), for instance, argues how
I think I’ve been very unfairly criticized for not dealing with socioeco-
nomic inequality. I think I’ve been one of the first urbanists, modern 
urbanists, empirical urbanists, to point to socioeconomic inequality. I said 
it was a direct outgrowth of the clustering of knowledge and creative 
workers, and their competition. In Rise of the Creative Class, I said that 
place would become the arena for class conflict in modern capitalism, and 
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I think I didn’t quite know how that would play out. I cautioned city 
leaders and the creative class to be well aware over that contestation over 
space.
The interconnections between the contemporary form of knowledge-based 
economization and uneven geographical development require further schol-
arly attention. As Neil Smith (2005, 895) argues, socially divided societies 
reproduce their forms of social differentiation in geographical space and, by 
corollary, centrally produced hierarchic geographies reaffirm and reproduce 
social differences. The obvious socio-spatial unevenness inherent in the con-
temporary processes of knowledge-based economization inescapably has polit-
ical implications which touch upon issues of socio-spatial justice, and which 
might manifest themselves in what Painter (2006) calls the prosaic geographies 
of stateness.
It is important in this context to re-think the means through which spatial 
justice can be engendered through public policies, and the ways in which poli-
cies are constrained by the current form of knowledge-based economization. 
This issue is pertinent not only in the context of states but also in the context 
of supranational political actors such as the EU. The Lisbon Strategy (2000) 
and the associated “knowledge-based economy talk” still dominate the so-
called cohesion policies of the EU. Regions and cities are constantly encour-
aged to apply for EU funding in order to develop the territorial cohesion of 
the EU. But they are simultaneously forced to react to the tens of indices and 
metrics that have been developed after the launching of the Lisbon Agenda in 
order to measure the implementation of the Agenda and in order to develop 
the evidence-based policies of the EU (Moisio and Luukkonen 2015). This 
agenda, together with the recent proxy agenda of “smart specialization” (high-
lighting “smart growth” and “endogenous growth”), fundamentally structures 
and constrains the ways in which spatial policies can be imagined and practiced 
in the European countryside and in small and medium-sized cities and regions. 
It is clear that the Lisbon Agenda-driven regional policies of the EU favor 
major urban concentrations over smaller cities and their hinterlands – at a risk 
of furthering socio-spatial polarization in Europe. This is in stark contrast with 
the recent Urban Agenda of the EU which states that “small and medium-sized 
cities … form the backbone of Europe’s territory and have an important role to 
play for territorial development and cohesion” (CEC 2014, 4).
Finally, the vulnerabilities of life and places as the processes of knowledge-
based economization proceed will be pressing concerns in different corners of 
the OECD world and beyond. New social divisions, possible policy failures, 
the presence of symbolic violence, tensions, contradictions, crisis tendencies, 
conflicts over urban space and issues of socio-spatial inequality and uneven 
development are all crucial geopolitical issues of knowledge-based economi-
zation. Identifying and analyzing particular “cracks” inherent in the process 
of knowledge-based economization is an inviting challenge for scholarship 
and political action. An analysis of these cracks may increase the possibility of 
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directing knowledge-based economization toward alternative projects which 
move it toward more progressive and inclusive forms that could de-stabilize 
the contemporary geopolitical discourses of inter-territorial competition and 
competitiveness. Developing new forms of knowledge-based economization 
would also require re-thinking the relationship between business firms and the 
public. It is not impossible that in the future knowledge-based economization 
might take a form that is more inclusive than its contemporary manifesta-
tions, and that its geopolitical constitution will be different compared to the 
current ones.
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